

Evaluation of Capacity Development in Danish Development Assistance

Annex D: Desk-based Review Report

November 2015

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1 Introduction

Background

Following the Portfolio Screening, 17 of the 30 Danida interventions were selected based on the evaluation team's assessment on the capacity development (CD) content for the more detailed Desk-based Review (DBR), see Portfolio Screening Note Annex C of the Main Evaluation Report. For three of the selected interventions it was found that adequate information was not available and those three were therefore not included in the DBR. Subsequently, reviews were conducted for 14 interventions. The reviews consisted of a Scorecard assessment (see Appendix A of the present report) and a more qualitative assessment of each intervention, the findings of which are recorded in a two-page report.¹ The narrative reports are structured according to the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The purpose of the review is to collect consistent information across interventions and donors (Norad, Sida and Danida) to be able to compare the characteristics of the interventions. Therefore, it has been emphasized from the outset not to deviate from the scorecard instructions as developed by the Sida evaluation team. The scorecard comprises assessments of: planning of the intervention; design of the intervention; implementation of the intervention and monitoring and evaluation of the intervention. The resulting sample of the 14 Danida interventions for the DBR is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Sample for the Desk Based Review (DKK)

Country	Programme/ project title	Sector	Total grant	Disbursed	Year
Bangladesh	Community Development Centre (CODEC)	Government & civil society	129.000.000	96.208.721	2007-2012
Bangladesh	Agriculture Sector Programme Support, Phase II (ASPS II)	Agriculture & fishing	531.000.000	519.217.008	2006-2013
Indonesia	Environmental Support Programme Phase 2 (ESP2)	Environment	220.000.000	218.429.142	2008-2012
Mozambique	General Budget Support (GBS) Programme	General budget support	370.000.000	281.179.586	2010-2014
Mozambique	Support to Public Sector Reform and Statistics, Phase II	Government & civil society	100.000.000	99.993.632	2008-2012
Nepal	Human Rights and Good Governance Program, Phase III (HRGG III)	Government & civil society	170.000.000	169.236.589	2009-2013
Nepal	School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP)	Education	220.000.000	218.776.856	2009-2012
Nepal	Energy Sector Assistance Programme, Phase 2 (ESAP II)	Energy generation & supply	150.000.000	146.362.626	2007-2012
Tanzania	Health Sector Programme Support, Tanzania, Phase IV (HSPS IV)	Health	910.000.000	809.950.246	2009-2014
Tanzania	Business Sector Programme Support - Phase III (BSPS III)	Business & other services	550.000.000	435.263.262	2008-2014
Uganda	Anti-Corruption Programme, Phase II (ACP II)	Government & civil society	47.580.000	44.741.177	2008-2011
Uganda	U-Growth Programme (UGP)	Agriculture and transport	440.000.000	393.042.434	2010-2013
Vietnam	Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate System	Government & civil society	15.000.000	14.002.117	2006-2014
Vietnam	Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation (CCAM)	Climate	200.000.000	125.722.723	2009-2015

¹ The Terms of Reference, Annex 2 state (p. 3) that narrative description should as a maximum be a two-page report. The narrative description for sector programmes with two or more components has in some cases been expanded to cover all components.

All of the 14 selected interventions for the DBR are sector programmes. Generally, capacity development is integrated in the programme components, but a few programmes have specific CD components. In those cases priority has been given to programme components that emphasised capacity development, but the entire sector programme has been assessed in order to relate CD to the overall programme context. In accordance with the Scorecard guidance, the reviews have concentrated on the latest completed phase, but with some backward links to the previous phase(s). The reviews have been dependent on the availability of documentation.

Limitations

Despite effective assistance from EVAL it proved difficult to get access to all relevant documentation. The evaluation team contacted all the embassies for supplementing documents several times but for three of the interventions without any luck. The aim of the ToR was to have 15 interventions, and thus it was foreseen that a few of the interventions would be abandoned for whatever reasons.

The Scorecard assessment was very time consuming and most of the Danida interventions included several components (one intervention had as many as 10 components). This complicated the assessment since the format did not allow for more than one 'unit'. The scoring was supplemented with a description of the 'evidence', which allowed for a specification of which components were being assessed. In principle this was a functional feature of the Scorecard but it seemed to overlap with the two-page narrative report. Also, some of the indicators of the Scorecard asked for a narrative explanation, which could have been avoided and instead captured in the two-page report. While the Scorecard generated useful information for the Evaluation, a more optimal design could have improved its use.

2 Findings from the Scorecard

This section contains an overview of findings extracted from the Scorecard with a focus on selected variables within design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the interventions and an analysis of meta-level trends and correlations between selected variables. The variables are numbered according to the scorecard and not all variables are included here, and thus the variables are not chronologically presented in the following.

Variable 7: Content of the intervention

The parameters in Variable 7 indicate the extent to which the Danida supported interventions' contents have been aligned to: findings from preparatory studies; the national strategy; the recipient institution's demand for institutional development; and recommendation from evaluations. The evaluation team's ratings are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Content of the intervention

Variable 7.1 Content of programme design reflects findings from preparatory studies		Variable 7.2 National strategy of relevance for the intervention		Variable 7.3 Institutional development aligned to the recipient institution		Variable 7.4 Recommendations from evaluation	
1. Very strong	1	1. Very strong	2	1. Very strong	0	1. Very strong	1
2. Strong	5	2. Strong	10	2. Strong	6	2. Strong	4
3. Medium	5	3. Medium	1	3. Medium	3	3. Medium	2
4. Weak	2	4. Weak	0	4. Weak	2	4. Weak	1
5. Very weak	0	5. Very weak	0	5. Very weak	0	5. Very weak	0
6. No alignment	0	6. No alignment	0	6. No alignment	2	6. No alignment	0
7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	6

The interventions have been: well aligned to findings from preparatory studies; strongly aligned to national strategies; and well aligned to the recipient institutions demand for institutional development. Not all interventions have been subject to evaluations, which explains the high number of interventions with 'insufficient data'.

Variable 8: Adaptation to context

The parameters in Variable 8 indicate the extent to which the Danida supported interventions' have been adapted to the context: political and policy; social and cultural; legal framework; needs and capacity of the recipient institution; and physical and natural environment. The evaluation team's ratings are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Adaptation to context

Variable 8.1 Political and Policy Context		Variable 8.2 Social and Cultural Factors		Variable 8.3 Legal Framework		Variable 8.4 Needs and capacity of recipient institution	
1. Very strong	1	1. Very strong	1	1. Very strong	1	1. Very strong	1
2. Strong	5	2. Strong	7	2. Strong	5	2. Strong	3
3. Medium	8	3. Medium	5	3. Medium	6	3. Medium	6
4. Weak	0	4. Weak	0	4. Weak	0	4. Weak	2
5. Very weak	0	5. Very weak	0	5. Very weak	0	5. Very weak	1
6. Not adapted	0	6. Not adapted	0	6. Not adapted	0	6. Not adapted	0
7. Insufficient data	0	7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	2	7. Insufficient data	1

According to the review, the interventions have been well fitted to their respective contexts. The scores fall within medium, strong or very strong adaptation to the context. Thus, the political

context, the legal framework, social and cultural factors and the physical and natural environment are to a large degree taken into consideration in the interventions.

However, as to the “needs and capacity of recipient institution” this picture is more spread. Three of the interventions are considered to be weakly or very weakly adapted to the needs of the recipient institutions. The majority of interventions are assessed as taking the recipient institutions’ capacity and needs into medium consideration, three are considered strong and one very strong. The review shows a trend to have rather complex programmes and thus requirements to recipient institutions’ capacity to manage the programmes are correspondingly demanding. Therefore, it is problematic that recipient institution’s capacity is only averagely taken into account – the review shows that especially lack of management capacity is limiting project/program results in some of the interventions (e.g. “Programme on strengthening the comprehensive capacity of the inspectorate sector to the year 2014” in Vietnam and the “Anti-Corruption Programme” in Uganda).

Only one of the Danida supported interventions falls within the ‘environment sector’. Six other interventions have strong links to the environment, whereas the remaining have no or limited links to the environment – for which reason the rating ‘insufficient data’ is relatively high.

Table 3 continued

Variable 8.5 Physical and natural environment	
1. Very strong	1
2. Strong	3
3. Medium	4
4. Weak	0
5. Very weak	0
6. Not adapted	0
7. Insufficient data	6

Variable 9: Targeting of external actors

In terms of targeting stakeholders external to the recipient institution(s), the review shows that 12 out of 14 interventions do target external stakeholders. External stakeholders include CSOs, CBOs, local governments and the private sector. The purpose of the indicator is to gain insight into a potential “pull approach” applied by the intervention. The evaluation team’s ratings are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: External actors

Variable 9 Targeting of external actors	
1. Yes	12
2. No	2
3. Insufficient data	0

Variable 10: Identification and use of champions

Identification and use of champions explores one of Boesen’s elements of the adequacy of the donor effort vis-à-vis the capacities to be developed,² inquiring about the engagement of so-called champions by the intervention. Champions are here considered to be individuals or groups

² Approach paper, Annex 1 to the ToR, p.12.

of individuals sufficiently powerful to influence the support granted to the intervention and the respective CD goals at the recipient institution. The evaluation team’s ratings are presented in Table 5.

Table 5: External actors

Variable 10	
Identification and use of champions	
1. Yes	8
2. No	1
3. Insufficient data	5

The review indicates that eight interventions have had sufficient power to influence the recipient institution. This means that in eight institutions the champions have been able to advocate for change in a more powerful way than those resisting change.

Variable 12: Complexity of the capacity to be developed

The parameters in Variable 12 indicate the degree of complexity with which the Danida supported interventions have been confronted: specificity of products and services; scope/distribution of capacities; incentives to perform (CD recipients); interest of the elites; and affinity with dominant norms and values. The parameters are outlined in the Approach Paper, which states that these parameters (or factors) relate to the “nature” of CD and are essential elements in influencing the degree of complexity.³ The evaluation team’s ratings are presented in Table 6.

Table 6: Complexity of the capacity to be developed

<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2">Variable 12.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Specificity of products and services</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1. High</td> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Medium</td> <td>6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Low</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Insufficient data</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </table>	Variable 12.1		Specificity of products and services		1. High	8	2. Medium	6	3. Low	0	4. Insufficient data	0	<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2">Variable 12.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Scope/ distribution of capacities</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1. High</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Medium</td> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Low</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Insufficient data</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </table>	Variable 12.2		Scope/ distribution of capacities		1. High	5	2. Medium	8	3. Low	0	4. Insufficient data	1	<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2">Variable 12.3</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Incentives to perform (CD recipients)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1. High</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Medium</td> <td>6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Low</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Insufficient data</td> <td>3</td> </tr> </table>	Variable 12.3		Incentives to perform (CD recipients)		1. High	5	2. Medium	6	3. Low	0	4. Insufficient data	3
Variable 12.1																																						
Specificity of products and services																																						
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<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2">Variable 12.4</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Interest of elites</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1. High</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Medium</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Low</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Insufficient data</td> <td>3</td> </tr> </table>	Variable 12.4		Interest of elites		1. High	3	2. Medium	4	3. Low	4	4. Insufficient data	3	<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2">Variable 12.5</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Affinity with dominant norms and values</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1. High</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Medium</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Low</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Insufficient data</td> <td>6</td> </tr> </table>	Variable 12.5		Affinity with dominant norms and values		1. High	4	2. Medium	2	3. Low	2	4. Insufficient data	6													
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3. Low	2																																					
4. Insufficient data	6																																					

The review shows that ‘specificity of products or services’ and ‘scope and distribution or capacities’ affect the complexity of CD at high or medium levels. The recipient organisations’ incentives to perform are rated between high and medium for 11 interventions. In relation to interest of elites the picture is more varied. Low interest was recorded in four interventions. Low interest covered lack of political will to change due to corrupt practices and a lack of interest due to lack of benefits for the well-off (e.g. improvement of public schools will not benefit elites who

³ Approach paper, Annex 1 to the ToR, p.10.

send their children to private schools). The picture is unclear as regards “affinity with dominant norms and values”.

Variable 13: Alignment with CD Theory of Change

The parameters in Variable 13 indicate the degree to which the Danida supported interventions are aligned to a CD Theory of Change. The parameters are: adaptation and flexibility; concurrence of external factors; demand from recipient organisations; endogeneity; focus on achieving measurable results; and measurability of results. The parameters are outlined in the Approach Paper, which states that these parameters influence the efficiency and effectiveness of CD processes.⁴ The evaluation team’s ratings are presented in Table 7.

Table 7: Parameters influencing the CD processes – elements of a CD Theory of Change

<p>Variable 13.1 Adaptation and flexibility (to internal and external factors)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>1. High</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>2. Medium</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>3. Low</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>4. Insufficient data</td><td>3</td></tr> </table>	1. High	4	2. Medium	6	3. Low	1	4. Insufficient data	3	<p>Variable 13.2 Concurrence of CD and external factors</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>1. High</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2. Medium</td><td>9</td></tr> <tr><td>3. Low</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>4. Insufficient data</td><td>5</td></tr> </table>	1. High	0	2. Medium	9	3. Low	0	4. Insufficient data	5	<p>Variable 13.3 Demand from recipient organisations</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>1. High</td><td>9</td></tr> <tr><td>2. Medium</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>3. Low</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>4. Insufficient data</td><td>0</td></tr> </table>	1. High	9	2. Medium	5	3. Low	0	4. Insufficient data	0	<p>Variable 13.4 Endogeneity (locally driven, managed and owned)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>1. High</td><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>2. Medium</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>3. Low</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>4. Insufficient data</td><td>0</td></tr> </table>	1. High	7	2. Medium	5	3. Low	2	4. Insufficient data	0
1. High	4																																		
2. Medium	6																																		
3. Low	1																																		
4. Insufficient data	3																																		
1. High	0																																		
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1. High	7																																		
2. Medium	5																																		
3. Low	2																																		
4. Insufficient data	0																																		
<p>Variable 13.5 Focus on achieving measurable results</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>1. High</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>2. Medium</td><td>11</td></tr> <tr><td>3. Low</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>4. Insufficient data</td><td>0</td></tr> </table>	1. High	1	2. Medium	11	3. Low	2	4. Insufficient data	0	<p>Variable 13.6 Measurability of results (capacity and performance)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>1. High</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2. Medium</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>3. Low</td><td>9</td></tr> <tr><td>4. Insufficient data</td><td>0</td></tr> </table>	1. High	0	2. Medium	5	3. Low	9	4. Insufficient data	0																		
1. High	1																																		
2. Medium	11																																		
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4. Insufficient data	0																																		
1. High	0																																		
2. Medium	5																																		
3. Low	9																																		
4. Insufficient data	0																																		

Adaptation and flexibility was rated high or medium for 10 interventions 10. Only Human Rights and Good Governance Programme III in Nepal was assessed as low on flexibility – the reason being the volatile governance culture with many vacancies and high staff turnover. For those interventions where data was available (there was insufficient data for five), the concurrence of external factors was assessed to be medium for nine interventions. The demand from recipients was assessed to be significant (high and medium 14). The majority of the interventions emphasised endogeneity (high and medium 12). The majority of the interventions focussed on achieving measurable results (high and medium 12). However, measurability of results was generally poor with nine interventions scoring low and five medium. This is mainly due to CD outcomes not being adequately defined and monitored.

Variable 15: Degree of delivery

The parameters in Variable 15 indicate the degree to which outputs have been delivered (achieved) against planned targets for the Danida supported interventions (a similar set of parameters for activities is also rated in the scorecard, but only the ratings for outputs are presented). The parameters are: systems (methods, procedures, routines); structures (authority, rights, & duties, communication); individual knowledge and skills; equipment (hard & software); work environment; and external factors (if the interventions seeks to influence factors external to

⁴ Approach paper, Annex 1 to the ToR, p. 9.

the recipient institution that are considered relevant for the capacity of the organisation). The evaluation team’s ratings for variable (15.2) are presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Degree of delivery

Variable 15.2.1 Delivery of systems (methods, procedures and routines)		Variable 15.2.2 Delivery of structures (power, responsibilities and accountability)		Variable 15.2.3 Delivery of individual knowledge and skills		Variable 15.2.4 Equipment (hard & software)	
1. Very high	0	1. Very high	0	1. Very high	1	1. Very high	0
2. High	6	2. High	4	2. High	1	2. High	4
3. Medium	5	3. Medium	9	3. Medium	10	3. Medium	3
4. Low	1	4. Low	1	4. Low	1	4. Low	2
5. Very low	0	5. Very low	0	5. Very low	0	5. Very low	0
6. None	0	6. None	0	6. None	0	6. None	0
7. Insufficient data	0	7. Insufficient data	0	7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	3
8. Not relevant	2	8. Not relevant	0	8. Not relevant	0	8. Not relevant	2
Variable 15.2.5 Work environment		Variable 15.2.6 External factors					
1. Very high	0	1. Very high	0				
2. High	1	2. High	1				
3. Medium	4	3. Medium	7				
4. Low	1	4. Low	0				
5. Very low	0	5. Very low	1				
6. None	0	6. None	0				
7. Insufficient data	5	7. Insufficient data	5				
8. Not relevant	3	8. Not relevant	0				

The delivery of outputs related systems, structures, and individual knowledge has been obtained to a satisfactory degree. Delivery of outputs related to equipment is less satisfactory but also somewhat uncertain as three interventions have insufficient data and this output is not relevant for two interventions. Delivery of outputs related to the working environment is unclear as five interventions have insufficient data and this output is not relevant for three interventions. As regards delivery of outputs related to external factors, the ratings are satisfactory for those interventions that have sufficient information – but five have insufficient information.

Variable 17: Achievement of planned outcomes

The parameter in Variable 17 indicates the extent to which the interventions have achieved their planned outcomes. The evaluation team’s ratings for variable 17 are presented in Table 9.

Table 9:

Variable 17 Achievements of planned sector-outcomes	
1. Very high	0
2. High	2
3. Medium	9
4. Low	1
5. Very low	1
6. None	0
7. Insufficient data	1

The parameter was intended to record on CD outcomes, but these have not been recorded, as they were not included in the monitoring system. Instead, sector-outcomes have been recorded. The achievement of planned sector outcomes is rated satisfactory with 11 interventions achieving a score of either high or medium.

Variable 21: Implementation of recommendation from evaluations

The parameter in Variable 21 indicates the extent to which recommendations from evaluations have been implemented in the latest phase of the intervention under review.

Table 10: Implementation of recommendations from evaluations

Variable 21 Implementation of recommendations from evaluations	
1. Very high	0
2. High	4
3. Medium	3
4. Low	0
5. Very low	1
6. None	5
7. Insufficient data	1

Eight interventions have been subject to evaluations, seven of them get a rating of either high or medium and one gets very low. Five have not been subject to an evaluation and one has insufficient data.

Variable 22: Systems for accountability and learning

The parameter in Variable 22 indicates if there is evidence of learning from the results of M&E.

Table 11: Learning from M&E

Variable 22 Learning from M&E	
1. Yes	8
2. No	4
3. Insufficient data	2

Only eight interventions were deemed to have benefited from learning of the M&E process, whereas four have not. There were insufficient data for two of the interventions.

Correlations between variables

Correlations between variables are analysed and tested to see how one step in the process affects another. This analysis is done to extract lessons learned from the 14 interventions.

Correlation between preparation of the assignment and their outcomes

The content of the interventions was generally well based on preparatory studies and well aligned to the institutions’ capacity development strategy. Moreover, the interventions were reasonably adapted to the institutions capacity needs. The sector-outcomes have correspondingly been achieved to a satisfactory level. Consequently, it can be stated that there is a corresponding correlation between proper preparation, alignment to the capacity development strategy, adaptation to capacity needs, and achievement of sector outcomes.

Table 12: Correlation between alignment, adaptation and achievement of sector outcomes

Variable 7.1 Content of programme design reflects findings from preparatory studies		Variable 7.3 Institutional development aligned to the recipient institution		Variable 8.4 Adapted to needs and capacity of recipient institutions		Variable 17 Achievements of planned sector outcomes	
1. Very strong	1	1. Very strong	0	1. Very strong	1	1. Very high	0
2. Strong	5	2. Strong	6	2. Strong	3	2. High	2
3. Medium	5	3. Medium	3	3. Medium	6	3. Medium	9
4. Weak	2	4. Weak	2	4. Weak	2	4. Low	1
5. Very weak	0	5. Very weak	0	5. Very weak	1	5. Very low	1
6. No alignment	0	6. No alignment	2	6. Not adapted	0	6. None	0
7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	1

Note: Desk-based review – scorecard results

Correlation between outputs and achievement of planned outcomes

The outputs of the interventions seem to correlate with achievements of planned sector-outcomes.

Table 13: Correlation between delivery of outputs and achievement of sector outcomes

Variable 15.2.1 Delivery of systems (methods, procedures and routines)		Variable 15.2.2 Delivery of structures (power, responsibilities and accountability)		Variable 15.2.3 Delivery of individual knowledge and skills		Variable 17 Achievements of planned sector outcomes	
1. Very high	0	1. Very high	0	1. Very high	0	1. Very high	0
2. High	6	2. High	3	2. High	1	2. High	2
3. Medium	5	3. Medium	9	3. Medium	9	3. Medium	9
4. Low	1	4. Low	1	4. Low	1	4. Low	1
5. Very low	0	5. Very low	0	5. Very low	0	5. Very low	1
6. None	0	6. None	0	6. None	0	6. None	0
7. Insufficient data	2	7. Insufficient data	1	7. Insufficient data	3	7. Insufficient data	1

Note: Desk-based review – scorecard results

Generally when outputs are assessed high or low so are the achievements of planned outcomes. One exception is the BSPS III (Tanzania), which is assessed to have achieved a low degree of planned outcomes, whereas outputs were satisfactorily delivered. Several reasons for lack of achievements of the BSPS III outcomes are stated in the scorecard, included poorly prepared trade negotiators compared to regional standards; a disconnect between trade policy and private sector development policy; local and central governments with different understandings of private sector development, etc. So even though there is a high correlation between achieving outputs and achieving outcomes it is not always the case.

Correlation between outputs and systems for accountability and learning

The review shows that outputs in terms of systems (methods, procedures, routines) and structures (power responsibilities and accountability structures) are considered to be high or medium delivered in the interventions. Individual knowledge and skills are delivered to a medium degree (9). The majority of the interventions sought to influence factors external to the institutions (high 1 and medium 7); there were insufficient data for five of the interventions. Work environment has been difficult to assess based on the documentation – a number of the interventions do not deal with this theme. Only the HSPS IV (Tanzania) – with the exception of Component 3, TACAIDS – was assessed to have a low degree of delivery in all indicators; poor or little planning and lack of implementation explain the poor rating.

The degree of ‘delivery of outputs’ do not correlate with ‘systems for accountability and learning’ (variable 16) in the sense that outputs can be delivered to a high or medium degree without having well-functioning M&E systems. For instance, the ASPS II (Bangladesh) and the ESP II (Indonesia) have delivered systems and structures to a medium or high degree even though M&E were generally not well undertaken. The “Programme on Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate Sector” in Vietnam was rated high in terms of achieving outputs within systems and structures, but the M&E system was implemented late and this component was the least successful of the programme.

The BSPS III (Tanzania) can be highlighted as an example of an intervention where outputs are delivered to a high degree. The BSPS III was, however, assessed as somewhat unsuccessful in terms of overall success as there was a lack of capacity to turn policies into action, reducing the ability to implement trade policy, and translate market access to market penetration.

Correlation between ‘systems for accountability and learning’ and ‘learning from M&E’

Systems for accountability and learning (Variable 16) are in general assessed poorly in the review and they are not very elaborated in terms of CD. Most interventions are subject to reviews, annual reports, annual work plans, but few of the interventions are evaluated. Findings from the review include delays in implementation (e.g. Programme on Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate Sector in Vietnam), absence of learning and knowledge systems (e.g. the U-Growth Programme in Uganda). In other interventions national systems are applied, but these interventions are not specifically tailored to the national systems (e.g. HSPS IV in Tanzania and Public Sector Support in Mozambique).

‘Learning from M&E’ (Variable 22) has been obtained for eight interventions, whereas four have not provided any learning, and two interventions had insufficient data. Although eight out of the 14 interventions under review have not been evaluated (Variable 7.4), it is evident that when evaluations are conducted, recommendations are to a high or medium degree implemented. Recommendations from, e.g. reviews also tends to a large degree to be implemented. There is correlation between ‘systems for accountability and learning’ and ‘learning from M&E’.

Table 14:

Variable 7.4 Recommendations from evaluation		Variable 21 Implementation of recommendations from evaluations		Variable 22 Learning from M&E	
1. Very strong	1	1. Very high	0	1. Yes	8
2. Strong	4	2. High	4	2. No	4
3. Medium	2	3. Medium	3	3. Insufficient data	2
4. Weak	1	4. Low	0		
5. Very weak	0	5. Very low	1		
6. No alignment	0	6. None	5		
7. Insufficient data	6	7. Insufficient data	1		

3. Findings from desk reviews not included in country studies

This section presents findings from the review of interventions that were not included in the country case studies, namely the following seven interventions:

Country	Programme/ project title	Sector	Year
Bangladesh	Community Development Centre (CODEC)	Government & civil society	2007-2012
Bangladesh	Agriculture Sector Programme Support, Phase II (ASPS II)	Agriculture & fishing	2006-2013
Indonesia	Environmental Support Programme Phase 2 (ESP2)	Environment	2008-2012
Mozambique	General Budget Support (GBS) Programme	General budget support	2010-2014
Mozambique	Support to Public Sector Reform and Statistics, Phase II	Government & civil society	2008-2012
Vietnam	Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate System	Government & civil society	2006-2014
Vietnam	Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation (CCAM)	Climate	2009-2015

Thus, the interventions from Nepal, Uganda and Tanzania, which are thoroughly analysed in the country case studies, are excluded from the matrix below. Findings from the case studies are crosschecked on the seven interventions that were not subject to analysis under the country case studies.

Findings from the case studies tested on the remaining interventions			
	Yes	No	Comment
Is it evident that sector-outcomes have been generated?	X		In general the interventions' sector-outcomes are rated rather well as medium. However, this rating refers to the overall interventions and not the CD interventions as such.
Is it evident that CD outcomes have been generated?		X	CD-outcomes are rarely defined explicitly and thus it is difficult to state whether they have been generated or not. This includes e.g. CCAM in Vietnam, DNEAP policy unit in Mozambique and CODEC in Bangladesh. Both DNEAP and CODEC are recognized as well functioning organisations that deliver as expected but CD-outcomes have been poorly defined and are thus difficult to measure. One exemption is POSCIS in Vietnam, which had explicit CD outcomes in terms of performance that were largely achieved.
Was there an enabling environment for CD interventions?	X		For the majority of the interventions there is an enabling environment for CD interventions. Interventions are often well adapted to the context although adaptation to the recipient institutions capacity and needs could be improved. There is a high demand for the support from recipients and the interventions are assessed as medium or highly endogenous processes, thus locally driven, managed and owned CD processes. However, some of the recipient governments/elites are registered as being unwilling to support the interventions e.g. Bangladesh which provides a less enabling environment. But interestingly CD outcomes have been generated although the government has been unwilling.
Is it evident that CD-outcomes have indirectly been generated due to the organisation's increased performance/ sector-outcomes?	X		Targets are rarely defined in terms of performance outcomes and thus difficult to measure. However, institutions such as DNEAP in Mozambique and CODEC in Bangladesh are being recognized as strong organisations with focus on human resources. INE in Mozambique has managed to fulfil the objective of "progressively creating capacity for statistical production" but again the target is vaguely defined and therefore it is difficult to assess the actual achievements of the intervention. POSCIS in Vietnam is a good example of achievement of clearly defined performance outcomes.
Have CD baseline studies, capacity needs assessments and risk analysis been conducted?		X	In general only few CD assessments are conducted when preparing interventions. However, some appraisals assesses the implementing institutions' capacity to implement programmes/projects but only sketchy. For interventions with multiple phases, reviews and evaluations feed into planning of subsequent phases.
Has a capacity results framework been developed with specific CD results?		X	Results frameworks with specific CD results were rarely developed. One exemption is the POSCIS in Vietnam, which had an explicit CD results framework developed.
Has a CD change management plan been developed?		X	None of the reviews found evidence of CD change management plans.

As was the case with the interventions in the case countries, very few interventions are prepared based on capacity needs assessment/baseline and a results framework for CD interventions. In none of the seven interventions was there evidence of the existence of a CD change management plan. It is evident CD-outcomes have been generated in several of the interventions although it is difficult to assess if they achieved targets since these were poorly defined. End-target is not specified in terms of enhanced performance and therefore difficult to measure.

4. Briefs on the sample's interventions

4.1 Bangladesh, Community Development Centre

Reference no.: 104.Bangladesh.104.
Period under review: 2007-2012

Introduction:

Denmark has been supporting CODEC since 1985, to begin with as sole donor and throughout the project as the main donor. CODEC is working among the coastal communities; which are destitute and vulnerable in political, social and economic context. They require assistance from outside organisations towards their own self-sufficiency in all aspects of their life. This is done through three components: 1) Economic Development Component (CODEC Micro Finance Institution), 2) Socio-Political Development Component and 3) National Advocacy Component. The period under review is 2007 to 2012. However, documentation from this period is scarce. Therefore the review also relies on documentation conducted before this period e.g. the appraisal from 2006 informing the preparation of the fifth phase.

Relevance:

The project document addresses the context briefly and highlights main risks to implementing the programme, including issues as lacking political will, an insufficient legal framework to meet the needs of coastal areas/fishery communities, the risk of natural disasters, unrest in relation to general elections etc. The status on these risks in the Mid-Term Review from 2009 (MTR 2009) shows that they were very relevant since most of them had materialized by 2009. E.g. natural disasters in two of the districts resulted in CODEC reorienting its work towards relief activities for a period of time. Thus CODEC was flexible in terms of adapting the programme to the changing context.

The Bangladesh-Denmark Partnership Strategy for Development Cooperation 2005-2009 identifies the continued need for external assistance for poverty reduction supplemented with support to human rights and good governance and with targeted assistance to marginalised groups. Thus, the programme is considered very relevant since it targets poor and marginalized people, including women and the absolute poor in generating income and economic empowerment, but also in relation to access to legal services, protection and promotion of human rights.

Danida was the organisation that initially provided support to CODEC and it has been involved with CODEC until now. CODEC was started as a Danida project and Danish assistance has had a great impact on CODEC in terms of its values, its style of management, its way of organising, monitoring and reporting, its way of presenting itself. The Danida's support was absolutely required to develop CODEC as a strong organisation advocating for marginalized coastal communities rights. However, the MTR from 2009 notes that considering the fact that CODEC is in the middle of the 5th phase of Danish support there is a need for changing the self-perception of CODEC. CODEC staff continuously considers the organisation to be a Danida project instead of acknowledging CODEC as an independent organisation that has managed to diversify its financing sources (more than 76% is financed by other donors). Thus, the programme has not been entirely successful in generating endogenous and autonomous capabilities, at least not in terms of staffs' perception of the organisation.

Efficiency:

The institutional capacity of CODEC was found by the appraisal in 2006 to be well suited to carry out the proposed programme. The Executive Director and other senior officers are vital human resources of the organization, and the management (director and deputy director) are first generation leaders and thus have 20 years of organisational experience. The appraisal, however, recommended having a more indebt study of efficiency to look at cost-efficiency, e.g. the high salary level was questioned and the quite extensive publishing activity of CODEC could be assessed considering availability of information on the Internet. It was also recommended to consciously plan to move into a “second-generation” organisation, which should include more women in its management structures.

There has been an increased acknowledgement of the need to prepare for a management generation shift in CODEC. The staff has received training outside Bangladesh and this has affected the organisational culture of CODEC. Previous experiences with replacing management with candidates from outside the organisation have proven difficult due to this specific culture. Thus, it is acknowledged that new management staff should be recruited within the organisation.

The MTR 2009 found it commendable that the management has regularly changed staff members in order for the performance of the organisation to increase; and applied a zero tolerance towards corrupt practices causing a number of staff being sacked.

In terms of financing, CODEC has managed to diversify its financing sources. The first phase from 1986 to 1990 was 100 % financed by Danida. During the period 2007 to 2012, 76% of the financial resources are from other donors. That the organisation has managed to change this trend is commendable and it has certainly decreased its vulnerability.

Effectiveness:

The main conclusion of the MTR 2009 is that CODEC is a well run organisation, it is serving clear needs in the coastal districts and it is working towards reaching the targets set for the five years duration of the 5th phase of the Danida support. However, implementation of some of CODEC’s sub-programmes is behind schedule, mainly due to external factors, especially natural disasters in two of the districts. This partly resulted in CODEC reorienting its work towards relief activities for a period of time, which partly hampered the operation of the Micro Finance Programme. Likewise, CODEC is behind in reaching some of the targets of the Socio-Cultural Programme, mainly due to the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) not having provided the services (especially child vaccination) as assumed.

According to MTR 2009, CODEC cannot be said to have been successful in its national advocacy activities – the second round of PRSP did not really deal with the issues of the coastal population and sea piracy still exists, to mention some examples. However, there is no doubt that the national advocacy is very important if the livelihood situation of the coastal population should be improved and real impact achieved on a longer term basis. A number of specific issues have been brought on the agenda by CODEC. The most prominent one is to fight sea piracy, which is affecting many fishermen and their families. It is difficult to eradicate sea piracy, as there is no real willingness from the authorities to effectively remove the problem. It is in a number of places known who is organising this and who carry out the crimes, but due to corrupt practises the people involved are not brought to justice.

The impact with regard to economic empowerment is remarkable, but the impact with regard to social political empowerment was in 2006 not adequate. In the 5th phase of the programme, a

special emphasis is put on the marginalized Joladas communities as recommended by the appraisal team. These communities were found to be very poor and absolute poverty was the reality for a majority of the communities. One of the aims of the programme is to provide economic and social support to 15,000 absolute poor persons. The MTR 2009 reported that only 288 absolute poor persons had been reached and that the initial aim was very unrealistic. There is a range of reasons for this low performance, the main one being that CODEC until now has not been geared to assisting this group of people.

CODEC organises various right-based trainings, discussions and mobilization programs through the social-political empowerment component. By such participation and inclusion the coastal fisher communities are mobilized to form groups, community based organisations and coordination committees. The appraisal strongly supported this process, the community-based organisations, and particularly CODEC's endeavours for capacity development of those organizations. In 2009 the MTR assessed the performance of community organisations and committees and it was noted that they also needed support and training after their formation to strengthening them, before they can become self-reliant. This is underlined in an evaluation carried out by CODEC on the strength of coordination committees: The majority was graded as fair, but 17 of the surveyed 50 were still regarded as weak at the time of evaluation in 2008. According to the programme completion report (PCR) all targets concerning groups and organisations have been achieved, including strengthening their capacity to advocate for changes such as preventing early marriages and violence against women, raise awareness of human rights, e.g. rights to health and education services provided by the government. Although, the PCR lists achievements in relation to community organisations it is difficult to assess their long-term impact on the communities based on this report.

According to the appraisal in 2006, CODEC has developed a proper MIS for monitoring of the economic component that was done in a user-friendly and computerized system. Regular research/impact studies were undertaken to inform the management and the studies were assessed as efficient tools for decision-making. None of the documents recommend changes to the way Danida deals with capacity development.

Poverty reduction:

Marginalized and poor coastal fishing communities are directly targeted in the programme with a special emphasis on reaching women, children and the poorest segment of the society to enhance their income generation opportunities as well as access to service delivery such as health, nutrition and education facilities. In this phase CODEC initiated a new program for absolute poor members with soft terms and conditions with the assistance from e.g. Danida.

Sustainability:

CODEC's micro finance programme has from the very beginning of the 5th phase been operating any financial assistance and it has managed to carry out its activities with a surplus, thus this element of the programme is sustainable. As to the "Social-political component" it is expected be taken over by the groups, community based organisations, and coordination committees. CODEC will continue assisting the people's forums in their capacity-building and assist in organising forums where the Coordinating Committees can meet, exchange experiences and discuss common problems and issues and plan joint actions. The achievement of these groups in awareness raising in the communities has enhanced local knowledge of human rights and the states obligation to fulfil them. The appraisal in 2006 was convinced that most of these community-based organisations would be able to continue and sustain themselves, when phased out by CODEC after the next phase.

The national advocacy component needs attention over the coming years and needs to be strengthened, possibly through the Coastal Fisher Folk Community Network (COFCON). The advocacy work is challenged by GoB's lack of political will to reform legal frameworks that are disadvantageous to the coastal areas; and enforce existing law (e.g. on sea piracy) but this is nevertheless where CODEC plans to put its major efforts.

CODEC has established itself as a well-organised specialised NGO with diversified financial support providing them with a good point of departure for further fundraising.

Documents consulted:

CODEC, Final CODEC 5 year plan Completion report, July 2011

Danida/GOB, Community Development Centre, Programme and Management Review, Final Review Report, July 2004

CODEC, Community Development Centre's (CODEC's) Proposed Five-Year Plan (2007-2011), Appraisal Report, October 2006

Project Document, Community Development Centre, CODEC, 2007-2012, February 2007

Danida, Mid Term Review of the 5th Phase of Community Development Centre (CODEC), Final Report, October 2009

CODEC, Annual Report, 2011-12

CODEC, Annual Report, 2010-11

4.2 Bangladesh, Agriculture Sector Programme Support, Phase II

Reference no.: 104.Bang.805-200.DAC

Period under review: 2006-2013

Overview and Assessment

Introduction:

The *development objective* of ASPS II is: Improved living conditions of poor marginal and small farmer households through enhanced integrated and sustainable agricultural productivity. The ASPS II development objective embraces the following vision for the programme: In future marginal and small-scale farmers will have increased their production and incomes to enable them to move out of poverty and improved their nutritional status. Farmers will be able to express their interest and demands and receive agricultural support from the private sector and a responsive local government system that is able to deliver decentralised services. The rural economy stakeholders will include productive farmers and private enterprises in food, aquaculture and livestock production and processing. Village and rural roads will be maintained to a standard that meets transport needs for the timely supply of inputs and for access to farmers and their markets.

The ASPS II has three components:

1. **Agricultural Extension (AEC)** – Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)
Immediate objectives: 1) Improved, demand driven, integrated and decentralised extension systems developed to support poor marginal and small farmer households; and 2) Enhanced capacity of associated agricultural agencies of MoA. The Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) implemented the component.
2. **Regional Fisheries and Livestock Development (RFLDC)** – Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock (MoFL)
Immediate objective: Improved and sustainable productivity of, and returns from, fisheries and livestock systems benefitting poor households. The Department of Fisheries (DoF) and Department of Livestock Services (DLS) implemented the component.
3. **Rural Roads and Market Access (RRMAC)** – Ministry of Local Development, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MLGRDC).
Immediate objectives: 1) Improved efficiency and sustainability of the rural roads and market infrastructure; and 2) Improved efficiency of LGED's maintenance management. The Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) implemented the component.

Some of the major changes from ASPS I to ASPS II are:

- Rationalisation of the support to line ministries for institutional and policy development.
- Decentralised approach by delegating planning, decision-making and implementation to local authorities, NGO's and Community Based Organisations (CBO).
- Development of the negotiating capacity of CBOs to formulate and demand an adequate agricultural extension service from the public and private sector.

The ASPS II addressed key strategic issues such as:

- Capacity development at grass root, district and national levels focusing on a result oriented and on-the-job approach;

- A demand driven, integration and privatisation approach to agricultural extension, focusing especially on involving poor women and men in Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and promoting the spread of knowledge through training of Farmer Trainers;
- Promotion of local government and decentralisation in agriculture, fisheries and livestock development; and
- Promotion of farmer organisations.

The ASPS II was extended up to June 2013 at no costs. The ASPS II was succeeded by the Agricultural Growth and Employment Programme 2013-2018.

Relevance:

There is evidence that the programme design took the overall national context into account. The thrust of the ASPS is consistent with Bangladesh's poverty reduction strategy with a focus on pro-poor households and agricultural growth.⁵ The ASPS II coincided with the "Moving Ahead: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction Phase II (NSAPR II) 2008-2011". Progress monitoring was conducted for each of the three components with indicators and set targets for the five-year period related to the immediate objectives – however, none of the targets relate to capacity development. Change in context was monitored through joint reviews during implementation. The second phase ASPS was based on some of the lessons learnt from the first phase of the ASPS and the Transport Sector Programme Support (TSPS). It appears, however, that the governance context was not taken adequately into account. The local socio-economic context was taken well in to account.

The intent was to strengthen the entire institutional framework including central and local government, CSOs as well as the private sector. The central government's performance was generally low. The farmers receiving training improved their capabilities, which generally resulted in improved livelihoods. The programme was not likely to reach the primary target group without the active involvement of Danida driving the process. The accountability framework vis-à-vis the central government departments were not clear. The assistance was appreciated by the direct service providers – local government and CSOs) and the direct beneficiaries. The Programme Management Guidelines were followed, but it is evident from implementation that CD guidelines were not utilised.

Efficiency:

An analysis of the budget for FY 2009 compared to FY 2008 showed that the share of the Annual Development Programme (ADP) expenditures of the total budget is at the same level for the two years. The ADP in FY 2009 is equivalent to only 4.2 % of GDP. Considering the importance of agriculture in Bangladesh, public expenditures on agricultural extension is low by international standards.

The institutional reforms in the agricultural sector that have been made over the past 20-30 years have not had the desired effect. Reforms of sector institutions (i.a. MoA and MoFL), which enable them to respond better to demands coming from a changing environment, are yet to be seen. After a period of time where Danida was the only major development partner, the number of DPs increased. The DPs have different approaches to their work with inefficient government systems and have varying degrees of interest in harmonisation. The Embassy of Denmark initiated a process for preparation of a Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) among GoB and 15 DPs representing more than 95% of aid resources.

⁵ Bangladesh is susceptible to natural calamities. Two consecutive floods (August and October 2007) followed by the cyclone Sidr in November 2007 have negatively affected agriculture, food security, rural livelihoods and overall economic growth.

A Programme Secretariat was located in the Agriculture Division of the Planning Commission for overall programme management – headed by a Member Secretary and assisted by a national adviser. For each component a director and deputy director were appointed and assisted by an international adviser. There are several examples of insufficient cooperation between government ministries and departments involved in the ASPS II – besides the high number of institutions involved in implementation, a main reason is the hierarchical structure and the lack of coordination mechanisms within the government system. Collaboration between the three components is inherently difficult due to the fragmentation of the ASPS II – opportunities for a higher level of development is lost on this account.

The programme document stated that more focus will be given to developing demand driven agricultural extension including increased emphasis on facilitating partnership of DAE, DLS, and DoF and providing integrated agricultural extension services in cooperation with NGOs and private sector actors. Institutional Support Units were established in MoA and MoFL in order to provide support to: policy development and policy coordination; establishment of a Management Information System; and human resources development – including surveys and studies. The support from these units was low and there was no clear vision and limited commitment. The 2009 Review recommended that the units were dissolved. A general feature during implementation was the varying level of government commitments to ASPS II, which resulted in fragmentation of the ASPS II into individual projects and a frequent change of project directors, especially at the central level and insufficient allocation of operational costs. Components developed independently in the absence of strategic **management**. The provision of **block grants** to local governments could have been a vehicle for building capacity at the local level and enhancing transparency and accountability towards the public.

Compared to ASPS I there has been a significant reduction of international advisers and an increase of national advisers in ASPS II. There has been a gradual change in role of advisers away from being both managers and advisers through reduction of the managerial responsibilities. It was recognised that advisers need to have a strong technical background – one reason being that they also need to act as change agents, which also requires some managerial expertise.

Logframes and baseline surveys are issues too important to be postponed for inception. Relying on national **monitoring and reporting** systems and data in the design phase is risky. The process was driven almost entirely by the development partner, in this case the EoD.

A lesson learned from recent years with aid-effectiveness high on the international agenda was that efforts to establish sector programme support have largely been wasted in Bangladesh. ASPS institutional support units failed to produce expected results and were closed. The PSU/PC or the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) had not been able to manage ASPS II as a cohesive programme – due to the underlying constraints that are inherent to the government system involving high fiduciary risks resulting in a clear trade-off between **alignment and aid effectiveness**. Sufficient change of GoB systems for alignment to take place could not be achieved at sector level during the ASPS II period, which would have required concerted efforts at the highest level of government. The lack of GoB structures and procedures that would have enabled alignment called for increased attention to opportunities for **harmonisation** between donor-financed projects. Ownership cannot easily be sustained with central level administration, and the underlying structural causes could not be addressed at the sector level. In this situation the present separate project management set-up was effective. **Ownership and sustainability** of interventions could be facilitated working with local level institutions. (TRM 2010)

In conclusion, there is no evidence to show that the executing agencies' capabilities were put in place. Despite the fact that there had been a previous five-year programme, it appears that the institutional context had not been captured when designing ASPS II. Apparently, there was no change management plan – if there was one, it did not work. In terms of reaching the primary target group, the programme was successful to a satisfactory extent – mainly because Danida compensated for the lack of performance of the central agencies through the use of national and international TA. Ideally, this was not the most efficient way – but nonetheless it worked.

Effectiveness:

Agricultural Extension Component

One major outcome of the AEC is the development of Farmer Field Schools (FFS) into clubs and subsequently into farmer associations. Reaching that goal was seen as an important step in reforming the institutional set-up of the agricultural sector. Experience from other countries is that such process takes time. In Bangladesh, the process is more advanced in areas that were also covered by ASPS I.

The FFS approach proved to be an effective extension service delivery mechanism, provided that the necessary resources and organisational capacity for implementation were made available. Also, FFSs were effective in facilitating the organisation of farmers/communities. The FFS approach served as a vehicle for developing technical capacity in the farming community that facilitated the emergence of private extension services and entrepreneurship. When working in a community environment, the definition of target groups should be realistic by also taking social and community relations into account. CSOs require long-term capacity building. CBOs, Farmer Clubs and Local Farmer Associations constituted new social structures of importance for the decentralisation process, and as change agents for increased commercialisation of the rural economy. This went hand-in-hand with the acknowledgement of the need for developing agro-processing and marketing in partnership between producers, the **private commercial sector** and **local government**.

Impact and Outcome indicators	Project Target	Achieved	Comments
ASPS II Impact: Percentage increase of income of FFS trained farmers compared to non-FFS farmers	10%	10%	AEC Mid-Term Evaluation 2011
ASPS II Impact: Percentage reduced of FFS trained households from food deficit months compared to non-FFS households	10%	25%	AEC Mid-Term Evaluation 2011
AEC Outcome: Percentage increase in crop yields of FFS trained households compared to non-FFS households	10%	15%	AEC Mid-Term Evaluation 2011
Percentage of FFS trained farmers using new marketing chains	30%	33%	AEC Mid-Term Evaluation 2011
Percentage of farmers using at least two new technologies for crop production.	50%	70%	AEC Mid-Term Evaluation 2011

Source: ASPS II/DAE. July 2012. Agricultural Extension Component Progress Report No. 11, July 2011-June 2012.

Golden Output Indicator	Project Target	Accrued end Dec 2011		July 2011 – June 2012	
		Planned	Achieved	Planned	Achieved
1. Number of male and female farmers trained in Integrated Crop Management FFS	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male
	286750	263000	262950	43700	43550
	Female	Female	Female	Female	Female
	286750	263000	262950	43700	43550
2. Number of new farmer clubs (FC) established and exiting farmers clubs organized into farmers associations (FA)	8000 FC	7364 FC	7300 FC	1223 FC	1200 FC
	2400 FA	1579 FA	1469 FA		
3. Number of new facilitators developed to run Integrated Crop Management FFS (DT: Department Trainer; FT: Farmer Trainer)	607 DT	607 DT	587 DT	100 DT	80 DT
	1197 FT	1197 FT	1127 FT	150 FT	130 FT
4. Number of research trials (T) and demonstration (D) of technologies tested in club member fields	2850 T	2850 T	2836 T	230 T	222 T
	3000 D	2650 D	2615 D	789 D	780 D

Source: ASPS II/DAE. July 2012. Agricultural Extension Component Progress Report No. 11, July 2011-June 2012.

Regional Fisheries and Livestock Development Component (RFLDC)

The concept of FFS was a new within the fisheries and livestock sub-sectors. The Farmer Field School activities were mainly implemented through CBOs that hired facilitators from the local community who were trained by TA staff under a highly practical and hands-on approach. The FFS consisted of almost 40 learning sessions in five main modules (aquaculture, poultry, livestock, homestead gardening, nutrition), spread out over a period of 12-18 months. The FFS curriculum was adapted to the local context to make it more relevant and later incorporated sessions in farm planning for market-oriented production. A total of over 14,400 FFS were implemented over a period of five years, involving around 337,000 households. The vast majority of FFS participants were resource-poor women, including over 10,000 participants from the LCSs

Golden Output Indicator	Targets 2007	Achieved	Achieved (%)
1. Number of households with access to improved extension services	Total: 300,000 in 12,000 FFS Barisal: 172,500 in 6,900 FFS Noakhali: 127,500 in 5,100 FFS	Total: 337,197 in 14,438 FFS Barisal: 189,047 in 8,512 FFS Noakhali: 148,150 in 5,926 FFS	112.40 120.32 109.59 123.36 116.20 102.17
2. Number of active CBOs (offering farmer-to-farmer extension, input supply and marketing services)	Barisal: 288 Noakhali: 212	332 CBOs and 5 District Associations 205 CBOs + 7 District Associations	115.28 96.70

Source: DoF and DLS, June 2013

Perhaps the most disappointing element of the RFLDC design was the capacity building with the local offices of DLS and DoF. Both DLS and DoF have limited manpower at the local level and, although, in Noakhali, local government offices were brought into the FFS activity at an early stage and linked to CBOs through a formal structure of meetings, it proved difficult to develop a common understanding of the respective roles of GoB and TA. In Noakhali, two years were lost as a result of some examples of misuse of funds by the government officers and it was only in the last year of the Component that an atmosphere more conducive of positive cooperation was developed.

Rural Roads and Market Access Component

In terms of meeting the targets set for impact indicators of the ASPs II, 292,000 (March 2009) of the targeted 700,000 had been trained; and of the targeted 2.3 million labour days to be provided through the Labour Contracting Societies (LCS – mainly comprised by poor women to generate income), 680,000 have been generated. The LGED lowered the target with 30% – one reason being the increase in costs of construction materials and labour. However, there were also other reasons, e.g. contractors had not been obliged to use LCS, and the road type for which LCS could be used was reduced in length. LGED had not accommodated the demand for roads from the other two components.

Impact and Outcome indicators	Project Target	Achieved	Comments
Income increase of target group	30%	200m BDT*	Target 250m BDT
Percentage of households without food deficit in four food deficit months	10%	1027 families	Target 850 families
Percentage of LCS finding sustainable employment in construction industry	2%	12%	2179 women
Percentage of paved rural road network with acceptable roughness (IRI) whole country	100%	45%	IRI standard = 8

*Note: LCS labour days times daily wage.

Source: LGED. March 2011. RRMAC Progress Report July-December 2010 & Work Plan 2011.

Golden Output Indicator	Project Target	Accrued end Dec 2010		July – Dec 2010	
		Planned	Achieved	Planned	Achieved
Number of LCS labour days	2.3 m	1.9 m	1.96 m	85,000	105,000
Length of roads re-constructed/constructed (km)	1169	1075	1094	31.4	28.5
% LCS women incorporated I in FFS	100%	100%	55%	100%	208%
Number of local government (LG) development plans	150	39	39	0	0
% of paved LG roads in acceptable condition (project area)	100%	75%	53%	75%	53%

Source: LGED. March 2011. RRMAC Progress Report July-December 2010 & Work Plan 2011

The support given by ASPSP II components show that if real and meaningful opportunities are provided to women they will respond. In concrete terms it has been learned that the LCS **gender** concept can be further applied in a range of infrastructure and maintenance works. Also, income-generating activities for poor landless households can directly alleviate poverty or mitigate the return to poverty of involved vulnerable households. Use of LCS in work plans should be emphasised, and additional GoB funds be allocated for LCS contracts. The scope for LCS maintenance works should be expanded and the role of local government for maintenance of roads and market infrastructure should be determined. Climate change mitigation measures and disaster preparedness should be implemented, and impact of interventions should be assessed as part of the impact survey currently being planned.

Overall assessment

From its observations and findings the TRM (2010) is of the opinion that ASPSP II components are well on track to fulfil the majority of stated immediate objectives thereby contributing to the achievement of the development objective of the programme. There are clear indications that many marginal and small-scale farmers have increased their production and income considerably and at the same time improved the nutrition of the household e.g. through diversification of production. The Farmer Clubs (FCs) and Community Based Organisations (CBOs), which are increasingly organised and able to identify opportunities and needs, are creating links to incipient local government structures at the local government (union) level. However, results are still to be seen in the area of maintenance of those village road networks that have been expanded and improved in recent years.

The interventions were not designed in accordance with the executing agencies' capability and capacity, as documented in review and progress reports. The programme did, however, reach its intended target groups through FFSs and FCs in which training and extension services were provided in cooperation with local governments by trainers and facilitators that were mobilised through CBOs. The continued involvement of CBOs would to some extent dependent on financial and TA support provided through ASPSP II.

An ASPSP II results framework was established, which was mainly concerned with quantitative aspects, but which did not include actions that could address the apparent capability gaps. An M&E was put in place. Danida's comparative advantage was that it maintained its focus and support to poor farmers, which would likely not have been the case without direct donor involvement – even if funds were provided. The reviews of ASPSP II did result in some changes in the institutional set-up of the programme as it became evident that the coordinating mechanisms at the central level did not work.

Impact:

The ASPSP II has impacted positively on the primary target group's livelihood in terms of increased income and productivity through targeted CD efforts. The communities', CBOs' and local governments' perception and mind-set of addressing poverty are also likely to have changed paying more attention to reduce poverty while at the same time increase productivity. The central

level executing agencies demonstrated very little ownership to the programme and willingness to embark on a change process. There were also incidences of misuse of funds.

Sustainability:

The extension services approach demonstrated that the poor households can be reached and capabilities developed that will improve the households' livelihood – and that the capabilities developed could be maintained over time. The central level executing agencies' lack of commitment and ownership did not render the approach sustainable unless attitudes and performance are radically changed.

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Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives/ LGED. March 2011. RRMAC Progress Report July-December 2010 & Work Plan 2011

Government of Bangladesh/Government of Denmark. July 2012. Annual Progress Report, Agricultural Extension Component

Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock/ DoF/DLS. June 2013. Regional Fisheries and Livestock Development Component: Implementation Partners' Final Report

4.3 Indonesia, Environmental Support Programme Phase 2

Reference no.: 104.Indonesia.1.MFS.4.

Period under review: 2008-2012

Overview and Assessment

Introduction: The *development objective* of ESP2 is: Sustainable environmental management in support of livelihoods in Indonesia.

The ESP2 has three components:

1. Support to Public Sector Institutions

The component will contribute to improved institutional capacity at the national level to support cross-sectoral and decentralised development planning and environmental management. The Immediate objective is: Practical instruments and systems for addressing the environmental implications of the development cycle (policy, planning, implementation and regulation) developed, tested and adopted in partner ministries and districts. The Component has six outputs with a single institution responsible for each output.

- EIA reform and decentralisation process strengthened, Ministry of Environment (KLH)
- Application of Strategic Environmental Analysis (SEA) for national development planning strengthened Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS)
- SEA applied in policy analysis and environmental planning, (KLH)
- SEA for local development planning, Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA)
- Economic Instruments (EI) increasingly used in development planning (BAPPENAS)
- Existing Economic Instruments Strengthened (KLH)

2. Energy Efficiency and use in construction of large buildings

The component will address both sides of the supply and demand equation, i.e. on one side it will support the production of information, norms, standards and capacity to deliver professional services, including facilitation of investments – and on the other side create the demand through awareness raising. The *immediate objective* is: Energy efficiency measures are increasingly adopted by major industrial, commercial and public sector consumers of energy. The Component will be anchored in and hosted by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM). The Component has three outputs:

- A Clearing House for Energy Efficiency.
- New large private and public buildings designed and constructed to be energy efficient.
- Operation and management of industries and large buildings to optimise energy use.

3. Support to decentralised Natural Resources Management and Renewable Energy

The Component will support sustainable, community driven development, with the aim of contributing to reduced poverty and improved local governance in rural communities in Indonesia. The *immediate objective* is: The utilisation of natural resources by rural communities in North-western Sumatra is increasingly sustainable and contributes to improvements in rural livelihoods. The Component will be coordinated by MoHA. The Component has four outputs:

- Sustained benefits from natural resources management by local communities
- Rural electrification of a number of villages in North-western Sumatra through renewable energy solutions
- Improved management at district level of sub-catchments
- Local level capacity regarding sustainable natural resources management and renewable energy development to be applied in the National Programme for Community Empowerment (PNPM)

Technical Assistance will consist of three specialised long-term advisers. Short-term national, regional and international advisers will be provided as required. *Capacity Development* will be related to systems development at all levels – in the form of IT support, development of standard operating procedures, and executive regulation. The TA shall apply effective skills transfer mechanisms to ensure that the recipient organisations have adequate capacity to sustain programme interventions. The programme will attempt to offer specialised technical know-how and technology, which would be able to advance and accelerate the efforts and initiatives being undertaken by the Government, the private sector and the civil society.

The following aspects has played a major role:

- The on-going capacity development activities at central level in ESP1 – with KLH and BAPPENAS – should be further developed and finalised successfully.
- A political interest from GoI to collaborate on energy efficiency and renewable energy, where Denmark has considerable experience. Furthermore energy consumption and the Climate Changes agenda are highly relevant in an Indonesian as well as Danish/International context. Also, the energy sector involves a limited number of donors.
- Striking the right balance between central and decentralised support and clear poverty orientation is essential, which will contribute to strengthening of the Indonesian decentralisation efforts.

In 2010, the GoI issued the medium-term development plan (RPJMN for 2010-2014, which defined the GoI's development agenda and priorities. The "Environment" was one of the national priorities. The Ministry of Environment (KLH) was in the process of following-up on the Environmental Protection and Management Act (No. 32, 2009) by developing/ revising regulations for EIA and SEA. Consistent with the 'pro-poor, pro-growth, pro-job, pro-environment' strategy the Government announced a direction towards 'green growth' at the Rio +20 Summit in June 2012 – indicating a further commitment to pursuing a more sustainable path of economic growth.

A third phase ESP3 2013-2017 is currently being conducted.

Relevance:

According to World Bank studies, Indonesia's environmental legal framework approximates to international standards. However, a recent study found that there still are significant areas of need in environmental management that have not been addressed by the legal system and that there are difficulties caused by overlapping and contradictory laws and regulations. This is caused by the lack of coordination between sectors in the formulation of laws and regulations that relate to environmental management. There are significant challenges still to be faced in terms of operationalising regulations both with regard to decentralisation and putting in place the necessary capacity at different levels of Government.

The ESP2 will assist Indonesia in the process of improving environmental governance and enabling policies and institutional environment for addressing the poverty-environment concerns. Improving the use of instruments such as environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental assessments will guide economic growth and development projects in directions that are both growth orientated and sustainable in environmental terms and focusing on poverty-environment linkages. The linkages between poverty and environment will be most directly supported in Component 3 which will be contributing to poverty reduction by supporting local initiatives that ensures sustainable management of natural resources in a strongly poverty focused approach and based on the fact that natural resources are the foundation for the livelihood of many of the poorest people in the rural areas. Component 3 will support local level policies and strategies that focus on promoting access to land and natural resources for those most in need of using natural resources for their livelihood.

The ESP2 was well aligned with the prevailing environmental and energy contexts and was related to all stakeholder entities: central and local government, civil society and the private sector. The accountability framework was in place at three levels: GoI-Danida/donors; national government-local government; and local government-communities. The ESP2 builds on the experiences and lessons learned from the first phase of the programme. The level of the technology applied and supporting systems were relatively high, which warranted external support. Danida could provide the required know-how and was committed to a long-term engagement. Danida followed its programme guidelines and emphasised CD, although it is not evident to what degree that the capacity development guidance notes have been used.

Efficiency:

Although Indonesia has highly qualified technical and professional staff, technical assistance (TA) is the major budget element in Component 1 (85%) and Component 2 (75%). This clearly reflects the desire of GOI to advance and accelerate technical competence by drawing on the highly technical know-how and experience in Denmark as well as on relevant technical best practices in the region.

C1: A Technical Review Team (TRT) undertook a detailed analysis of activities and outputs in March 2009. The TRT noted that it was difficult to see how the activities were contributing to clear outcomes: the emphasising environmental management tool resulted in less attention paid to the purpose of using those tools. The TRT recommended that a draft proposal for strengthening of the technical assistance inputs should be prepared. (RAM November 2009).

During 2010 review, the focus was on supporting the EIA reform and decentralisation. BAPPENAS, KLH and MoHA were working jointly to ensure that environment was mainstreamed into the planning process. CD related to the Sustainable Development Indicators (SDIs) and on Environment and Natural Resources (ENR) was proposed. The SEA activities had focussed on the development of the legal framework. The work on economic instruments (EI) had progressed considerably. (RAM October 2010)

C2: The Component is implemented through the Directorate General of Electricity and Energy Utilisation (DGEEU). The DGEEU hosted four donor projects including ESP2. The GoI upgraded the national institution in charge of renewable energy and energy efficiency with the establishment of the Directorate of New, Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation (NREEC). The Component has a large TA input and the team leader handles all financial matters. An additional activity concerned with CD for the DG NREEC was considered favourably by the Review. (RAM October 2010)

C3: The Component was originally designed as a contribution to a ‘green window’ of Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP). Financing was channelled via a multi-donor trust fund. The KDP was later on absorbed into the national programme for community empowerment (PNPM rural), a programme providing support to: 1) community development; 2) community block grants; 3) multi-stakeholder and local government empowerment; and 4) programme management. The donors established a support facility (PSF), which was a mechanism for channelling donor assistance to enable GoI to provide effective leadership and management. Complementary assistance was provided to the ‘Green PNPM’ by the Netherlands and Denmark, which included a Technical Support Unit (TSU). Green facilitators were critical to the success of the Green PNPM, as they played a critical role in community planning and processes. CSOs assisted with training of the facilitators. (RAM November 2009).

A Guide Book and a Training Manual on Renewable Energy for Rural Communities were under preparation. A WB mission recommended among others: strengthening of the monitoring and enforcement of fiduciary policies; training of consultants, facilitators and government officials; and improvement of M&E. (RAM October 2010).

Overall assessment of ESP2

The overall aim was to install adequate capacity so that environmental and energy management tools and systems could be appropriately applied for conservation, protection and improved livelihoods. It is not evident that there was a change management system put in place that would have provided incentives and guided the CD process. Although a change process was not prepared, the adapted approach was based on the experiences from phase 1 on what was needed and what would be possible to implement.

Effectiveness:

C1: There is on average about 50-60 larger national **EIAs** and 5,000 EIAs at local government level carried out on an annual basis. The support had been for tools and systems and not the actual implementation. With the promulgation of the Government Regulation (No. 27/2012) **EIAs** became a pre-requisite for an environmental permit. The development of SEA tools and guidelines – as well as awareness about SEA – made good progress. ESP2 provided support to develop guidelines and draft regulations. A weakness was that the Government regulation was still pending. For **EIs** there had been some progress on the development of the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) protocol. National consultants in five regions delivered training of trainers for some 100 persons from local government and universities. Papers were prepared on environmental fiscal reform and ‘green economic development’. There were limitations in transforming ideas and theory into practical action. All component 1 activities have to a large degree relied on inputs from national and international consultants. (RAM September 2012).

C2: The ESP2 helped jump-start and create a momentum for energy awareness across many different stakeholders. Key accomplishments were: Establishment of a demonstration office; making available a range of tools according to international standards; increased capacity in DG NREEC; green building regulations; and a post-2012 strategy. Progress was demonstrated in using the M&E system. (RAM September 2012).

C3: The achievements included: undertaking of more than 2,600 NRM sub-projects; and reaching of over 32,000 households with renewable energy solutions. Earmarked funds from the support facility had among others been used for: training in water catchment area planning, management and conservation; training of green facilitators; publication of extension manuals

and booklets; and training of government and NGO staff in NRM organised by the Danida Fellowship Centre. (RAM September 2012).

Overall programme matters: There has been limited focus on monitoring of results and on cross-fertilisation between the partner institutions (with some exceptions). The committees have been Danida driven and not aligned to GoI decision-making bodies – and not integrated with GoI procedures. (RAM September 2012).

The interventions aimed at developing adequate capacity that would enable the primary target group (national government, local governments, CSOs and the private sector) to use the instruments and systems that were put in place for more effective planning and appropriate use of resources. The interventions did to a satisfactory degree achieve the results at outcome level. Although the anticipated CD results were not clearly elaborated – there were no comprehensive results framework developed – the achievement of the other programme results suggests that the organisational capacity was improved. Programme implementation was subject to monitoring at input and output levels, but less so at the outcome level. The monitoring would nonetheless have identified positive and negative unintended results. It appears that the M&E system was not entirely adequate to manage results chains and support causality-based approaches. Danida's long-term commitment is deemed to be an important factor for achieving results, combined with adequate TA. It is not clear, however, if the TA was given a larger role that somewhat constrained the endogenous capacity development.

Impact:

C1: EIAs and SEA are widely used for policy, strategy, planning and project preparation purposes at national and local levels. The instruments are recognised by key stakeholders as a means to integrate environmental concerns and engage civil society and the private sector.

C2: There is a lack of political will to reduce the subsidy to energy services and to enforce energy regulations. The potential for energy savings in buildings has been demonstrated through successfully implemented projects.

C3: The 2012 Economic and Livelihood Study concluded that the National Poverty Empowerment Programme (PNPM Green) contributed to increasing natural assets and improved energy services.

The CD interventions were both directly and indirectly linked to GoI strategies and development plans. ESP2 had contributed to public sector management and capacity development. The contribution to livelihoods and the state of the environment had yet to materialise, as the development effects require time to make the footprint.

Sustainability:

The legal and regulatory functions have to a large degree been put in place, the enforcement of which will enhance sustainability. Maintenance and further development of capacity will be essential to enhance sustainability. The fact that ESP continues into a third phase and builds on the lessons learned and experience from Phase 2 will contribute to make attained benefits sustainable. ESP3 aims at supporting environmental management, energy management, and natural resource management in local communities. ESP3 continues to emphasise CD.

Documents consulted:

Danida/GoI. 2007. Environmental Support Programme, Phase 2 (2008-2012) Indonesia: Programme Document

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Danida. 2013. Environmental Support Programme, Phase 2, Indonesia: Component 1 Completion Report – Support to Public Sector Institutions

Danida. 2013. Environmental Support Programme, Phase 2, Indonesia: Component 2 Completion Report – Energy Efficiency and use in construction of large buildings

Danida. 2013. Environmental Support Programme, Phase 2, Indonesia: Component 3 Completion Report – Support to decentralised Natural Resources Management and Renewable Energy

4.4 Mozambique, General Budget Support Programme

Reference no.: 104.Mozambique.96-400

Period under review: 2011-2014

Introduction:

Denmark has provided budget support to Mozambique since 2001. In 2010, 19 donors were providing budget support. The program has three components: 1) General Budget Support, 2) Support to PFM and 3) Support to Institution Building. Component 3 is a direct capacity building intervention that strives to strengthen the implementing partner the National Directorate of Studies and Policy Analysis – DNEAP's – role in policy research.

Component 2: support to PFM reform/Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado (SISTAFE) III – also contains a large degree of capacity development and focuses on human and organizational development and continued development of PFM system. The SISTAFE III Programme (2010-2012) is the third phase of the Public Financial Management (PFM) reform programme under the SISTAFE law in Mozambique and is financed by Norway (donor focal point), Italy, Belgium and Denmark. SISTAFE was in previous phases implemented by a technical unit in the Ministry of Finance called UTRAFE but in 2010 CEDSIF (also in the Ministry of Finance) was given this responsibility.

The documentation for the desk-based review of the programme has been scarce and e.g. no completion reports for any of the finalized phases have been available to the consultants. The assessment of the DNEAP component (3) relies heavily on a program review conducted in 2008, thus a review of the previous phase of the programme. The programme document also mainly refers to this review so it appears that more recent documentation is not available. For the PFM component a review was conducted in 2011 and yearly reports also document progress.

Relevance:

Denmark has provided budget support since 2001 and the nature of budget support by channelling money directly into the state budget and the Mozambique's own systems underpin generation of endogenous and autonomous capabilities. The 2011-2014 phase is based on experiences from previous phases and these constitute the foundation for the continuous support for capacity development of DNEAP and the PFM component. The DNEAP review (2008) recommends a continuous support to DNEAP's capacity to strengthen DNEAP's role as a policy unit. It points to concrete capacity and policy results from previous phases but states that in order to obtain credibility, DNEAP needs to provide relevant and good studies and policies for a longer time period to have a real impact on country policies. This requires a critical mass of researchers who will continue to produce reliable analysis. The DNEAP applies the Ministry of Planning and Development's financial management system and the SISTAFE financial management procedures to enhance use of national systems and build their capacity.

The PFM component/SISTAFE programme's emphasis on creating improved rules and norms for financial administration of government funds and enhanced transparency in fiscal policies and execution is deemed to be highly relevant considering the potential benefits from exploitation of natural resources.

Efficiency:

The DNEAP review (2008) points to the support to capacity building in the institute as positive in terms of results in increasing the number of better-qualified economists at DNEAP and producing high quality economic analysis that can feed into policy. Thus DNEAP has managed to secure a consistent flow of researchers who delivers high quality analysis, which also shows that DNEAP is capable of delivering results and manage the intervention. However, DNEAP

has been challenged by a high staff turnover and a clash between younger staff who wished to pursue an academic career versus senior staff who are more policy oriented. The review (2008) indicates a need to define and communicate the institution's goals and visions more clearly to avoid tensions like that.

One incentive to overcome high staff turnover has been the removal of the much higher salary for short-term employed staff versus permanent employed staff. Permanent staff earned almost half the salary as short-term staff reducing incentive for young researchers to work on a permanent basis.

A successful strategy to attract and retain skilled staff in DNEAP has been to recruit staff directly from University at the undergraduate (Licenciatura) level. Links with the University of Eduardo Mondlane have proven to be an important element in identifying the most promising recruits who then work with DNEAP staff on specific projects.

As to the SISTAFE programme the mid-term review (2011) finds that the majority of indicators are on track. Implementation of Mozambique's electronic finance management and accounting system – e-SISTAFE – centrally and regionally is for instance progressing rapidly and financial transactions (such as payment of salary) have increased with 400% from end 2009 to 2011. This indicates that management are capable of implementing the programme and results are as expected. It is also noted that a good working climate is established between development partners and CEDSIF Board and personnel providing good conditions for efficiency and further capacity development.

Effectiveness:

The DNEAP component is based on an on-the-job training strategy and intended performance results are not clearly defined and thus a comprehensive results framework was not in place. However the intended outcome has been achieved in terms of more qualified research papers and reports and a growing number of qualified staff, researchers and management capable of delivering high quality policy analyses. The capacity development of DNEAP has led to more research outputs and DNEAP has been widely acknowledged as a productive actor within policy analysis. DNEAP is recognized as the main centre for information, policy analysis and ideas and has managed to attract highly skilled management and staff (master or PhD level).

It is difficult to assess the effect of the analyses on policy but the experience is that DNEAP analyses often have an impact on policy. For example, it is suggested that DNEAP's memo evaluating the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) most likely influenced the decision to join EITI. Also oil price policy followed closely DNEAP's recommendations in 2005. DNEAP has also contributed to capacity building objectives within government and the public administration generally. As part of its overall function to increase capacity for critical research and analysis, in the last six years DNEAP has sponsored at least one major short course per year. The resident advisor and the overall TA have played a major role in enhancing research quality and supporting researchers' work. The 2008 review noticed a declining participation of the resident advisor in the conducted research papers but ascribed this as an approach to assist staff and researchers in becoming more independent. The overall picture of the resident advisor is very positive and he is considered key to the improvements of the institution. Thus, there is a clear trail from the intervention results and the improved capacity.

An evaluation of PFM in developing countries has highlighted Mozambique as a case of how substantive donor PFM support has led to improved PFM systems⁶ and the support has in that sense been effective and with the intended outcome.

The use of e-SISTAFE for budget accounting, implementation and reporting is generally accepted and well established in the government administration and has contributed to improved rules and norms for financial administration of government funds. The competences and skills of central staff in the Ministry of Finance and in CEDSIF have improved significantly and reform ownership seems to be anchored solidly within the Ministry.

Implementation of the e-SISTAFE has made impressive progress in terms of direct budget execution that expanded from 4.5% of government budget in 2006 to 58.6% in 2013. In 2014 e-SISTAFE was operational in 677/983 budget execution units and it is realistic to complete the rollout in 2015. The share of state employee receiving their salary by direct payment had increased to 89% in 2014.

Poverty reduction:

The general budget support is directly linked to the Mozambican poverty reduction strategy, which sets the frame for the GBS. The strategy focuses on service delivery, improved private sector and public sector reform to help Mozambique achieve MDGs. The DNEAP component strives to build capacity in policy analysis and surveys e.g. on household level to monitor progress in poverty reduction. Analysis within the private and agricultural sector as well as climate change is priority areas affecting all citizens including poor people.

Sustainability:

Sustainability of DNEAP achievements depends largely on three factors, namely: the importance of continued political will, the challenge of retaining staff, skills and knowledge, and the necessity of managerial commitment. It is important to have a critical mass of capable researchers who will deliver credible work on a continuous basis to maintain DNEAP as an institution that delivers high quality research. This image will ensure attraction of new qualified staff who will also benefit from on-the-job training, short-term training or long-term degree courses, as well as a pecuniary incentive to stay in the institution. Some staff will leave DNEAP but often to take more senior positions in other government departments and thus their competences will still benefit the public administration as such.

Documents consulted:

Concept note, General Budget Support, 2011-2014

Annual Review, 2013, Aide Mémoire

Programme Document, General Budget Support, 2011-2014, 15 September 2010,

Danida GBS Programme 2011-2013, component document for Institutional Development of the National Directorate of Studies and Policy Analysis (DNEAP) of the Ministry of Planning and Development

Concept Note, General Budget Support, 2015-2017, 27 June 2013

Relatório Anual 2013, Programa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Institucional da Direcção Nacional de Estudos e Análise de Políticas no Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento: Componente financiada pelo Governo de Dinamarca

⁶ Evaluation of Donor Support to Public Financial Management Reform (PFM) in Developing Countries, Analytical Study of Quantitative cross-country evidence, November 2010, ODI.

Relatório Semestral 2014, Programa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Institucional da Direcção Nacional de Estudos e Análise de Políticas no Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento: Componente financiada pelo Governo de Dinamarca

Agreement with Implementing Partner DNEAP – Bilateral Agreement 2011-2014

Revisão de Meio-termo, Programa SISTAFE III, 2011

Performance Audit UTRAFE Final Report, 2007

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Project assessment (donor), Strengthening Fiscal institutions in Mozambique FY 2012-2014, 2014

Evaluation of Donor Support to Public Financial Management Reform (PFM) in Developing Countries, Analytical Study of Quantitative cross-country evidence, November 2010, ODI

Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique, Executive summary, May 2014, commissioned by European Commission, the Ministry of Planning and Development of Mozambique, and the Evaluation Departments of Ireland, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and France

4.5 Mozambique, Support to Public Sector Reform and Statistics

Reference no.: 104.Mozambique.104

Period under review: 2008-2012

Introduction:

Denmark has supported the public sector reform in Mozambique since 2003 and the phase under review is the second phase. The development objective of the programme is to promote the development of rationalised, integrated public institutions with a motivated professional civil service providing quality services to citizens and the private sector, basing decisions on reliable and impartial statistics benefiting society as a whole. The Programme has three components: 1) Support to Public Sector Reform Phase II; 2) Support to National Statistical System Strategic Plan 2008-2012; and 3) Support to an independent research institute (IESE). This review will focus on initiatives within the two first components since these contain specific capacity development objectives. Component 1 is implemented by the Technical Unit for Public Sector Reform (UTRESP) and the Ministry for Public Service (MFP) whereas component II is implemented by the National Statistical Institute (INE) with the aim of strengthening the overall National Statistical System (SEN).

Relevance:

The programme's context and the needs of the implementing institutions are taken into consideration when designing the second phase of the programme. Much of the required preparatory and diagnostic work was done as part of Phase I and in addition, a Strategic Review and an appraisal provided important input to the design of Phase II. The "Evaluation of the Scandinavian Assistance to Strengthening Institutional Capacity of the National Statistical Institute" in 2007 concluded that the Joint Scandinavian programme has worked well and has contributed immensely to the development of INE and the SEN, including building capacity. Both the review and the appraisal from 2007 recommended to continue support to the PSR programme in general and to INE to consolidate achievements and further support the CD processes. Personnel expenditure constitutes around 50% of recurrent expenditures in the national budget, and an effective and efficient use of these is of paramount importance for addressing poverty reduction in the development trajectory of Mozambique.

The programme appraisal has a brief section on lessons learned/best practice within public sector reforms including lessons of management of reforms, political incentives to reforms and decision-making and it highlights the importance of taking the complexity of these reforms into consideration. In a large evaluation of public sector governance (PSG) from 2013 it is concluded that there have been evident changes in PSG in Mozambique but interviewees indicated that these changes did not necessarily happen as a result of the donor-funded activities and some reforms produced paradoxical results. For example, the number of ministries actually increased from 22 in 2004 to 30 in 2009 rather than being reduced as one might expect in a reform and rationalization process. Reports do indicate that the delivery of a variety of services improved but it is not clear as to the causes of such improvement; the evaluation found it difficult to attribute them to restructured reforms.

Efficiency:

A strategic review of the public sector reform was carried out in 2005, which concluded that implementation had generally been slow, and that results in the difficult areas were not achieved during the first phase. Important achievements were however achieved. In terms of the content of Phase II, the risk identified in the Strategic Review in 2005 and repeated in the Component Document that the programme was too broad, was not taken into consideration. The scope of the programme remained broad and technically complex and required considerable management capacity for the implementing partners to program efficiently.

Doubts about commitment to reform and weak leadership of the reform process as a whole have been addressed in the second phase by the creation of the National Authority for Public Service (ANFP) in 2006 and the Ministry for Public Service (MFP) in 2007. MFP took over all ANFP's tasks and the programme thus took recommendations from the appraisal into consideration since the appraisal pointed to the weak capacity of ANFP to implement the programme. However, it is not clear from the documentation whether the MFP was more capable to implement the reform and thus whether the problems were reduced by moving responsibility from ANFP to MFP.

The appraisal also highlighted that roles of involved partners were unclearly defined. Even though the programme document defines the role of UTRESP as that of an advisory and technical unit to the Minister for Public Service the role of other oversight mechanisms such as CIRESP (Inter-ministerial Commission for Public Sector Reform) remains poorly defined. The appraisal notes that the programme document fails to define roles in policy and technical areas like pay reform and a lack of clarity in the operational roles and responsibilities of implementing partners led to slow progress and high staff turnover in the previous phase.

The appraisal from 2007 stated that UTRESP suffered a very high turnover of procurement and financial management staff and this loss could have affected its stability and capacity in the short-term. As to the efficiency of INE the Mid-Term Review from 2010 refers to the management as capable of implementing the component and achieving progress. However, it concludes that there is a need for further capacity to support decentralization, including the development of standards and methods, the monitoring of progress and providing for effective coordination and technical backstopping. There is a need to share statistical experience and expertise between provinces beyond formal meetings moderated by INE staff and in general training is needed at lower level in contrast to the focus on the higher level of INE staff.

There are no direct indications of Danida not following its own guidelines. It is, however, noted in the programme document that the expectations of outcomes are too high and thus the programme targets too ambitious. This might discourage partners and their willingness to change. Another risk that potentially can discourage partners is the fact that the World Bank is threatening to close down their programme, being implemented separately from the common fund, due to unsatisfactory results. The dialogue with WB is assessed to be constructive but it could create problems that the two programmes are not harmonized and the partners have to balance in between the two sets of donors. Also, the collaboration in the common fund among donors might also force Danida to settle compromises, which could have been the case in accepting the ambitious expectations.

Effectiveness:

The appraisal from 2007 concludes that due to the concerns raised about the lack of impact of Phase I, it is recommended that the programme monitoring focus on the output-impact linkage analysis in order to attain better measurement of the results yielded. As mentioned above donors had too high expectations to results considering the complexity of the programme. E.g. INE was expected to be financially independent by 2012 but this was not achieved and donors financed 63% of operational costs of INE. High expectations to results does not seem to have been minimized in the second phase and the programme document does have a comment in the introduction stating that some of the donors believe it is an over-ambitious programme.

For component II the final evaluation from 2013 concluded that the general objective of progressively creating capacity for statistics production at district and municipality level was achieved. All activities planned were achieved and statistical capacity was enhanced through long and short-term training, and regional training. With funding from the Common Fund, Officers from INE were trained for Masters and Degree courses in Statistics, Demography, and IT. The Scandinavian project has supported

development of IT, building the business register, improvements in the National Accounts Database System (NADABAS); training at different levels and on different subjects including statistics, IT, management, etc.; on-the-job training and study tours; management including financial management. In order to improve the scope and quality of statistics and in order to enhance its institutional sustainability, INE also put in place a major training programme.

Although the capacity development of INE has been assessed as effective challenges still remains. E.g. specific problems with IT at INE headquarters and in the provinces, including a multiplicity of databases as well as a general lack of capacity; slow progress in addressing the issue of donor dependence during the preparation of the subsequent SEN strategy (2013-17) and the review form 2010 recommends that Monitoring of the Strategic Plan should be done more systematically; there is a monitoring framework in place, but reports are not being made publicly available.

Poverty reduction:

The documents conclude that public sector reform is rightly identified as one of the key requirements for further poverty reduction in Mozambique. As such, a precondition for improving service delivery is a fundamental reform of the “back-office” functions of the civil service. The broad objectives and planned outputs of the PSR component are thus consistent with poverty reduction and especially Component 1 focusing on service delivery relates directly to this.

Sustainability:

INE has benefitted from enhanced statistical capacity and quality official statistics that responds to national, regional and international development frameworks. These outcomes will sustain the institution on a continuously basis. However, in 2007 the political support to the reform from the President and his ministers were not sufficient. They neglected their responsibility to carefully monitor progress in the reforms and such neglect could pose a serious risk to the viability of the programme. In addition, if the reforms are carried out under the same conditions as in the first phase, progress will be slow; technical and sequencing problems will continue and the *sustainability* of what is achieved will be at risk.

Documents consulted:

Feasibility study/Debriefing note of the Evaluation of the Scandinavian Assistance to Strengthening Institutional Capacity of the National Statistical Institute (INE) (2003-2007), 2007

Appraisal Report, Support to Public Sector Reform and Statistics Reform, 2008-2012, Phase II

Mid-Term Review of the Strategic Plan for the National Statistics System 2008-12, September 2, 2010

Final Evaluation Report, SEN Strategic Plan (2008-2012), Norah Madaya and Carlos Damaia, July 2013

Mission Report from a review of the National Agricultural Information System in Mozambique, TA for the Scandinavian Support Program to Strengthen the Institutional Capacity of the National Statistics, Mozambique, Ben Kiregyera, David Megill (Edt.) and Bonifácio José, 2007

Summary report of the Public Sector Governance Reform Evaluation, DFID, Irish Aid and Sida, 2013

Relatório Annual, 2010, Programa da Reforma do Sector Público - Fase I

4.6 Nepal, Human Rights and Good Governance (HRGG), Phase III

Reference no.: 104.Nepal.54-300.KTM

Period under review: 2009-2013

Overview and Analysis:

Introduction:

Denmark has supported human rights and good governance in Nepal since the early 1990s. The HRGG III was designed to support initiatives by government and state institutions and civil society organisations in order to deepen democracy and contribute to realisation of human rights and effective, inclusive and accountable local governance. HRGG comprises three inter-related components: 1) Inclusive Democracy; 2) Human Rights and Justice; and 3) Local Governance. Development objective: A functional and inclusive democracy based on respect for human rights established. Component 1 & 2 were implemented through a Programme Implementation Unit (PIU) DanidaHUGOU⁷, which was downsized and streamlined in Phase III and would focus more on policy analysis and development of strategic partnerships and joint harmonised funding mechanisms. Component 3 was implemented through the MLD/MoFALD and administered by the EOD. Human rights and good governance are included in the succeeding programme Peace, Rights and Governance Programme (PRGP) 2014-2018.

Relevance:

Nepal emerged from a decade of civil war, which ended in November 2006 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. The challenge ahead was to build a sustainable peace, which included restoration of democracy and addressing the causes of the conflict through political, social and economic reforms and strengthening of the delivery of public goods – by taking the interests of Nepal's highly diverse population into account. In January 2007 an Interim Constitution (IC) was approved. An election to the Constituent Assembly was held in April 2008, which was tasked with writing of a new constitution to be promulgated by May 2010. The deadline for the constitution was extended several times. In May 2012 the Prime Minister dissolved the Constituent Assembly after it had failed to finish the constitution in its last time extension, ending four year of constitution drafting and leaving the country in a legal vacuum.

In March 2013, major political parties agreed to replace the government that was relegated to a caretaker status after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (CA) in May 2012. As a positive development, the newly formed government initiated preliminary steps towards holding elections to a new CA in November 2013, which was seen as an opportunity to complete the constitution writing process and put in place mechanisms to deal with challenges that Nepal has faced in its post-conflict transition. The election to the Constituent Assembly on 19 November 2013 went out peacefully and with great voter turnout. The Nepali Congress along with the coalition partner Communist Party of Nepal formed a coalition in March 2014. The Constituent Assembly had pledged to submit a new constitution for deliberations by January 2015, but the deadline was missed again. One contentious issue is how to draw state boundaries.

The regulatory and service delivery functions for local governance are stated in the 1999 Local Self-Government Act. Elections for Local Governments were held in 1998 for a five-year term. When the term expired in 2003 new elections were not held. Elections await the outcome of the new Constitution, the formulation of which is still debated in Parliament. Local governance has since 2003 been conducted in the absence of elected councils with seconded central government officers. Local governments receive national grants (performance based) and generate local revenues as well.

⁷ Human Rights and Good Governance Advisory Unit.

There is evidence that the design of HRGG took the post-conflict context into account. The HRGG is the third phase – except for the LGCDP, which entered into its first phase in 2009. As regards the Inclusive Democracy Component and the Human Rights and Justice Component there was substantial information at hand for the design and subsequent implementation. The HRGG facilitated endogenous capacity development of partner institutions. There was limited mentioning of lessons learned regarding capacity development from other countries in the programme document. The most significant contextual issue was the post-conflict situation with all the challenges that had to be overcome. The HRGG interacted with government and state institutions and CSOs. Accountability was attained through the annual work plans and budgets and through progress and performance monitoring of results according to set targets. The HRGG was subject to annual reviews and Steering Committee meetings. Donor assistance – including Danida’s – in terms of knowledge (TA) and funding were significant contributions to re-establishing a democratic and human rights based foundation for state and community functions. Danida adhered to its programmatic and thematic guidelines and promoted joint implementation and funding arrangements with other donors.

Efficiency:

Overall

In sum, the overall HRGG results have been satisfactory with almost all major targets and priorities achieved, time considerations largely met. The challenges faced by HRGGP III were systematically addressed despite obstacles created by the political environment that is still rather muddled in terms of completing the peace process, drafting the new constitution, and preparing for state restructuring and socio-economic transformation in Nepal. DanidaHUGOU support to the Election Commission of Nepal (ECN) and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was in collaboration with other donors and UN agencies. Joining Rights, Democracy and Inclusions Fund (RDIF) was another important step to harmonise donor support mechanism in its areas of work.

DanidaHUGOU has been playing a leading role in strengthening mechanisms of donor harmonisation and alignment. DanidaHUGOU’s efforts since mid-2008 to harmonise and align donor support to selected civil society partners through support to their strategic plans have been increasingly successful. DanidaHUGOU by mid-July 2009 entered into Strategic Partnerships with 12 CSOs, who are altogether being supported by five bilateral donors and 16 INGOs – in a new modality of support to CSOs in Nepal that is a clear departure from the past practice of project-centric grants. This demonstrated that harmonised donor support to civil society, which established common partnership management principles and practices, is possible in Nepal.

Component 1

ECN is an autonomous body established under Part 14 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, and is empowered to hold elections for the Constituency Assembly (CA) of Nepal.

ECN drafted a five-year strategic plan that was put in place on 8 February 2009, which outlined a very specific, ambitious and wide-ranging reform agenda. The three most wide-reaching issues addressed in the reform agenda include: a) efforts to gain more control over the retention of its human resources; b) drafting and seeking approval for a new organisational structure; and c) creating a permanent biometric voter database. The issues of human resources retention is addressed in provisions of ECN’s draft consolidated election act. ECN has made significant achievements (November 2011) in improving its capacity and electoral processes since the implementation of strategic plan in 2009. The key outputs include: i) submission of recommendations to Constituent Assembly on new electoral system; ii) draft legislations on electoral dispute resolution and electoral campaign financing; and iii) preparation of framework for future consolidated electoral legislation.

The Electoral Support Project (ESP) was conceived as a three-year project (August 2008 – July 2011) – being the Phase I of the support to ECN. In moving forward the ESP Phase II (2012-2016) should consider: i) the systemic issues that have complicated its capacity development in Phase I and base the strategy for moving forward with continued capacity development support on an analysis of ECN’s institutional context; ii) strengthening of the capacity of the ECN based on a detailed and joint capacity building strategy; and iii) consolidating gains already made.

Component 2

NHRC registered 276 complaints against various types of human rights violations and completed investigation into 216 backlog cases, which related both to “civil and political” and “economic, social and cultural” categories of rights. After the investigation, NHRC made 104 recommendations to the government for interim relief and compensation to the victims, and launched prosecution of alleged perpetrators – in some cases, against public officials responsible for the violation. (Ref. DanidaHUGOU 2013).

As part of the establishment of a Crime Trend Research Centre, Office of the Attorney General (OAG) completed a baseline survey with information on strengths and weaknesses of existing institutional and legal framework of criminal justice system, existing human resource capacity, existing case load, duration of case disposal and overall costs involved to settle a case, existing acts not in conformity with international human rights standards. Similarly, OAG completed the revision of the eight-year old “Prosecutor’s Manual”, which guides the entire prosecution process, incorporating the developments that have occurred over the years. In particular, the revised Manual has included recent precedents, added a new chapter on custodial monitoring and human rights protection role of the OAG, and discussed ways to professionalize prosecution.

Working closely with the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Women for Human Rights (WHR) was able to establish the total number of single women to be at 498,606. Based on the census undertaken in 2011. The figure now clears confusion as to the exact number of single women in Nepal and helps policy makers to plan what to do and how. In a striking revelation, the CBS data show that only 11.1% of single women are literate, against the national average female literacy rate of 57.4%.

Component 3

Training has been delivered on a large variety of topics including: procurement management, gender and social inclusion, building code for contractors, public financial management, information disseminations for journalists, social mobilisation strategies, and training on administration of the LGCDP programme for DDC, VDC and Municipal staff. While the number and diversity of trainings and related programming are impressive, the programme has lacked the focus and coordination – and as a consequence has not had the expected impact. The social transformation of citizen has not been matched by a transformation in the performance of local bodies.

The allocation of fiscal transfers has been rationalized and a performance culture has been introduced at the local level. LGCDP I has also promoted social accountability processes like public audit, public hearings and social audit throughout the country. The programme has been highly successful in mainstreaming disadvantaged groups into the development process by taking a rights-based approach to local governance.

Overall assessment

The support to ECN and NHRC was based on ten years’ of experience implying that there was a good understanding of the capability and capacity that were in place. As regards the LGCDP, the programme commenced its first phase and thus there was limited prior knowledge of the capacity development context – bearing in mind that the local governance system had to be re-established. Given the complex network of participating partners in many DDCs and VDCs across the country, an overall

detailed CD management plan would not have been meaningful. The thrust of the support was to enable each entity to prepare their respective management plans.

Effectiveness:

Overall

Overall, the Danish bilateral sector support to CSOs in Nepal has been highly relevant to the Nepalese context and needs. The support has responded to the needs and priorities of poor and marginalised groups and been largely relevant to the needs of civil society. The greater focus on micro and meso level CSOs, capacity development and internal governance systems has been well recognised. HRGG is the most noteworthy aspect of Danish support to the Nepalese civil society. Inclusion and the rights of marginalised groups have been central themes.

Component 1

The ESP Phase II (January 2012-January 2016) responds to the need for continued capacity building for the ECN to build long-term institutional and human resources capacity in order to organise credible elections in the context of highly polarised political environment and during a period of political instability. Under three outputs the ESP aimed at: 1) strengthening the capacity of ECN to function as an independent, credible and professional institution of governance; 2) providing support activities throughout the electoral cycle to ensure key processes are conducted effective, sustainable and credible manner; and 3) increasing democratic participation in the forthcoming cycle of elections and ensure an inclusive electoral process including underrepresented groups and vulnerable and traditionally marginalised communities.

Component 2

NHRC, OHCHR (Office of the High Commission for Human Rights), civil society and international organizations continued to make concerted efforts to build pressure on the government for implementation of NHRC recommendations, which resulted in a progressive increase in the status of government implementation of the NHRC recommendations.

By end of 2012, the Community Self Reliance Centre (CSRC), Centre for Legal Research and Resource Development (CeLRRd), and the Advocacy Forum (AF) had made the following achievements:

- The CSRC facilitated land rights campaign, implemented through the land rights forums of the landless and land-poor people. 629 families received land entitlement certificates of around 11.5 hectares of land. The entitlement has secured shelter for the landless and has enabled them to gain access to services, such as bank loans and other public services, which are dependent on land certificate. Another 149 families acquired joint land ownership of an area of 38.34 hectares. The number of women inheriting an equal share of land has been increasing, a trend that gives the women both recognition and power to participate in family and social affairs.
- The CeLRRd provided mediation services in relation to 2,030 cases, which benefited around 4,100 people. Of the beneficiaries, some 35% were women and 75% were from adibasi-janajati and other marginalised communities. The rate of success, gauged in terms of the level of satisfaction with the service of the beneficiaries and non-repetition of dispute/violence, was estimated to be more than 90%. In addition to direct justice, the mediation process was also held to bring to the community skills necessary to analyse community-level disputes and find negotiated settlement to those disputes at the local level.
- As part of its detention monitoring activity, AF visited 3,171 detainees in the reporting period to ensure that the detainees were treated fairly and had legal representation on their trial. 709 of the detainees claimed being tortured, according to AF. AF brought the report of torture to the attention of concerned authorities and continued further investigation into the claim. Similarly,

AF filed seven First Information Reports (FIRs)/Mandamus in concerned government authorities and closely followed up all pending cases in districts. AF also documented 80 cases of human rights violations including disappearances, extrajudicial execution and rape, and completed video documentations of five emblematic cases that related to extrajudicial execution, disappearance and torture.

Component 3

The Focused Evaluation (September 2012) concluded that the extent to which citizens have been actively engaged and able to hold local government to account has seen modest progress. It found that much of the new social infrastructure that is needed to enable this to happen has been successfully put in place. It was noted that the extent to which women, children and disadvantaged groups (DAG) have been included in governance processes has been greatly enhanced by the establishment of community institutions like Citizens Awareness Centres (CACs) and Ward Citizen Forums (WCFs). The Focused Evaluation Noted that there has been a significant change over the life of LGCDP in the capacity of local governments to manage resources and deliver services in an inclusive and equitable fashion; and significant increase in access to resources by local governments as a result of LGCDP activities.

The most significant achievements of LGCDP I have been the re-establishment of links between state and citizens in the aftermath of the conflict, the reinforcement of participatory planning process in the absence of elected officials and the creation of citizens' institutions across the country. The programme has promoted inclusive and participatory development and built government partnerships with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) for citizens' empowerment.

More specifically, LGCDP I has: (i) involved more than 770,000 citizens in WCFs in 3,817 VDCs and 387 Municipal wards in local level planning processes using 741 local service providers to facilitate that engagement; (ii) implemented a GESI strategy to ensure that the social mobilization process was inclusive of women, children and DAGs; (iii) established a Local Governance Accountability Facility (LGAF) for promoting downward accountability in the local governance system; (iv) increased the level of unconditional capital grant funding to local bodies (LBs) three-fold; (v) developed and implemented a system of performance-based intergovernmental fiscal transfer system known as the Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures (MCPM) system; and, (vi) implemented a system of capacity development grants to LBs that allows them to manage their own capacity development agendas.

Overall assessment

The interventions were targeted to address the executing agencies' delivery of services, while also supporting CSO to contribute to the overall performance by assisting the executing agencies and holding them accountable. The interventions did to a satisfactory degree achieve the planned results, but the agencies' organisational capacity suffered from frequent staff transfers – but nonetheless results were achieved. There was no overall results framework in place that clearly defined capacity gaps. The ECN did develop a strategic plan, but given the volatile political situation it would be difficult to establish a results framework that took account of the fluid political situation. The approach was rather too support the executing agencies in striving for achievement of the overall results as per their mandates. Unintended results would generally be identified and corrective measures put in place. The M&E systems were more geared to account for progress as opposed to monitoring of the results chain. Danida took a lead role in designing and implementing the interventions in due consultation with the executing agencies – and contributed significantly to improved performance, especially as regards local governance and addressing the needs of disadvantaged groups.

Impact:

In terms of poverty reduction, the HRGG Programme has contributed to local governments' capacity to: a) manage resources and deliver services in an inclusive and equitable fashion; b) increase in access to resources by local governments as a result of LGCDP activities – which have had an impact on communities' socio-economic conditions and peoples' livelihood. The HRGG Programme has contributed to citizens' capacity to hold local government accountable for service provision regulatory functions.

Sustainability:

As the HRGG continues into a fourth phase (PRGP), there is a probability that benefits achieved during Phase III will be maintained and further expanded – especially so if local governments with elected councillors are reinstated by adopting a new constitution and holding government elections.

Documents consulted:

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ECN/UNDP. November 2011. Mid-term Evaluation of the Five-Year Strategic Plan (2009-2013) of Election Commission, Nepal (*Component I, Sub-component I.A*)

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4.7 Nepal, School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP)

Reference no.: 104.Nepal.813-4.KTM
Period under review: 2009-2012

Overview and Analysis:

Introduction:

Denmark has since 1992 been one of the leading donors in supporting the Nepalese education sector. Initially the support focused on primary education, but from 2003 the support was expanded to comprise secondary education up to the 10th Grade. Denmark supported the Education for All (EFA) Programme 2004-2009 and the Secondary Education Support Programme (SESP) 2003-2009 through joint financing arrangements with Ministry of Education (MoE) and other development partners (DPs). Denmark continued its support to the education sector through its participation in the School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP) 2009-2016, which covers: early childhood education, basic and secondary education, neo-literacy and lifelong learning, technical education and vocational training, teachers' professional development, and capacity development. Denmark ceased with the support to the SSRP in 2013. The SSRP is GoN's education sector plan. Denmark's Country Programme for Nepal 2013-2017 does not include further support to the education sector.

Relevance:

The SSRP has been prepared by the GoN/MoE based on the School Sector Reform Core Document (SSR Core Doc), the EFA National Plan of Action 2001-15, and the feedback received from stakeholder consultations conducted at all levels. Key policy goals and values, such as the rights to education, gender parity, inclusion, and equity have guided the plan preparation process and have been integrated as strategic interventions in the SSRP. The SSRP stressed that the plan with its level of funding in 2009 would not be adequate to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) "Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality".

There is evidence that Danida's support – jointly with other DPs' – was well aligned to the context that emerged in the wake of the civil war towards a more stable and democratic country and that lessons learned from previous donor supported interventions in the education sector were taken into account. The SSRP adopted a sector wide approach including the entire organisational network from the MoE to the individual school. An Education Management Information System (EMIS) was established for the SSRP, which was further developed utilised during implementation. The oversight structure (Steering Committee, government, councils and school management) held implementing stakeholders accountable and facilitated that non-performance malpractices were identified. The donors' support was essential for provision of expertise and financing and for ensuring accountability. Danida advocated strongly for the SWAp and took a special interest in capacity development and other interventions of importance for the SSRP – consistently with the Danida guidelines.

Efficiency:

From 2009/10 onwards, the SSRP was implemented throughout the country, focusing on the integration and consolidation of basic education (grades 1-8), completing the process in 2012. At the same time, the model building for secondary education (grades 9-12) and vocational education started from 2009/10 and continued through 2012/13 and will be completed by 2015. In June 2010, MoE issued the National Framework for Capacity Development for the entire education sector including strategies and guidelines for capacity development with the intent of providing a comprehensive but flexible capacity development framework. The process of establishing a baseline for capacity

development, conducting a performance-gap analysis, and designing a results-oriented capacity development plan aimed at closing performance gaps is time-consuming and requires full resourcing and commitment throughout the system, from teachers at the end of the service delivery chain to the top management.

The framework for capacity development was outlined, studies conducted and workshops held. The intent was that each entity in the school system should prepare its own capacity development plan. The overall change process was outlined, but the details and implications only became evident during the SSRP implementation process. One complication was that the SSRP applied a highly decentralised model for capacity development, which proved to be challenging – given the political situation.

Effectiveness:

Lack of adequate capacity was accepted as a major challenge to the implementation of the SSRP. There were also problems with the way capacity building is conceived, designed, budgeted and implemented. The current mechanism for CD is supply driven. (ADB 2013)

SSRP continued strengthening its decentralised management system – particularly at school and district levels. Significant gains have been made in MoE's EMIS in terms of systems coverage, regularity and accessibility of information. Other achievements include a significant reduction of repetition and dropout rates; textbook production and distribution have improved; the qualification criteria for basic education teachers have been raised to the intermediate level, etc. With almost all teachers having basic minimum teachers' training, SSRP has launched a demand based and decentralised training programme. (Danida 2013)

Capacity development has largely been financed outside the JFA, as capacity building within the SSRP was getting inadequate attention. The Joint Direct Funding Arrangement (JDFA) was by design an integral part of SSRP. It was designed to be a broad sector support mechanism through a direct pool funding arrangement for channelling of multi donor contributions – however, only Danida and Finland contributed. The JDFA was set up to support three main areas: 1) capacity building; 2) key reform initiatives; and 3) piloting of innovations. The Education Programme Support Office (EPSO) served as the secretariat for the JDFA. The major thrust of EPSO funds has been capacity building of MoE and DoE institutions at various levels. (Danida 2013)

During the past decade Nepal has made impressive gains in the schooling sector in terms of access, equity and completion. Primary education Net Enrolment Rate (NER) has reached 95%, Primary cycle completion rate stands at 77%; the proportion out-of-school children has declined to 11%; gender parity in primary NER has already been achieved; and disparities in education access across income groups and ethnic/caste groups have decreased significantly. (WB 2014)

The SSRP capacity development framework included all entities in the school system's organisational set-up. The CD interventions targeted the stakeholders at entity level, but planning and selection of supplied training activities were to a large degree left to the individual entity, which generally may not have had adequate management capacity to make the optimal choices. Overall the SSRP generated the warranted outcomes to satisfactory level according to the EMIS, indicating that improvement in capacity and capabilities has taken place consistently with the results generated.

It appears that a specific CD result framework was not developed, but the weak areas were identified through the performance monitoring of school results. There is evidence that Danida through its support to JDFA applied its comparative advantage, which is deemed to be of critical importance for the capacity development efforts. The JDFA mechanism provided a flexibility to intervene rapidly in

situations that warranted a response in terms of capacity development. The SSRP JFA and the government PFM did not have that flexibility.

Impact:

In all probability, the enhanced performance of the school sector in terms of access, equity and completion have contributed to poverty reduction. Much of the significant progress in educational indicators can be attributed to a series of national level programmes and projects undertaken by the country in the school sector. These include the Education for All Program (EFA, 2004-09) and the ongoing School Sector Reform Program (SSRP, 2009-16).

Sustainability:

The GoN has given a very high priority to the education sector. The education sector has been receiving the largest share (16%) of the government budget in recent years. Public investment in education as a share of the country's GDP has increased from less than 2.9% in 1999 to over 4.7% in 2010, and represents a very significant increase in investments in absolute terms. School education, implemented through the SSRP receives about 86% of the Government's annual education budget. Sustainability of the SSRP will depend on adequate budget allocation in the education sector in the post SSRP period, and not least a prioritization of the school system's capacity and capabilities in each of its entities – including a flexibility to adjust to changing demands.

Documents consulted:

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4.8. Nepal, Energy Sector Assistance Programme (ESAP), Phase II

Reference no.: 104.Nepal.802-200
Period under review: 2007-2012

Overview and Analysis:

Introduction:

The first phase of ESAP commenced in 1999 with support from Danida (and later on with support from Norad) with the objective of creating a sustainable rural renewable energy sector in Nepal within a timeframe of 20 years, which included support to the Alternative Energy Promotion Centre (AEPC), rural energy investments, and technological support. The second phase commenced in 2007 with the aim of providing access to clean, cheap and reliable energy in remote rural areas. The ESAP II had three components: 1) Institutional strengthening of the rural energy sector; 2) Rural energy investment/Rural Energy Fund; and 3) Technical support. The ESAP I & II were succeeded by the National Rural and Renewable Energy Programme (NRREP), which commenced in 2012. The ESAP is anchored in the Ministry of Science and Technology and Environment (MoSTE) with the AEPC being the implementing agency.

Relevance:

A Rural Energy Policy was adopted in November 2006 (MoSTE). Difficulties had been experienced in expansion of the national grid due to adverse topography, dispersed habitation patterns, and limited government financial resources. The ESAP II was formulated in accordance with the 2006 Energy Policy. The organisational network (business ecosystem) – emerging from the ESAP I – was well perceived with programme implementation addressing stakeholders' needs – including capacity development. While substantial gains had been achieved on institutionalising rural energy policy, AEPC's own achievements on institutional and capacity development were modest. At the onset of ESAP II, it was recognised that there was a need to develop AEPC as an apex institution on rural energy.⁸ Danida and Norad were instrumental in supporting AEPC's delivery mechanisms for rural energy and provided a major part of the financing required. Danida's and Norad's support were conducive to generating endogenous and autonomous capabilities and in formulating a long-term vision and strategy.

The accountability framework for ESAP at central level includes among others of the ESAP Steering Committee (SC), which is the formal mechanism for coordination and decision-making. The SC comprises representatives from GoN, donors, private sector, NGOs, academic institutions, user organisations, credit organisations, etc. The Danida funding contribution is on budget. The 1998 Sector Programme Support (SPS) Guidelines were in place when the ESAP was formulated, which emphasise support to policy and strategy development as well as capacity development in situations where there is not an established national sector framework – as were the case in Nepal. Correspondingly, the Guidelines – A Results-oriented Approach to Capacity Development (ROACH) – were in place.

Efficiency:

ESAP support has reached more than one million households in Nepal. ESAP has worked directly with rural communities to provide a variety of energy sector services and financial support options. Technical support was an integral part of each programme component, while financial support came from the Rural Energy Fund – ESAP's ISO certified integrated funding mechanism. ESAP II build on the experience and lessons learned from ESAP I and shared similar overall goals. During

⁸ The civil war ended in 2006.

implementation of Phase 2, joint and annual reviews recorded that the AEPC/ ESAP capacity was not optimal. Strategic and Organisational Development plans were updated periodically, but apparently the financial resources have not been adequate to recruit the warranted number of staff with the required abilities. AEPC was only able to offer enumeration in accordance with the public salary scales.

Effectiveness:

The ESAP II interventions related to the institutional component focussed particularly on policy, divisions of roles between AEPC and cooperating partners (local governments, NGOs and the private sector), promotion of SWAp and donor harmonisation, accountable and effective management, conducive working environment in AEPC including human resources development. The capacity development interventions specifically related to the AEPC/ESAP organisational set-up appears not to be clearly spelled out in the Programme Document. AEPC was the host organisation for five donor-supported programmes – each having their specific implementation arrangements and focus. The donors’ programme set-up tended to have more emphasis on reaching their specific targets (physical) rather than promoting AEPC’s corporate capacity. The joint review in 2008 (GoN, Danida and Norad) of ESAP II stated that the ESAP arrangement resembled a ‘project management unit’ and recommended and changed approach. The intent was that AEPC should be turned into an autonomous apex organisation, which could offer competitive salaries and assumedly attract more competent staff.

The physical targets for rural energy were reached to a reasonable extent – implying that the capacity of the organisational network (business ecosystem) has evolved in parallel with the physical achievements. The organisational network comprised District/Village Development Councils mandated to improve energy services for their constituencies; NGOs involved with promotional and management activities; private companies engaged in supplying, installing and maintaining rural energy solutions; and financial institutions providing managing financial affairs and insurance. The capacity development was to a large extent driven by the efforts to reach the physical targets, the achievement of which was effectively monitored. A corresponding M&E system for capacity development did not evolve. The programme concept emphasised a holistic approach for disseminating rural energy technology and services, while also emphasising a SWAp. As the physical results were rather impressive – even though they were below the set targets – the general acceptance of the AEPC/ESAP achievements in promotion of rural renewable energy have probably stimulated GoN’s interest in consolidating the policy and legal framework and donors’ interest in a SWAp.

Impact:

The introduction of mini-grid electrification, solar home systems and improved cooking stoves has had a considerable positive impact on the lives and livelihoods of rural communities that benefitted from the ESAP interventions across the country. Studies carried out during the programme period reveal that access to rural energy technologies and services can improve health and education levels of rural communities in addition to improving the economic status. Cross cutting issues such as gender and social inclusion, and access to information and community empowerment are also positively affected by energy interventions. In addition, clean renewable energy systems have a positive impact on the environment. In consequence of the positive impact generated, AEPC/ESAP is a well recognised organisation.

Sustainability:

The number and capacity of private sector organisations and NGOs increased significantly across the country. Involvement of local government institutions became significant, as most District Development Committees (DDC) and Village Development Committees (VDC) made investments in

renewable energy. The awareness level of users has increased significantly. ESAP's achievements are likely to be sustained as a strong institutional framework has been established at all levels. AEPC will continue to support the rural energy sector, among others through the NRREP. (Source: ESAP II Programme Completion Report, 2013).

Effective operation and maintenance (O&M) systems and routines of the installed energy systems are essential aspect for ensuring sustainability.

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Danida/Norad. 2008. ESAP II, Annual Progress Report 2007/08

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4.9 Tanzania, Health Sector Programme Support (HSPS), Phase IV

Reference no.: 104.Tanzania.810-400
Period under review: 2009-2014

Overview and Analysis:

Introduction:

Denmark has supported the health sector in Tanzania for decades. HSPS IV (2009-14) is in line with the Third Health Sector Strategic Plan (Mainland) 2009-2014, the Second Zanzibar Health Sector Reform Strategic Plan 2006-2010 and the National Multi-sectoral Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS 2008-2012. The HSPS IV has three components: 1) Support to the health sector in Tanzania Mainland; 2) Support to the health sector in Zanzibar; and 3) Support to the multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS.

Relevance:

The GoT is now working with a Health Sector Programme and a Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP-3) 2009-2015 that was considered to be relevant and consistent with well-defined indicators and targets. HSSP 3 is reflected in the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (MKUKUTA)-2. Many problems remained at the time of formulation, including the need to transition from strategies and plans to actual on-the-ground implementation. There was also a need to better define the roles of NSA, CSO and the private sector in health programmes delivery, since it was clear that the GoT could not do it alone.

Zanzibar had (and still has) its own health strategy and ministry. Its most recent document is the HSSP-3 (Zanzibar) 2011-12 to 2015-16. The reforms there progressed more rapidly than on the Mainland but have slowed down in very recent years. In both cases there are serious capability and capacity issues due to a large number of causes, including the inability to find a workable implementation mechanism (s), underfunding, competing national priorities (large single-domain funding versus broader based but reduced levels of funding). Implementation through the PMO-RALG and the LGAs was a major challenge then and still is. Danida provided support to help resolve many of these issues. In all cases the support was needed and relevant, even if many of the problems still persist.

Efficiency:

For the mainland, Danida support was coordinated through a SWAp under the joint leadership of the MoHSW and PMO-RALG. Although provisions were made of joint annual reviews this was not an effective or efficient way to manage the strategic level of the intervention because very few changes were ever made as a result of meetings even though the evidence pointed to the need for important adjustments. PMO-RALG participation was also found wanting. A basket fund supported the dialogue process. This was found to be efficient but the large number of TWG appears to have taxed the ability of the MoHSW to absorb them all.

In Zanzibar, the situation was different. No other like-minded donor was present and USG funded activities, vertical programs funded by large donors such as USAID and Global Fund, as well as international NGOs and multilaterals were less willing to coordinate, align and harmonise. So Danida's advisers and its direct support has been mostly effective and there is no reason to believe that it could have been done differently under the circumstances. On the other hand, the use of advisors was not that efficient in terms of comparing the time and money incurred against the results obtained.

Effectiveness:

It is interesting to note that the mid-term review predicted that the large amounts of funds coming from ‘deep pocket donors’ would “undermine the organisation of the health system and disturb the implementation of activities that are planned according to the priorities of HSSP 3”. That is precisely what happened in Zanzibar and was an important contributor to the lack of attention paid to policy implementation and CD overall on the mainland.

By and large, the sector-specific objectives of the programme were realised, but the capacity development objectives were left wanting, specifically those related to improved capability with respect to implementation. The support to the CD of TACAIDS and to the private sector and CSSO were relatively successful, although it must be clear that no specific performance objectives were ever agreed upon.

The new HSPS V will start with some of the CD-related lessons learned and will establish clearer RBM and other performance-based frameworks. That should provide the EoD and the GoT with a clear set of targets to monitor; effectiveness should improve, all other things considered.

Impact/ Poverty Reduction:

The entire programme strategy is based on the implied impacts of improved health systems effectiveness, and therefore it can be implied that there will be an effect on poverty. The documentation available does not support any specific conclusion to that effect, since it does not include monitoring of poverty indicators or changes on the livelihoods of the poorest. There are, nevertheless, tenuous linkages between the HSSP 3 and the poverty-reduction strategy of Tanzania

Sustainability:

It is not clear at all what has been rendered sustainable in the three components, but it is clear that each component is a separate thrust and needs to be examined as such.

The majority of funding in HSPS 3 went to the provision of supplies; that, by definition, is not sustainable. The CD efforts within the ministries are not, to a large extent, going to be sustainable within the public service; but work on PPP may be sustainable if the GoT proceeds with power sharing and allows the private sector and CSOs to participate in service delivery without necessarily privatizing health.

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HSPS IV, Annex 2: Support to the health sector in Zanzibar (Component 2)

HSPS IV, Annex 3: Support to the multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS (Component 3)

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Boex, Jamie. 2008. Fiscal Decentralization and the Financing of Local Health Services in Tanzania (Abstract)

URT/MoHSW. 2008. National Road Map Strategic Plan To Accelerate Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Deaths in Tanzania 2008-2015

WHO, Ifakara Institute and National Institute for Medical Research. 2013. Mid-term Analytical Review Of Performance Of The Health Sector Strategic Plan III 2009–2015

WB/White, J, et al. 2013. Private Health Sector Assessment in Tanzania

4.10 Tanzania, Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS), Phase III

Reference no.: 104.Tanzania.809-300
 Period under review: 2008-2014

Overview and Analysis:

Business Sector Programme Support III 2008-2013		
A. Improved business Environment Component	B. Better Access to Markets Component	C. Development of MSME's Component
A1. Business Environment Strengthening Tanzania (BEST-BRU Basket Fund)	B1. International Trade Negotiations (MITM)	C1. Private Agricultural Sector Support (PASS Trust)
A2. BEST-Advocacy Component (Basket Fund)	B2. Trade and business Education (UDBS)	C2. Enterprise Development (SCF and ECP)
A3. Enhanced capacity of private labour market organisations (ATE and TUCTA)		C3. Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSDT)

Relevance:

Denmark has supported private sector development in Tanzania for more than 20 years. Initially through a broad range of projects and for the past 15 years through Business Sector Programme Support – BSPS I, II and III. Tanzania has undergone significant changes from a state-led economy developing towards a market economy with the private sector playing an increasingly important role.

Phase III of the Danish support to the business sector in Tanzania is a five-year programme that was initiated in July 2008. The development objective of BSPS III is defined as “*Accelerated and more equitable, broad-based and export oriented growth in Tanzania’s business sector*”. The BSPS III contributed to this development objective through three components and 10 subcomponents. Four of the 10 sub-components were supported jointly with other Development Partners (BEST, BESTAC, the Enterprise Development Programme and the FSDT) while six were supported only by Danida (ATE, TUCTA, MITM, FCM, PASS and SCF).

Over the last 10-15 years, the GoT has opted for and devoted itself to the formation of a market-based and private sector led economy. The BSPS III aimed to contribute to this development, focusing on the creation of a business friendly environment with appropriate public and private institutions and the establishing of clusters and value chains consisting of micro, small and medium sized companies, which are able to compete locally, regionally or internationally. Focus is on the agro-business sector and thus the value chain from the farm to the international customer.

Component A: Improved Business Environment

During the early stages of implementation, important indicators of the achievements of the first component clearly showed that the business reform process in Tanzania is not moving satisfactorily. The two components of the BEST programme, namely the better regulation component and the business advocacy component were supposed to have a direct impact on the reform process but that was not to be, and bilateral donors decided to put the second phase of BEST on hold. Among the issues that needed to be improved was the “commitment” of the Government towards the programme (but even moving the BEST Secretariat to the Prime Minister’s Office did little to improve confidence until a review was conducted to ensure that the component could be re-activated).

The BEST-AC primarily applied a “challenge fund” approach, which implied that business associations could present applications for support that were not necessarily linked to any reform process.

Support to labour market.

During BSPS II, significant progress was made concerning CMA, OSHA and the Labour Court as well as the design, approval and implementation of new labour laws. A tripartite body, LESCO, contributed positively to this progress, but organisational changes at the top level initially meant that the contract with the labour market implementer and advisor was not in place, and the transfer of funds to the labour market institutions (OHSA) would be problematic.

Capacity support to ATE

ATE progressed well during BSPS II. The member base increased from 530 to 900 members and new members were being recruited every year. It was apparent that ATE had become a well-known and influential player on the labour market, and was providing better services to its members. ATE also confirmed that the tripartite efforts to create more industrial harmony among others through better mediation and arbitration, better bargaining systems, agreements on minimum wages and many other tripartite initiatives have been progressing well. Also noted that the new “budget” support approach would have a bigger impact in BSPS 3 than the previous support given in BSPS 2 as an “issue-oriented”.

Concerning financial sustainability, ATE considered the Danida support as an investment for heavily supporting the expansion of ATE and building up capacity of ATE staff to advocate and to provide services to members. The assumption was that when this happened, then ATE would also be able to sustain itself financially at a high level. Danida financed an assessment of the capacity of ATE to handle its funds, resulting in a conclusion that it needs to strengthen its administrative and management capacity, financial management and procurement procedures and capacity of the staff and the secretariat in financial management and procurement. An external consultant was retained to assist.

Capacity support to TUCTA

TUCTA’s development during BSPS II had also been positive, as shown in its participation in tripartite negotiations (labour laws, labour court, CMA, minimum salaries, etc.). TUCTA noted that its increased capability to participate was largely due to extensive training efforts, which provided many members with knowledge of the new labour laws, on OHS and conflict resolution HIV/AIDS etc. More trained shop stewards were able to negotiate better collective agreements with employers. In BSPS 3, TUCTA would focus on strengthening the capacity of its 14 affiliated unions (most of which were public sector unions) and on setting up 21 Regional Technical Committees. The latter also includes refurbishment of some regional buildings.

Of interest is the analysis that Danida did of the financial arrangements of TUCTA, these were seen as being not transparent with questionable transfer processes.

Component B: Better Access to Markets

Component B comprises two sub-components: International Trade Negotiations located within MITM and Trade and Business Education located within UDDBS, formerly FCM. The aim of the component is to enhance the human resource capacity and the international capacity that Tanzania needs to improve its position and participation in international and regional markets. Overall, the component progressed well.

International Trade Negotiations

Two TAs were recruited and began what was described in a Danida report as a continuation of the BSPS II programme, building on the BSPS II-results including the use of the UDDBS master programme and short courses. The need to prepare well in advance for trade negotiations and the importance of

involvement of stakeholders were key design factors, as was the recognition from MITM that training activities would be allocated according to a recent need assessment, and that MITM in particular would assure that the new knowledge and skills acquired from the training would be used and embedded into the organisation.

UDBS

This sub-component is a continuation and an enlargement of BSPS II. The sub-component has multiple activities related to studies, research and education/training to be designed and implemented by UDBS with its around 75 academic staff members.

The MIT-programme was reviewed and approved and the new MIB-programme was designed so that it was to start in September 2009, eventually focussing more on the needs of students to work at a company level.

UDBS capacity enhancement related to the construction of appropriate facilities and to staff upgrading. The expansion plans of UDBS were comprehensive and there was a big need for both new staff and enhancement of the capacity of existing staff members. Research activities received more attention at the early stage because it takes time to implement and get results from such activities. A proposed research agenda was prepared but was not easily implemented. Courses and research tended to focus on international trade at the expense of international business, a tendency that remained all throughout BSPS 3.

Component 3: Development of SMEs

This component was comprised of three sub-components but four budgets supporting four programmes/institutions (PASS, SCF, ECP and FSDP) with the following common objective: *“Enhanced contribution of MSMEs and commercial agriculture to equitable growth, exports, employment and government revenue”*.

PASS was introduced in 2000 as a pilot intervention to improve the access of commercial agriculture to business development services (BDS) and credit, through the guaranteeing of bank loans. SCF was introduced as a pilot intervention during the implementation of BSPS II. And was managed as a stand-alone project organisation working to improve the international competitiveness of food processing and marketing SMEs to access and exploit new markets.

The Enterprise Development Programme focused on enabling businesses to upgrade, innovate, and improve productivity and sales. Clusters and value chains were to be selected, and linkages were to be promoted between large and smaller enterprises, thereby increasing local supply and value addition. In particular, MSMEs were to be supported with matching grants to develop their capacity to supply products according to export market requirements.

Efficiency:

There is no data available to enable some form of assessment of the efficiency of BSPS 3 overall or its components specifically.

Effectiveness:

The Support to the Labour Market component showed important progress but did not meet all of its targets. With two years remaining, reviews found that ATE still faced a number of challenges. It was still critically dependent on external funding, and almost half of its members were concerned that they were not getting what they expected from their relationship. Its visibility and therefore its ability to act was limited. TUCTA also faced serious financing problems and was beginning to be seen as a

constraining force rather than a progressive one, largely due to strikes it had organised. It is also not seen as a professional organisation “TUCTA’s leadership finds that the government does not listen to its calls for better wages, reduction of the taxes on wages and salaries, and improvement of the social security of workers. Without going into details regarding the likely reasons for the government’s behaviour, it is evident that TUCTA would strengthen its argumentation if it was able to provide quality documentation on the situation of those members’ interests it wishes to protect”⁹. The labour market elements of the BEST were not progressing as planned. Most sub-components were very late and were not expected to reach their objectives.

The Better Access to Markets Sub-Component had five planned outputs: i) Improved stakeholder consultation in formulation of external trade policy; ii) Better informed decisions in external trade policy; iii) Enhanced in-house capacity to participate in international trade negotiations; iv) Improved follow-up on and compliance with international trade agreements; and v) Enhanced institutional capacity in in-house strategic planning and external communication.

Up to the end of 2011, output (i) has been completed according to expectations. Outputs (ii)-(v) were supposed to be implemented with substantial input from three consultants. Outputs (ii) and (iii) were envisaged as being implemented through an integrated series of expert studies and training inputs, following a strategic plan formulated by MITM assisted by the consultants. A review in 2011 decided that “Against this background, outputs (ii), and (iii) and (iv) have not been completed to expectation, very little activity has occurred under (iv) and no activity has occurred under output (v) during the year under review.”

Impact/Poverty Reduction:

No information is available to link the BPS 3 to poverty reduction.

Sustainability:

It is not clear at all what has been rendered sustainable in the three components. Some of the sub-components are being carried forward into BPS 4 indicating that the “lofty” objectives and targets specified for BPS 3 have not been achieved as planned, even if there has been important progress.

Documents consulted:

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Component A: Improved Business Environment

Component B: Better Access to Markets

Component C: Development of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

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4.11 Uganda, Anti-Corruption Programme (ACP)

Reference no.: 104.Uganda.74

Period under review: 2008-2011

Overview and Analysis:

Relevance:

The Danida ACP consists of three components that collectively seek to balance support to corruption fighting and prevention initiatives on the GoU side; while strengthening the *demand* side from the civil society for implementation of a "zero tolerance" policy.

Support to the Inspectorate of Government (IG)

According to a final review, the performance during the period under review was mixed. While performance on programme-defined indicators had been poor, there was improved performance on other relevant and related indicators (e.g. number of prosecutions compared to previous year). Some programme-supported investments that yielded impressive results are not reflected at all in the output indicators (e.g. technical assistance in the form of civil litigation support, directly linked to savings to the state of 4.16 billion UGX up to 2009). Overall, the final review noted that it had been difficult to evaluate the performance of the IG, as the institution did not report on performance or outcomes in a consistent or timely manner. The underlying fundamental challenge was then, and still is, that the IG does not have, and is unlikely to achieve, the level of human and financial resources required to fulfil its exceptionally broad mandate. The challenge is compounded by number of structural, operational, and management shortcomings that further hamper operations. Whatever CD initiatives were put into effect were much more concerned with individual ability, through training, than at the organisational or enabling environment levels.

The Inspector General of Government had a poor absorption rate due to among others legalities affecting its ability to implement key aspects of the program. Since the implementation of the Leadership Code Act was very central to the national laws and systems put in place to fight corruption it had a negative implication on the development objective of the programme.

Support to the Anti-Corruption Division (ACD) of the High Court

The ACD has consistently reported favourable results since its establishment in 2008. The first corruption cases were adjudicated by mid-2009 in a timely and effective manner, and have been effectively (i.e. timely and professionally in accordance with existing laws) since then. The training in Denmark given to judges has been particularly effective in changing the attitude and behaviours of the judges, according to the field interviews of the evaluation team in Uganda.

Support to the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI)

Formal progress on defined performance indicators has apparently been weak, despite some early indications to the contrary. The major issue has been the absolute lack of coordination between the key institutions involved within the structures of the IAF and the Accountability Sector. Apparently the DEI continues to operate with very modest capacities, particularly staffing levels and their ability to achieve expected goals, which it appears unable to address effectively.

Support to Civil Society

The role envisaged for a strengthened Civil Society in the Danida Anti Corruption PD is a multi-pronged one where CSOs can *provide a demand side to government services, demanding accountability while monitoring government anti-corruption efforts, and raising public awareness while being the voice of the public in the anti-*

*corruption fight.*¹⁰ The Civil Society component of ACP seeks to support capacity development of anti-corruption CSOs with the objective of realizing “effective civic participation” in the fight against corruption. Anti-corruption CSOs’ effective engagement in these processes had hitherto been hindered by institutional weaknesses; poor co-ordination mechanisms; limited technical capacities and resource constraints.

This programme sub-component has, according to the final review and the evaluation field mission, supported some useful and effective civil society work (core funding), and has helped rebuild NGOs’ capability after periods of crisis. Institutional support was provided to a small number of CSOs in implementing their strategic plans and in capacity and institutional support, mostly in line with management processes. Community-based monitoring of service delivery and mechanisms for citizens to report corruption and demand accountability of state institutions – key activities of the two regional coalitions – deserve highlighting in the context of promoting civic engagement in the fight against corruption. Those efforts are particularly promising in terms of integration in the planned activities and objectives of the Accountability Sector.

Flexible funding and additional initiatives

A variety of other activities were supported under this programme ranging from technical assistance to state institutions on specific skills or tasks that advanced overall programme outputs, to background studies that facilitated national institutions and development partners in designing future programmes. Most of this work took place in the early years but the final report notes that these efforts were useful for providing direction and consensus on structures. Through its ACP 2004-2007, Danida had attempted a more systematic and coordinated support to anti-corruption CSOs with a view to maximize use of available resources. During the short period of initial implementation of the ACP, it became apparent that the capacity development needs of anti-corruption CSOs at the various levels were broadly similar; and that a number of capacity building initiatives had been put in place to address them. Despite this, capacity to perform in advocacy, advice, service delivery or other roles was weak and almost totally dependent on external funding. The NCG report noted that there continued to be a steady stream of requests for more ‘generic’ and ‘individual’ capacity development which raised the question of “*capacity to do what*” and hence necessitated further inquiry into capacity development needs of anti-corruption CSOs. The NCG study examinee these issues and prepared recommendations.

Major deviations on allocated budget were made against the Uganda Revenue Authority for failure to meet programme conditionality’s and funds duly reallocated to the civil society component, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) and the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity. The Inspector General of Government had a poor absorption rate due to among others legalities affecting its ability to implement key aspects of the program. Since the implementation of the Leadership Code Act was very central to the national laws and systems put in place to fight corruption it had a negative implication on the development objective of the programme.

Documents received do not specify the extent to which ACP was initialised and designed by Ugandan officials. Since the GoU did not have a solid reputation for transparency and good governance, the programme was executed largely through TA, training and executing agencies.

Efficiency:

There is nothing to compare the intervention with. No baselines were developed, and the objectives were not specific enough to determine efficiency either in terms of time or resources. No GoU analysis was found that specifically identified what capabilities or performance metrics it wanted to develop and for what purpose. Nevertheless, it should still be noted that a fundamental philosophy of the ACP was to provide support in a triangulated effort targeting Government of Uganda accountability agencies,

¹⁰ Danida Anti-Corruption Programme Document 2004-2007.

CSOs and the media with each providing opportunity for enhancing complimentary roles around information and experience sharing, referral and complaints mechanisms and citizen awareness.

According to the completion report, “Efficiency was to be guaranteed, according to formulation documents, through investment (i.e. Danida contribution-LeBlanc) in process and structural related investments in which internal governance mechanisms of partners and institutional performance were improved through provision of skills training, retooling, and procuring of critical furniture and equipment”.

If one examines the efficiency gains of individual segments, there is some results to note: the ACP was overall able to reduce the turnaround time in the process of verifications of leader assets/wealth, improve the procurement audit process from two cases per year at inception to 54 by close of the program through introduction of outsourcing methodologies and an audit manual. Additionally, the development of alternative case referral mechanisms employing public “Leader face your community” methodologies created an often instantaneous response from leaders.

According to the completion report, “The efficiencies around adoption of umbrella organizations as key entry points for effective management of programs cannot be underestimated. For instance the adoption of regional CSOs as important catalysts for change given their location, visibility and a culture of volunteerism upon which majority of them have been nurtured, significantly improved and sustained civic response to fighting corruption. The underlying efficiency being created by among others the emerging notion of “safety in numbers” and mass action based on populist concerns.”

But much of the above may not, and likely are not, the result of efficiencies in the components and segments, but the result of added resources being brought to bear. They may also be the result of different processes being put into place to do different things than before. There is no data to explore these issues further.

Effectiveness:

The ACP design provided a flexible and often useful opportunity to shift outputs to meet the constant changing environment around corruption. The steering group and annual review approach constantly informed by action research and dialogue with key accountability stakeholders provided a solid base for effective management and implementation of the ACP program. Investment in key regulatory frameworks, improvement of institutional response to corruption through retooling and methodological, encouragement of civic groups critical in changing the risk threshold.

Impact/ Poverty Reduction:

None of the segments were directly tied to poverty reduction, although all were tied to human rights, good governance or democracy.

Sustainability:

The final report notes that a considerable amount of actions were undertaken in CD during the span of the intervention¹¹. Interviewees only focussed on training. It is also interesting that although the said report identifies the inputs in reference below, it does not attribute them to targeted organisations, so it is impossible to tell if they actually succeeded in increasing the capacity of the organisations. Nor does it indicate the extent to which CD was sustainable.

¹¹ “Investment in capacity building including aspects of organizational development, training, retooling, systems upgrade and development, provision of vehicles, furniture and equipment have been important additions to achieve mandates of all the key partners. The migration from manual to computerized systems and the development of process manuals and policies to facilitate better management and achievement of outputs was emphasized across the whole programme”.

“The report also notes that: “A mapping and assessment approach to determine sector gaps underpinned by a periodic review of required needs provided an opportunity to customize program design to meet partner needs”; these analyses were not mentioned when representatives of these segments were asked if they existed. Evidence shows, however, that contracts were provided to firms such as SKAT, Ramboll International, and PriceWaterhouse Coopers, to provide tools and training. The PPDA Audit Manual, the Fast Track Screening Tool, the Anti-Corruption Manual, the Universal Monitoring Tool and establishment of regional press clubs are some of the key tools and structural platforms supported. It is not known the extent to which they are still used, since the people met in March of 2015 had no knowledge of them.

Some of the indicators for results that were used by the Final Review included:

Support to the Inspectorate of Government (IG):

- Corruption cases effectively investigated and expeditiously prosecuted (DFID)
- Improved administrative effectiveness in processing, verification and investigation of leaders’ declarations (Danida)

Support to the Anti-Corruption Division (ACD) of the High Court

- Specialised judicial capacity for effective, timely and fair adjudication of corruption cases strengthened (DFID)
- Timely and fair adjudication and disposal of corruption cases (Danida)

Support to the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI)

- Improved coordination of ACAs for the implementation of the NACS (DFID)
- Institutional capacity of DEI strengthened to effectively fulfil its mandate (Danida)
- An effective Inter-Agency Forum operating at national and sub national level (Danida)
- Accountability sector operational with a Strategic Investment Plan (Danida)

Support to Civil Society

- Citizen and private sector demand for accountability strengthened (DFID)
- Enhanced capacity of non-state actors to observe integrity and demand for accountability at national and district level (Danida)
- Collaboration among CSOs, the private sector and media at national and district level improved (Danida)
- An institutional mechanism for channelling support to CSO and private sector developed (Danida)

Flexible funding initiatives

- Flexible funding for strategic opportunities in the fight against corruption (DFID)”

Documents consulted:

MFA/Danida. 2003. Programme Support Document ACP.

MFA/Danida. 2003. Danida Board Minutes.

MFA/ Danida. 2004. Media and Corruption Strategy.

MFA/Danida. 2005. Review of Danish Governance Interventions in Uganda.

HUGGO. 2005. Organisational Assessment of CSOs.

MFA/ Danida. 2007. Assessment of the ACP and capacity of CSOs

MFA/ Danida. 2007. Review Aide Memoire

MFA/ Danida. 2007. Agreement MFA/GoU on ACP II

MFA/ Danida. 2008. Appraisal Report

MFA/ Danida. 2008. Programme Support Document ACP Phase II

MFA/ Danida. 2008. Danida Board Minutes

OECD/DAC Anti-Corruption Task Team. 2008. Towards more effective donor responses to corruption

UGMP. 2009. Progress, Stagnation and Regression

MFA/ Danida. 2009. Study of Gender and Corruption in Uganda

MFA/ Danida. 2009. Annual Review ACP II Danida/DFID

MFA/ Danida. 2010. Project and Programme Completion Report

GoU. 2010. Policy Statement IG (Inspectorate General of Government)

MFA/ Danida. 2010. ACP Project Completion Review

JBSF. 2011. Assessment of JAF 3 (Joint Assistance Framework)

OECD Govnet. 2012. Improving Domestic Accountability Uganda

JBSF. 2013. Assessment of JAF 4

JBSF. 2014. Assessment of JAF 5

4.12 Uganda, U-Growth Programme

Reference no.: 104.Uganda.821

Period under review: 2010-2013

Overview and Analysis:

Relevance:

The U-Growth Programme was designed to be aligned to the national policy framework for rural economic growth. This policy framework consisted of the National Development Plan, the Government's Manifesto entitled: "Prosperity for All", and the Competitiveness and Investment Climate Strategy for Sustainable Maintenance of District, Urban and Community Access Roads. Its objective is to be "the objective of the National Development Plan", according to the Establishment Agreement, specifically its reference to "...continue building a self-sustaining export-led economy".

Documents received do not specify the extent to which the project was initialised and designed by Ugandan officials. Since the GoU did not have a solid reputation for transparency and good governance, the programme was executed largely through TA and executing agencies and not GoU organisations. The project is very broad in its scope but has been broken down into three essentially separate components. Within those components the business ecosystem approach was been applied in the **aBi** component, but not the **RTI** or the **PSAS**. The oversight mechanisms were primarily preoccupied with financial management and transfers of funds, and documents studied do not refer to CD or to CD results except in a marginal way. It is clear from the documents studied that Uganda needed to develop the capacity required boosting its agricultural sector activities (toward exports). This project should have contributed.

The basic design called for institutional development to take place at all levels. The CD objectives of PSAS and RTI were not met and the results of the aBi component are not clear with respect to CD, even though there are numerous references to training and TA in the 2012 and 2013 work plans for aBi. The documents analysed deal with CD at an input level but show that there was not a CD strategy in place. There was no discernable change strategy or plan for any of the components, and the project logic is essentially linear and bottom-up, although the 2013 Work plan for aBi notes that it plans to move towards DCED standards, thereby moving closer to the logic behind the ToC.

This is a classic Danida project design with a few important specific embellishments, including the aBi. Other donors participated in (bought into) public sector agriculture support (WB, AfDB, IFAD, JICA and EC for the PSAS). The aBi was co-financed by EU, Sweden, Belgium and USAID. DFID and KfW participated in the aBi Trust. Efforts at harmonisation were undertaken but one of the documents notes that harmonised approaches and joint programming was becoming more and more difficult as the number of donors rose, because donors wanted to do their own projects.

Efficiency:

The intention of the new phase of support to PSAS in the agricultural sector was to move the institutions to a position where they could participate in a sector-wide approach where the support could be given against MAAIF's Development Strategy and Investment Plan. This was the wish of the GoU. Unfortunately the project did not succeed in that objective, a result that was entirely predictable following a reading of the PSAS Component Description initially prepared and the Missions of the "Joint Development Partners" including the 2009 mission that identified a large number of weaknesses that were not likely going to be remedied. The ToR for the TA assigned to the GoU are very vague with respect to what capacity is to be developed, but there aren't any reports that monitor this (that were made available). (Ex. "The capacity development of central parts of MAAIF are addressed").

The RTI component has had some success but has been severely crippled by the decisions of the GoU to apply heavy equipment to the rural roads sector, and to not transfer road user charges to the URF. A commitment to restructure the MoT has not seen the light as of 2013, and the entire road sector has remained seriously underfunded since the beginning. To make things worse, some of the technologies and strategies that were identified in U-Growth planning have underperformed (ex. low-cost sealing, spot improvements and community access processes). The documentation does not support the contention that any studies had been done at the planning stage to show exactly which capabilities and abilities needed to be developed and the extent to which these had already been in place at inception. No change management plan was included in the documentation and the documentation does not support the idea that any “options” for strategic change were considered other than the one selected for this intervention. No GoU analysis is included that essentially identified what CD it wants to develop and for what purpose. The only component that speaks to that is the aBi, but even that is at a high level.

Effectiveness:

There were no specifically defined capability targets and monitoring reports do not identify the need for doing a gap analysis in the ministry. Reviews point to the lack of data on CD progress. Reports show that both the PSAS component and the RTI did not achieve their objectives and do not specifically identify capacity gains. The aBi has information that shows that there was capacity in place to operate this type of Fund and to use it to advance towards objectives, but the aBi is not a permanent organisation and the sustainability of that type of instrument is not clear.

In the mid-term review of 2011 it was noted that Denmark had been supporting the road sector in Uganda since 1995 and had provided about DKK 750 million. Approximately 60% of the funds had been utilised for public and private sector development. District staff had been trained in the Rehabilitation and Maintenance Planning System (RAMPS) and labour-based construction methods. Small-scale contractors and consultants had been trained in planning and implementation of road rehabilitation and maintenance using appropriate technologies at Mount Elgon Labour-based Training Centre (MELTC). The RTI programme for rehabilitating district roads had met its target but not those roads that were to use new technology. The conflict between MoWT and URF to clarify which of the two entities has the overall responsibility for road maintenance has caused problems of jurisdiction.

By 2011, a Manual for Community Access (CAS) was developed under the RSPS2 and RRP and has been ready for printing for a long time.

The MELT sub-component under RTI is primarily focussed on CD. And the 2012 review noted that a significant number of training actions had taken place. No mention of outputs or outcomes is in the documentation. A long-term training advisor was assigned to MELTC.

No unplanned results were identified. M&E systems were inadequate for purposes related to CD but appear to be appropriate for GoU purposes. No real Danish comparative advantages were noted as being specifically exploited.

Impact/Poverty reduction:

The entire project strategy is based on the implied impacts of improved agricultural effectiveness on growth (agri-business, roads, entrepreneurship, etc.) and therefore poverty. The documentation available does not support any conclusion to that effect, since it does not include monitoring of poverty indicators or changes on the livelihoods of the poorest.

Sustainability:

It is not clear at all what has been rendered sustainable in the three components, but it is clear that each component is a separate thrust and needs to be examined as such. The field mission will examine the extent to which capacity has been improved and rendered autonomous in PSAST, RTI and aBi.

Overall comments:

There are a number of interesting things to observe in this project:

1. The analysis presented above was based on planning documents and was only able to benefit from a few monitoring or evaluation docs. The CD performance will need to be examined in the field.
2. It is noteworthy that such an important intervention, dealing with the generation of an autonomous capability to generate growth via the development of the agriculture sector through such strategies as value-added agri-business, better rural and district roads to enable the transport of products to markets, and the development of innovation (to name a few) would have such a small explicitly devoted to CD.
3. The need to identify what capabilities and capacities were required in the sector (all parts of the business ecosystem) did not appear to be important in the development strategies (including inception reports) and plans prepared for the project.
4. The concept of best fit was not perceived as being important to the GoU, which systematically did not provide the resources, regulatory framework and project support it has committed to providing.

Documents consulted:

Programming and monitoring

Danida. 2008. U-Growth Concept Paper

Danida. 2008. U-Growth Identification Report Final”

Danida. 2009. Programme Document: U-Growth Programme

GoU and Danida. 2009. Government Agreement U-Growth 2

Danida. 2009. U-Growth Appraisal Report

Danida. 2010. Sector Assessment of Programme Support 2010

Danida. 2011. Sector Assessment of Programme Support-2011

Danida. 2012. Review Aide Memoire: Mid-term Review 2012

Danida. 2012. U-Growth Annual Review 2012

Danida. 2013. 2010-2011 Progress Report

Various dates. Minutes of U-Growth Programme oversight/steering committee

Component 1: PSAS

Danida. Not dated. Draft PCR for PSAS Component of UGP 1

Danida. 2009. PSAS Component Description

GoU and Danida. 2009. Government Agreement with Implementation Partner MAAIF

MAAIF. 2012. Progress Report on Training 2010 to date

MAAIF. 2011. Advisor Work Plan for 2012

GoU and Danida. 2013. Agreement with Implementing Partner MAAIF extending contract for Senior Advisor

Component 2: RTI

Danida. 2009. RTI Component Description

Danida. 2010. Inception Review of the U-Growth Program's Rural Transport Infrastructure Component

Danida. 2011. RTI Progress Review 2010-11

Danida. 2012. RTI Progress Review 2011-12"

MoT and Danida. 2011. Transport Sector Assessment

GoU and Danida. 2012. Tender for Consultancy services for Implementation of Rural Infrastructure in the Recovery and Development in Northern Uganda Component of U-Growth II Programme

Danida. 2013. RTI-MELTC Technical Review, Low-cost Sealing

Component 3: aBi

Ugandan Legal Firm. 2010. aBi Trust Deed

Danida. 2011. aBi Component Description

aBi Trust. 2011. Value Chain Strategy

GoU-Belgium. 2011. Agreement with Implementing Partner Delegated Cooperation Agreement – Belgium

GoU-EU. 2011. Agreement with Implementing Partner Delegated Cooperation Agreement –EC

GoU-Sweden.2012. Agreement with Implementing Partner Delegated Cooperation Agreement –Sida

GoU-Netherlands. 2011. Agreement with Implementing Partner Delegated Cooperation Agreement – Netherlands

GoU-USA. 2011. Agreement with Implementing Partner Delegated Cooperation Agreement –USAID

aBi. 2011. aBi Work Plan and Budget 2012

aBi Trust. 2011 Report ABI Gender Policy and Program

Danida. 2012. aBi analysis from Appraisal Team

aBi. 2012. aBi Annual Report 2012

Danida. 2012. "Reports to aBi concerning G4G assessment of possible sustainable approaches

aBi. 2012. aBi Annual Work Plan and Budget 2013

aBi. 2012. Requests for additional funds aBi Trust

aBi. 2013. aBi Annual Report 2013

Danida. 2014. aBi Component Description 2014-2018"

Danida. 2014. Component Description-Agriculture Business Initiative, 2014-2018

aBi. 2015. aBi Annual Report and Budget 2014

4.13 Vietnam, Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate System

Reference no.: 104.Vietnam.44
Period under review: 2009-2014

Introduction:

The program is a large and multifaceted program aiming at strengthening the Inspectorate Sector in Vietnam throughout the country. The program supports the objective of strengthening the capacity of the inspectorate in performance of inspection, complaints and denunciations settlement and anti-corruption to enhance public administration and good governance in the country. Development partners include besides Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden (leading donor). The inception phase of the program was initiated in 2005 and instead of a one-year inception phase it was extended to three years (2006-2009) due to the complexity of the program and the involvement of stakeholders in the program set-up. Discrepancy between the magnitude and complexity of the program and the insufficient management capacity was not sufficiently taken into account leading to a breakdown of donor confidence in the Vietnamese side in 2010 and POSCIS was suspended on 31 August 2010 due to failure to meet several benchmarks. The program was resumed on February 1, 2011 but one component was cut out.¹²

Relevance:

The program was considered relevant and feed well into the Vietnamese development context. Vietnam passed an anti-corruption law in 2005 and the inspectorate sector was key to implementing the law and improving public administration. However, the sector needed to be reformed to be able to carry out the intended oversight role. The program was aligned with Vietnamese strategies and the intervention was demand-driven. The mid-term report in 2012 estimated that the institutions themselves would have implemented several of the activities if they had had the resources to do so. Thus, Danida and other donors' financial support were required to implement the necessary improvements.

The project document was amended several times to take contexts into consideration, including the changing legal framework. The midterm (2012) review notes that the long inception phase and the revised legal framework in that period of time reduced the relevance of POSCIS in its initial form and called for a comprehensive overhaul of the program. This was, however, not conducted. The managerial capacity was misinterpreted and caused the prolongation of the inception phase but also caused the breakdown of the program since the management was unable to manage the complex program in a sufficient manner.

The Government Inspectorate was fully accountable and responsible for implementation and decision-making on behalf of all involved institutions to ensure generation of endogenous and autonomous capabilities. However, de facto it was the Steering Committee – consisting of directors of the implementing institutions¹³ - who assumed responsibility on the Vietnamese side due to unsatisfying managerial capacity. The Program management unit (PMU), which was the SC's executive branch, had only limited authority in practice and several of the component program units (CPMU) were much more independent compared to the PMU.

Development partners were intended to play a supporting role but due to the managerial issues the development partners came to be more involved in the implementation.

¹² Binh Duong Inspectorate component project was suspended.

¹³ Inspector General, Vice Inspector General, Director of Department of Legal Affairs, Director of Department of International Cooperation, Chairman of GI's Office, Director of Anti-Corruption Bureau, Director of Personnel Department, Director of Government Inspectorate Research Institute.

Efficiency:

The program had an inception phase of three years (extended from planned one year). The period was extended due to a lack of sufficient management skills. Even if this lack of capability was realized early in the inception phase it was not sufficiently taken into account in implementation of the program. The complexity of the programme, the fact that no such complex programs had previously been implemented by the recipient, high staff turn-over and lack of sufficient managerial competences made the program less efficiently implemented. The midterm review also noted that financial transfers were often delayed and a high staff turnover in PMU was delaying progress.

Effectiveness:

POSCIS focused on capacity building in the entire inspectorate sector both centrally and decentralized. The Government Inspectorate, ministries and several provinces were included in the support. The overall objective of the program was to build clear, strong, professional and modern GI agencies and Inspectorate system that were able to implement inspection duties, complaints and denunciation settlement and anti-corruption. The entire program aimed at building capacity including human resources, management capacity, institutional framework, research and training etc. and improve effectiveness of the sector's performance and accountability towards the citizens. The overall results framework was clearly defined in the program document with concrete targets designed to close capability gaps in the sector. However, less focus was on the capacity needs of individual institutions and the midterm evaluation called for more tailored capacity development support.

Almost all outputs were reached except from capacity development of M&E systems. These were not sufficiently established to manage results chains. It was delayed and only finalized in Sept. 2012. Data was collected by all components of the program but often not in accordance with the indicators in the LFA and thus inadequate for measuring progress within CD. However, outcome of the recent implemented M&E tools remains to be seen. POSCIS had great achievements in relation to the institutional framework and several Decrees and Circulars on the inspectorate sector and within anti-corruption and complaint mechanisms were passed during program implementation. These enabled the sector to work more independent and procedures were standardized across the sector saving time. The national assembly and the government assessed in 2013 the Government Inspectorate to be the leading agency/example in development and perfecting the institution.

Some outcomes have been identified and others are in process and therefore not fully documented. Documented outcomes include standardized procedures in the entire sector, which result in time saving, and more cases being solved; more female inspectors; training and English skills have improved effectiveness of inspections. Cooperation amongst the inspectorate sector and other public entities has improved which has led to more cases being processed by a single entity instead of the same case being processed by more entities on. Implemented IT systems have also helped save time and increased transparency towards the public. Regarding personal capabilities the management improved during implementation although not sufficiently enough to handle such a complex programme. Recruitment processes were standardized and transparency improved leading to more effective recruitments. The high staff turnover was a huge issue in the sector before but this was reduced in six out of 10 components. No means to identify unintended results were identified.

Linkage to poverty reduction:

The intervention was not specifically linked to poverty reduction strategies although it also aimed to improve citizens' access to information and complaint mechanisms thus benefitting less well off citizens.

Sustainability:

There is a high likelihood that substantial achievements of the program will be secured post-POSCIS. The strategy of capacitating the inspectorate sector to be the driving force of improving effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the public administration seems to be relatively achieved. GI is committed to continue the work and update guidelines, practices, tools, complaint mechanisms etc. developed during the program. State budget will be provided for maintaining some activities which has been performed within the projects including (1) maintenance of information system, (2) continuing development of legal framework and specialized procedures, (3) improving of institutional framework. Trained staff is expected to continue working in the specialized departments and be promoted to positions with more responsibility but all staff from the GI program management unit may not continue, because some cadres of PMU were recruited externally to work for POSCIS.

Documents consulted:

Joint Financing Arrangement between the governments of Vietnam, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 2006. On funding the Inception Phase of the Programme: Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate System from 2006-2006.

Governments of Denmark and Vietnam. 2007. Amendment to the Specific Agreement between Denmark and Vietnam on support to the Inspectorate 2006-2010.

Danida and the World Bank. 2009. Implementation Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Law: How far has Vietnam come at the Sector Level – A Case-Study of the Construction Sector.

Joint Financing Arrangement between the governments of Vietnam, Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden. 2009. On funding the Inception Phase of the Programme: Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate System from 2009-2014.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam/ Government Inspectorate. 2009. Revised Programme Document: On Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate Sector to the Year 2010.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam/ Government Inspectorate. 2009. Final Inception Report: On Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate Sector to the Year 2010.

2010. Final Report: Understanding Vietnam's Blogosphere – How Blogs Aid Information Exchange amid Weakening Media Freedoms.

World Bank, Embassy of Denmark and Embassy of Sweden. 2010. Assessing Risk Factors for Corruption in Land Management.

Transtec SA. 2012. Mid-Term Evaluation Report: The Program on Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate Sector to the Year 2014.

Government Inspectorate. 2012. Annual Report on 2011 Plan Implementation & 2012 Work Plan

Government Inspectorate. 2013. Annual Report on 2012 Plan Implementation & 2013 Work Plan.

Government Inspectorate. 2014. Annual Report on 2013 Plan Implementation & 2014 Work Plan.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam/ Government Inspectorate. 2014. National Program Completion Report On Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate Sector to the Year 2014.

4.14 Vietnam, Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation

Reference no.: 104.Vietnam.820

Period under review: 2009-2015

Overview and Analysis:

Relevance:

The Government of Vietnam (GoV) was instrumental in laying down the context and objectives of the programme, by generating a concept paper for a donor intervention. The entire project reflects GoV policy, strategy and intent with respect to CC and its impacts. GoV hierarchies and processes were used exclusively, and the regular reporting and accountability mechanisms used in the GoV were applied, with some flexibility for the donors to specify what data they needed. The business ecosystem was identified early on for the design phase and the GoV intervened in all parts of the network. Context was assumed to be managed the use of GoV mechanisms but no specific monitoring was in place. A significant number of separate bodies oversaw and managed the intervention, but not all of them functioned well, including those that ensured sustainability of the financing in the long term for CC. The accountability framework is clear only as it pertains to structures, not positions.

The basic design called for provincial pilots that would provide lessons learned so that the programme could be expanded elsewhere. The reviews pointed out that the lessons were not harvested and the coordination mechanisms were weak. Capacity development is an objective but was never defined in terms of targets, capabilities, etc. It was clear in the design docs that the donor support was sought for the financing; TA not needed, no external support, etc., Danida seems to have followed its own guidelines in terms of ownership, alignment and harmonisation, and a hands-off approach was used.

Efficiency:

The design docs indicate clearly what groups or structures will oversee and manage the project and its outcomes. Responsibility is diffused with no single entity being 'in charge'. There is a statement to the effect that the capabilities to manage the project are in place, but what this means is not defined. When examining the statements relating to progress and results, it is clear that the GoV is implying that the structures for management and oversight are producing what they were supposed to produce, but there is no evaluation and the reviews are mostly process oriented, so there is no objective analysis of the value of the results per se. In fact, it is possible to conceive of a scenario where all the outputs are of poor quality; what is also clear is that the outputs themselves have been created. (ex. training seats filled in but no statement of incremental qualifications; provinces did their pilots but what were the results?).

The GoV is clearly of the opinion that up-front planning was required, for all aspects of the intervention including CD (refer to the Annexes noted in this paper). Just because CD processes were not reported on does not mean that they were not managed; in fact, the reviews clearly show how the oversight bodies examined all aspects of the intervention out of a sense of ownership (common in Natural resources scientific interventions in my experience).

The documentation does not support the idea that any "options" for strategic change were considered other than the one selected for this intervention. The GoV presented its own analysis with what is essentially a project design built-in.

Effectiveness:

There were no specifically defined capability targets although one of the annexes to the design docs clearly spells out the need for doing a gap analysis in the ministry. Reviews point to the lack of data on CD progress but point to increased use of energy efficiency approaches by private sector and local governments, without specifying how. The entire governance structure of the GoV was involved in the

projects as well as the eventual implementing bodies such as architects and engineers. The overall outcomes were about to be achieved but the poor economic condition of the GoV pointed to a serious slowing down of the expansion of the results. It is not clear if the learning will be preserved and how. No unplanned results were identified. The programme was supposed to be based on results and in large part it was, except for activities with little definition... (process based). M&E systems were inadequate for Danida purposes related to CD but appear to be appropriate for GoV purposes. No real Danish comparative advantages were exploited. Design docs specifically exclude evaluations.

Poverty reduction:

The entire CC strategy is based on the impacts of CC on the economy and people of Vietnam. The Mitigation and Adaptation strategies generated and adapted to the local conditions clearly dealt with the mitigation of CC effects on what are, in effect, some of the most disadvantaged peoples of the Country.

Sustainability:

The strategy was to a) pilot approaches in two provinces and then expand to rest of country and b) prepare approaches and mitigation strategies to reduce the effect of CC on Vietnam and vice versa. Both parts of these strategies were apparently quite successful but the future financial support for continued rollout is in danger because of poor economic performance. The means were there to do it the first time and the experiences were mainstreamed across a large number of organisations, public bodies, civil society and the private sector. At least in terms of the beneficiaries that were involved so far, there has been a significant amount of learning. It is not clear what they will do with it, but at least it is imbedded into the technical-social systems of the Country (much as suggested by Nonaka in terms of group-individual transfer of explicit and implicit knowledge).

Documents consulted

MFA/ Danida and GoV. 2008. Final Programme Document: Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation, Vietnam.

MFA/ Danida and MoNRE. 2008. Final Component Document: Climate Change Adaptation – Support to the National Target Program to Respond to Climate Change.

MFA/ Danida and MoIT. 2008. Final Component Document: Climate Change Mitigation – Support to the Vietnam Energy Efficiency Program.

MFA/ Danida. 2011. Review Aide Memoire: Review of the Climate Change Adaptation & Mitigation (CCAM) Program

MFA/ Danida. 2013. Review Aide Memoire: Review of the Climate Change Adaptation & Mitigation (CCAM) Program

Appendix A: Desk-based scorecard guidance document

Joint Scandinavian evaluation of support to capacity development Desk-based Review scorecard guidance document

2 Nov 2014

Introduction

This document provides guidance on how to populate the scorecard for the Desk-based Review (DBR). The purpose of the scorecard is to collect consistent information across interventions and donors, therefore it is important not to deviate from the instructions contained within this document. It is important to not input your answers directly into the “Summary sheet” of the scorecard. This is automatically populated by the individual scorecards. It is equally important not to change the drop down lists in sheet “DropDownLists”. If you have comments or suggestions regarding these, please direct them to Gonçalo Carneiro at goncalo.carneiro@niras.se, tel. +46 705 242 987, so that any changes are shared with all evaluation teams.

For interventions that have a wider remit than capacity development, please only focus on the capacity development aspects of the intervention. However, you must make sure it is clear to the reader that the capacity development activities are a subset of the wider intervention activities.

For interventions that have had more than one phase, the DBR should concentrate only on the last two phases. When reviewing interventions with only one phase, please ignore variables 6 and 21 that refer to changes in planning and learning from evaluation results between different phases of the intervention respectively.

Recall that a maximum of two working days are to be used for the DBR of each intervention. The amount of documentation consulted, the comprehensiveness of your analyses, and the level of detail of your responses should take this constraint into consideration. Because of significant differences in the number, type and quality of the documentation available for each intervention, no generic guidance is provided on which documents to select. It is up to each evaluation team to make such selection.

Structure and functionalities of the scorecard

The functionality of the DBR scorecard is based on and very similar to that of the PS scorecard. Should you have doubts in this respect, please refer to the PS scorecard instructions sheet for an overview of its different fields. The only functional change introduced is that cells with drop down lists have been coloured in a darker shade of blue than cells where answers are input individually.

In what concerns the structure of the scorecard, it contains seven main divisions. Division “0. DBR Process” serves to gather information about the documentation consulted; Division “I. Intervention essentials” serves to gather information about selected structural elements of the intervention; Divisions “II. Planning of the intervention”, “III. Design of the intervention” and “IV. Implementation of the intervention” serve to describe and assess specific aspects of the planning, design and implementation stages of the intervention; Division “V. Monitoring and evaluation of the intervention” assesses M&E-related procedures of the intervention; and Division “VI.

Recommendation regarding the country studies” gives the reviewer’s assessment regarding the suitability of the intervention for further investigation in the country study phase.

With the exception of variables “1. Country” and “2. Name of the intervention”, the DBR scorecard does not include any variables already explored by the PS scorecard. In several instances, it does however serve to explore further and complement some of the PS variables. For example, variable “8.

Adaptation to context” provides additional detail relative to PS variable “16. Evidence of a comprehensive context analysis for capacity development”. Another example, variable “12. Complexity of the capacities to be developed” complements PS variable “15. Complexity of the target group for the capacity development intervention” by exploring other factors affecting the complexity of the capacities targeted by the intervention.

As was the case with the PS scorecard, the variables that make up the DBR scorecard have been developed with reference to the dimensions proposed in the ToR, and in particular in its Annexes I and II. Not all such dimensions have been included, due to the limitations in time, data sources and reporting format applicable to the DBR. The dimensions left out of the DBR and a more detailed exploration of some of the variables in the DBR will be addressed in the country studies for selected interventions.

Explanation of each variable

The italicized text contains instructions on how to input information for each variable; this text is also present in the scorecard itself. The boxed roman/upright text provides specific instructions on how to interpret or assess some of the variables or elements thereof.

0. DBR Process

0. Documentation used

List the types of documents consulted for the Desk-based Review of this intervention, indicating the number and year of documents of the same type (e.g. Progress report 2011, Progress report 2012)

I. Identification of the intervention

Variables 1 and 2 serve only to identify the intervention. Variable 3 complements the information compiled in the PS scorecard with details about the institution(s) responsible for implementing the intervention. Please refer to the PS scorecard for complementary details about the intervention.

1. Institution

Write the institution receiving capacity development support, exactly as in the PS scorecard.

Write the English name(s) in full.

2. Name of the intervention.

Write the name of the intervention.

3. Implementing institution(s)

Write the name the institution(s) implementing the intervention.

Write the English name(s) in full.

II. Planning of the intervention

4. Background and preparatory steps

In no more than 100 words, provide an account of the background and preparatory steps to the intervention. Among others, consider events such as visits by delegations, workshops or bilateral requests, and deliverables such as baseline, needs or feasibility assessments, grant submissions or evaluation reports. Please summarise the roles of the donor, of the implementing and recipient institutions, and, if applicable, of external actors in the identified background and preparatory steps. Write "No/ Insufficient data" if the data are insufficient to perform this assessment.

The purpose of this variable is to gain insight into the comprehensiveness of the analyses upon which the intervention has been elaborated, as well as into the relative contribution of different stakeholders to

this process. The assessment should include events involving consultations between stakeholders, as well as more standardised procedures/deliverables.

5. Financial assessment – latest phase

Has any financial assessment (cost-benefit, value-for-money, other) of the intervention been conducted (Yes / No)?

If yes, please summarise the main conclusions of the assessment in cell D12.

6. Learning: Changes in planning of the intervention

In no more than 100 words, summarise how the planning of the intervention has changed over time. To the extent applicable, refer to issues such as the roles of the donor, implementing and recipient institutions, involvement of external actors, capacities to be developed and scope of the intervention. Write "Not applicable" if the intervention only has one phase. Write "No / Insufficient data" if the data are insufficient to perform this assessment.

The purpose of this variable is to explore how responsive the intervention has been to changes in context and in the recipient organisation (e.g. resulting from the previous phase of the intervention) and whether such response has involved changes in the roles of different stakeholders and in the content of the intervention.

Changes should be sought at the level of the involvement of different stakeholders, type of the capacities to be developed, and scope of the intervention.

III. Design of the intervention

7. Content of the intervention

Using the options provided in the drop down box, give a rating of the extent to which the content of the intervention aligns with each of the alternatives provided in cells C15-G15. (No alignment; Very weak; Weak; Medium; Strong; Very strong; No / Insufficient data). Please provide evidence to support your assessment in cell B17.

The alternatives of analyses upon which the design of the intervention is based are:

- * Findings from preparatory studies (feasibility, needs and/or baseline assessments);
- * Issue-relevant part of national strategy (i.e. the part(s) of existing strategy(ies) of the recipient country that are directly relevant to the intervention)
- * Institutional development strategy (a strategy for the development of the capacity of the recipient institution)
- * Recommendations from evaluation

Assess the degree to which the findings or recommendations of each of these analyses are reflected in the design of the intervention.

Your assessment is largely qualitative, and the scale provided must not be regarded in strict quantitative terms (e.g. as percentage quintiles), as it will not be possible to establish a numerical standard valid across all interventions. The justification for the qualitative ratings – provided under “EVIDENCE”, for example with specific examples – is of greater importance than any eventual numerical exactitude.

EVIDENCE

Write a description of the evidence supporting your assessment for variable 7 here.

8. Adaptation to context

Using the options provided in the drop down box, give a rating of the extent to which the intervention is adapted to the context elements provided in cells C18-I18 (Not adapted; Very weak; Weak; Medium; Strong; Very strong; No / Insufficient data). Please provide evidence to support your assessment in cell B20.

The context elements include: Political and policy context, Social and cultural factors, Legal framework, Physical and natural environment, Needs and capacity of recipient institution, Other.

Assess the design of the intervention against these contextual factors as described in the contextual analysis underlying the intervention, as given in project or related background documents.

Justify your rating/assessment with concrete examples of how the intervention is or is not adapted to the mentioned context elements.

EVIDENCE

Write a description of the evidence supporting your assessment for variable 17 here.

9. Targeting of external actors

Does the intervention include any activities for or outputs and outcomes related to institutions other than the recipient(s) (Yes/No)? If yes, in no more than 100 words summarise these activities, outputs and outcomes. Please indicate the names, or if these are not specified, the categories of external actors targeted by the intervention. Write "No/ Insufficient data" if the data are insufficient to perform this assessment.

This variable captures whether the intervention has elaborated any specific activities, outputs and outcomes for stakeholders external to the recipient institution(s) and how these are expected to support the overall CD goals of the intervention. The purpose is to gain insight into an eventual "pull approach" applied by the intervention – who are the actors, how does the intervention interact with them, what is their role and how are they expected to support CD at the recipient institution(s).

10. Identification and use of champions

Has the intervention employed, or does it employ any champions, i.e. individuals or organisations external to the recipient institution with the power to support the organisational change envisioned by the intervention (Yes / No)? If yes, indicate who these champions are, and what their role is in cell D22. Write "No / Insufficient data" if the data are insufficient to perform this assessment.

This variable directly explores one of Boesen's elements of the adequacy of the donor effort vis-à-vis the capacity(ies) to be developed,¹⁴ inquiring about the employment of so-called champions by the intervention. In this context, champions are individuals or groups of individuals sufficiently powerful to influence the support granted to the intervention and the respective CD goals at the recipient institution(s).

11. Identification and use of change agents

Who are the change agents employed by the intervention and what is their role? Write "No/Insufficient data" if the data are insufficient to perform this assessment.

This variable complements variable 23 of the PS scorecard by inquiring specifically about the change agents envisioned by the intervention. The assessment should consider both implicit and explicit change agents, the former potentially including the human resources provided by the donor and/or the implementing institution(s) who are expected to promote change at the recipient institution(s). If the intervention explicitly identifies change agents, please refer to these.

As with variable 10, this variable directly addresses one of Boesen's elements of the adequacy of donor effort.

12. Complexity of the capacities to be developed

¹⁴ Approach paper, Annex 1 to the ToR, p.12.

Using the options provided in the drop down box, indicate the degree of each of the factors affecting the complexity of the capacities developed in the intervention (High, Medium, Low, No/ Insufficient data). For each factor, write a description of the evidence supporting your assessment (cells D24-D29).

- * Specificity of products or services
- * Scope/distribution of capacities
- * Incentives to performance (CD recipients)
- * Interests of elites
- * Affinity with dominant norms and values

This is an assessment of the complexity of the capacity to be developed by the intervention using Boesen's complexity factors. Please refer to Approach Paper: Annex 1 to the ToR, pp.10-11 for details of each of these factors. The assessment is predominantly qualitative and it is of great importance that a careful description of evidence is provided (EVIDENCE, cells D25-D29), ideally with concrete examples.

13. Alignment with CD Theory of Change

Using the options provided in the drop down box, indicate the degree to which each of the parameters indicated in cells B31-B36 apply to the latest phase of the intervention. These parameters are postulated to affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the CD process (High, Medium, Low, No/ Insufficient data). For each parameter, write a description of the evidence supporting your assessment (cells D31-D36).

- * Endogeneity (locally driven, managed and owned)
- * Adaptation and flexibility (to organisational and contextual factors)
- * Measurability of results (capacity and performance)
- * Concurrence of external factors
- * Focus on achieving measurable changes
- * Demand from the recipient

This is an assessment of the degree to which selected parameters of a generic theory of change of capacity development are present in the design of the intervention. This ToC is described by Boesen, who provides additional detail of each of the six parameters.¹⁵ The assessment is highly qualitative and it is of great importance that a careful description of evidence is provided (EVIDENCE, cells D58-D63), ideally with concrete examples.

IV. Implementation of the intervention

14. Challenges to implementation

Summarise the main challenges affecting the implementation of the CD component(s) of the intervention. If no challenges have been reported, write "None".

15. Degree of delivery

For each of the domains indicated in cells B40-B46, indicate the degree of delivery of activities and outputs against planned, using the drop down boxes in cells C40-E46 (Very high, High, Medium, Low, Very low, None, No/ Insufficient data, Not relevant for intervention).

- * Systems (methods, procedures, routines)

¹⁵ Approach paper, Annex 1 to the ToR, pp.9-10.

- * *Structures (authority, rights & duties, communication)*

(power, responsibility and accountability structures)

- * *Individual knowledge & skills*

- * *Equipment (hard- & software)*

- * *Work environment*

(comprising the physical and the social environment)

- * *External factors*

(if the intervention seeks to influence factors external to the recipient institution that are considered relevant for the capacity of the organisation)

- * *Other*

EVIDENCE

Write a description of the evidence supporting your assessment for variable 15 here.

V. Monitoring and evaluation of the intervention

Variables 17-21 only apply to interventions that have been evaluated and for which evaluation reports are available.

16. Systems for accountability and learning

In no more than 100 words, provide a description of how monitoring, evaluation and learning have been conducted in the intervention. Indicate any significant deviations from the planned M&E system.

The purpose of this variable is to describe how monitoring, evaluation and learning from evaluation results has been, or is being conducted in the intervention, and thereby provide insight into the elements of an eventual results-based approach of the intervention. The assessment should also consider differences between the planned and realised monitoring, evaluation and learning procedures.

17. Achievement of planned outcomes

Using the options provided in the drop down box, and according to the latest final report and evaluation report of the intervention, indicate the extent to which the intervention has achieved its planned outcomes in terms of capacity development (Very high, High, Medium, Low, Very low, None, No/Insufficient data, Not relevant for intervention). Describe the evidence supporting your assessment in cell D50.

EVIDENCE

Provide evidence of the degree of achievement of planned outcomes

This variable explores the extent to which reported capacity outcomes conform with the planned outcomes, thereby providing an indication of the success of the CD component(s) of the intervention.

18. Unanticipated positive outcomes

Have any unanticipated/unplanned positive CD outcomes of the intervention been reported in the latest final evaluation of the intervention (Yes/No)? If yes, summarise these in cell D51.

This variable explores the extent to which the intervention has led to any positive capacity outcomes that had not been planned for, as reported in the latest final evaluation report.

19. Negative outcomes

Have any negative impacts been reported in the latest final evaluation of the intervention (Yes/ No)? If yes, summarise those in cell D52.

This variable explores the extent to which the intervention has resulted in any negative capacity outcomes, as reported in the latest final evaluation report.

20. Overall success of the intervention

Using the options in the drop down box, and according to the documentation reviewed, what is your assessment of the overall success of the intervention? (Very successful, Somewhat successful, Neither successful nor unsuccessful, Somewhat unsuccessful, Very unsuccessful, No/Insufficient data)? Describe the evidence supporting your assessment in cell D53.

EVIDENCE

Justify your assessment.

21. Implementation of recommendations from evaluations

Using the options provided in the drop down box, indicate the degree to which recommendations from evaluations have been implemented in the latest phase of the intervention (Very high, High, Medium, Low, Very low, None, No/Insufficient data, Not relevant for intervention). Describe the evidence supporting your assessment in cell D54.

EVIDENCE

Provide evidence of the implementation of evaluation recommendations.

22. Learning from M&E

Is there any evidence of learning from the results of M&E (between and within each phase of the intervention) (Yes/ No)? If yes, give examples in cell D55.

Variables 21 and 22 explore further elements of the results-based orientation of the intervention by inquiring whether and to which extent recommendations from earlier evaluations have been acted upon and whether and how learning from evaluation results has occurred between subsequent phases of the intervention.

VI. Recommendation regarding the country studies

23. Recommendation

Do you recommend further assessment of this intervention in a country study (Yes/ No)? Provide a justification for your answer in cell D57.

Provide your assessment of whether this intervention is suitable for further investigation in the country study phase of the evaluation.

Data Cleaning

Once you have completed the review of interventions. You will need to clean the “Summary sheet” for instructional information, which is automatically appearing within the sheet. Click on the cells, which do not contain data that you have inputted and delete the generic text.