

# Evaluation of Capacity Development in Danish Development Assistance

## Annex F: Uganda Country Study

November 2015



**IRDC**



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## Abbreviations

aBi	Agri-business Initiative
ACC	Anti-Corruption Court
ACE	Association of Consulting Engineers
ACP	Anti-corruption Programme
AG	Auditor General
CCS	Commitment Control System
CD	Capacity Development
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
Danida	The term used for Denmark's development cooperation, which is an area of activity under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
DEI	Directorate of Ethics and Integrity
DBR	Desk-based Review
DfID	UK Development Agency
DGF	Democratic Governance Facility
DKK	Danish Kroner
DP	Development Partner
DPP	Directorate for Public Prosecutions
DSIP	Agriculture Sector Development Strategy and Investment Plan
DTS	Data Tracking Services
EFT	Electronic Funds Transfer
EoD	Embassy of Denmark (in Uganda)
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FG	Focus Group
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FDS	Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy
FTST	Fast Track Screening Test
G4G	Gender for Growth
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	German Development Implementation Agency
GoU	Government of Uganda
GPM	Denmark Guidelines for Project Management
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
HRD	Human Resources Development
HQ	Headquarters
HUGGO	Human Rights and Good Governance Office
IAF	Inter-Agency Forum
IFMS	Integrated Financial Management Systems
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
IG	Inspectorate General of Government (Statute of 1988)
IGG	Inspector General of Government
JLOS	Justice Law and Order Sector
KfW	German Development Bank
MAAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MELTC	Mount Elgon Labour-based Training Centre
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoW	Ministry of Works
MWE	Ministry of Water and Environment
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NCG	Nordic Consulting Group
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NTR	Non-Tax Revenue
PFM	Public Financial Management
PSAS	Public Sector Agricultural Support
RBM	Results-Based Management
ROACH	Results-Oriented Approach to Capacity Change
RTI	Rural Transportation Infrastructure
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SPS	Sector Programming Support
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approaches
TA	Technical Assistance or Technical Assistant
TMEA	Trade Mark East Africa
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UGOGO	Ugandan Good Governance Programme
UG1/UG2	Uganda Growth Programme 1 or 2
USAID	American Development Agency
WB	World Bank

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Scope and purpose of the country study

The “**Evaluation of Capacity Development in Danish Development Assistance**” was launched in September 2014. The Evaluation forms part of the “**Joint Scandinavian evaluation of support to capacity development**” involving Danida, Norad and Sida. As stated in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Evaluation, the purpose of the Evaluation is to improve decision-making and strategy development in Danida regarding support to capacity development (CD) in developing countries. The purpose has both learning and accountability elements. The methodology of the Evaluation contains five steps, where each step builds on the findings and development of the previous, and provides an opportunity for triangulation between documents and verbal accounts.

- Step 1: Portfolio Screening
- Step 2: Desk-Based Review
- Step 3: Country Case Studies
- Step 4: Cross-analysis of all data, development of main evaluation report
- Step 5: Synthesis Report writing (together with Sida and Norad teams)

The **Uganda Country Study** forms part of Step 3. Uganda was selected as one of three case countries (Nepal and Tanzania being the other two), as the portfolio screening and the desk based review pointed to three programme interventions, which were judged to have a relatively high CD contents and satisfactory results. Additional interventions were recommended by the Embassy of Denmark (EoD).

### Box 1: Danida interventions included in the Uganda Country Study

The Programmes selected for the Desk-based Review in Uganda were:

- **The Uganda-Growth Programme Phase I (U-Growth) 2011-2013:**
  1. Public Sector Agriculture Support (PSAS)
  2. Rural Transport Infrastructure (RTI) Component
  3. The Agribusiness Initiative (aBi)
- **The Anti-Corruption Programme (ACP) 2007-2011**

In addition to the Desk-based Review (DBR) interventions the following programmes were include in the Country Study in consultation with the EoD:

- **The Ugandan Good Governance Programme (UGOGO) 2011-2016**
  1. Democratic Governance Facility (DGF)
  2. Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS)
  3. Support to the Inspectorate of Government under the Accountable Local Service Delivery (ALSD)
- **Joint Water & Environment Sector Support Programme (JWESSP) 2013-2018**

Although the evaluation team had originally decided to leave out the Water and Environment Programme because, in its estimation, it was too recent to detect capacity development outcomes the EoD convinced the evaluation team to include it in study because it has a significant CD component that has produced important results. Its analysis is not as in-depth as the others, and it is considered as being complementary to that of the three main interventions.

The purpose of the country visit was to expand on the observations and findings from the desk based review. Part of the rationale for the mission was to continue to gather the information required to answer the 15 evaluation questions and the four hypotheses as stated in the Terms of Reference (ToR). Although they were not integrated into Danida's policy framework at the time of their planning, the evaluation nevertheless sought to deepen the understanding of the results-chain as regards capacity development and how this relates to a Theory of Change (ToC) concept in a practical setting, and only insofar as it was possible to do so.

The country visit was carried out from 1-13 March 2015. The List of Persons Met is attached as Annex A and the Visit Programme as Annex B. A Uganda Capacity Development Background Note was prepared prior to the visit to Uganda to provide an overview of the experience of other donors, attached as Annex C. A field visit was undertaken to Mbale and Kumi to examine the CD experience with rural transportation as part of U-GROWTH, and to Masaka to examine the CD experiences with the Magistrates Court and the IG Regional Office as part of the ACP and UGOGO. Field Notes are attached as Annex D. Two focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in Kampala: one for technical specialists and the other for programme managers (although some participants switched FGDs to match their own time availability – a Synthesis Note is attached as Annex E. Briefs on the Danida interventions (ref. Box 1) are attached as Annex F, which include the two interventions that were subject to the desk-based review and two additional interventions.

A briefing session was held with some of the key EoD staff on Monday March 1, and a de-briefing was held with EoD on Friday March 13. A power point presentation of overall findings and preliminary conclusions was used in that de-briefing.

The Evaluation team (ET)<sup>1</sup> would like to thank all stakeholders met and consulted for the valuable support and information that the ET received. It would especially like to thank the staff and management of the EoD for its guidance, content support and logistical help. The Uganda Country Study Report presents the major observation, findings and conclusions of the ET that are based on stakeholder consultations during the mission and on the documents reviewed prior to and during the visit. The views expressed in the report reflect the position of the ET, which may not necessarily be shared by Danida, other development partners (DPs) or by the Government of Uganda (GoU), its ministries and agencies.

## 1.2 Approach to Capacity Development

To design and manage a capacity development intervention, one needs to start out by defining what end-state of any selected organisation (or group of organisations) is desired. These are typically at an outcome level because that is the highest level over which some degree of influence can be applied. An “organisation” is more than the sum of human or social systems. In dealing with mandates and outcomes, that concept must be broadened to one where an organisation is seen as a socio-technical entity (composed of technical and human vectors) dedicated to collective action in the pursuit of the generation of outcomes and impacts; these will become the goods and services that are transferred to (consumed by) the various elements of the operational/business environment within which it is embedded.

An organisation exists to generate outcomes and impacts. Assuming that a public sector organisation has an approved mandate and strategic targets, a selection among strategic and operational options will define how these outcomes are expected to be produced. Thus, how much of those outcomes or impacts that one wants to generate within a given time or space,

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<sup>1</sup> Mr Robert LeBlanc (IRDC), Ms Marina Buch Kristensen (NCG), and Mr Jasper Tumuhimbise (freelance).

given assumed levels and means of production, defines the expected levels of results (what will be produced and how much) that the organisation will generate at the outcome/impact levels. To achieve that performance, the organisation(s) involved (there may be more than one) must decide how they will organise (mix, acquire, etc.) organisational abilities (individual, managerial, strategic and operational) assets and other resources, or any entitlements, authorities and delegations they may require. Obviously, they must also define how much and what kind of these assets, abilities and mandates they need. When organised (i.e. designed, mixed, orchestrated, grouped, deployed, etc.) to enable a functional or socio-technical system to perform, the integrated groupings are called the capabilities of the organisation.

For a given organisational entity, its **capacity** will be the resulting effect generated from the assemblage, orchestration, mobilization and manifestation of its **capabilities**, (assets, abilities and mandates). The capacity indicates the level of effectiveness of an organisation at whatever level it is being examined. For example, one can speak of the capacity of the organisation, of a division or a sub-unit. One can speak of the capacity to produce a specific product. In reality, a “capacity” is a measure of effectiveness at transforming, and is thus analogous to “productivity”. The table below illustrates capacity development levels, elements and approaches.

**Capacity Development Framework**

Capacity development level	Some elements that define capacity	Main capacity development approaches
Enabling environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socio-political interests and linkages</li> <li>• Social and economic factors</li> <li>• Policy frameworks</li> <li>• Strategies and plans</li> <li>• Laws and regulatory mechanisms</li> <li>• Institutional landscapes</li> <li>• Resource allocation among public sector functions</li> </ul>	Reform processes
Organisational level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mandate, legitimacy, credibility</li> <li>• Values, political interference</li> <li>• Organisational structure and processes</li> <li>• Planning and approval procedures</li> <li>• Systems and tools including M&amp;E</li> <li>• Knowledge management</li> <li>• Staff levels, qualifications and delegated authority</li> </ul>	Organisational development
Individual level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Skills</li> <li>• Knowledge</li> <li>• Experience</li> <li>• Attitude</li> <li>• Competence</li> </ul>	Human resources development

**1.3 Limitations**

It was encouraging to share findings with the personnel of the EoD and to find that their assessments were largely in line with those of the Evaluation.<sup>2</sup> The EoD agreed to assist the team in proving detailed comments to the country reports, which they did – thus improving the level of reliability and validity in our findings. This Evaluation of capacity development has its own challenges however, including:

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<sup>2</sup> Refer to the feedback sent by the Head of Cooperation which very much supported the findings of the evaluation, as well as the responses of the EoD sector managers who provided specific details and corrected some parts of the report, but where the key messages of the report are supported to a large degree.

- 1) Two weeks in Uganda, even if a team is composed of three people, is a very short time to understand such complex programmes and their progress, especially when there is little in the way of objectively verifiable indicators and progress metrics.
- 2) Many organisations were extremely busy, including EoD. Access to managers was difficult and took time to organise.
- 3) There were many occasions where misunderstanding and confusion occurred because of a lack of common understanding of what was, in fact, capacity development. Baselines and results frameworks were almost non-existent, making analysis of progress towards expected goals and objectives nearly impossible.
- 4) Progress reports and other intervention-based documentation rarely spoke of capacity progress, and capacity development outcomes even less. This made the evaluation team to rely more than necessary on individual perception and opinion, rather than empirical evidence.
- 5) Much of the detailed documentation and data regarding how and why an intervention was designed in a particular way is not readily available.
- 6) The difference between contribution and attribution being well known, the evaluation team focussed on capacity development *results* and not *process*. Simply noting that a capacity development initiative, action or activity contributed to “organisational strengthening”, for example, was not particularly helpful for the objectives of this evaluation. The evaluation team therefore sought to identify in what ways those investments and efforts contribute to the attainment of *organisational performance* (at outcome levels). The documented information was scarce and the evaluation team had to rely on opinion and proxy measures.

Despite the above limitations, it is the opinion of the ET that its findings and lessons learned deducted from the Evaluation can provide inputs to improve decision-making and strategy development in Danida generally and in Uganda specifically regarding support to capacity development.

## 2. Context for Capacity Development

### 2.1 Political

Political commentators on Uganda have often lamented the apparent veneer of democracy and reform.<sup>3</sup> In the context of a well-documented patronage system that favours policies that generate opportunities for rewarding political loyalty with power or wealth, reforms that reward merit, compliance and results are harder to implement consistently. Money politics is an issue at all levels. The distribution of money and gifts to voters to influence their electoral choices, ghost voters and media outlets being threatened for granting media space to certain political parties or candidates and abuse of state resources for political campaigns have become an entrenched part of the political culture in Uganda. The lack of transparency in political party and candidate funding, the low levels of accountability, and the poor or non-existent enforcement of rules prohibiting the use of public resources in campaigns all collude together to undermine democracy.<sup>4</sup> There are furthermore continued restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression and journalists face harassment, occasional violence, and various other obstacles while attempting to cover the news.<sup>5</sup> Under the multi-party system, elections have been held and these have been challenged in court because of alleged malpractices in 2006 and in 2011 respectively. Currently the country is preparing for another election period in 2016.

### 2.2 Governance culture

The Government supported by development partners has implemented various governance policies since 1986 and there has been progress in terms of public sector reforms. Uganda has by now an elaborate legal frameworks, regulations and systems that follow best international practice but that have an implementation gap in their enforcement and compliance.<sup>6</sup> Public service reforms have however streamlined the civil service. In 1991 the number of ministries was cut from 38 to 21 and in 1992 the finance and planning ministries were merged.<sup>7</sup> However, efforts have since waned, leaving pay scales out of line with the region and private sector counterparts, as well as rigid structures that are not responsive to capacity needs. This has led to greater demand for 'gap filling' by enabling well-qualified and motivated professionals to do the job of civil servants through subsidised salaries. Low motivation and low capacity of counterpart staff may constrain the capability-transfer impact.

Uganda was one of the first countries to receive budget support and enjoyed good relations with donors, who have also provided significant on-budget and off-budget project support.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, Uganda still faces major challenges. In line with its NDP, the Government has focused development spending on accelerated infrastructure development. The need to mobilise domestic revenue to manage financing needs more sustainably has not yet been achieved consistently and domestic revenue is the lowest in the region as a percentage of GDP. Resources for public service delivery are therefore often inadequate and performance has been affected. For example, through stagnant or worsening trends in maternal mortality and HIV/AIDs, difficulty raising educational performance and several cases of poor quality public works. Donor-

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<sup>3</sup> Barkan, Uganda: *Assessing Risks to Stability*, 2011.

<sup>4</sup> IG, *Data Tracking Mechanism of Corruption*, 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Assessment of JAF 5, May 2014 and Freedom House, 2014 report for Uganda.

<sup>6</sup> For example, Global Integrity calculates this gap as 51 percent for Uganda. Laws score 100 out of 100 points but implementation scores only 49 out of 100 points.

<sup>7</sup> Tilley et al 2015 forthcoming.

<sup>8</sup> Budget support to Uganda may be divided into three phases: the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), Poverty Action Fund (PAF) and Sector Budget Support (SBS) (1998-2001); General Budget Support (GBS) and the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) (2001-08); and the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) and the shift back to projects (2008-12).

Government tensions have also arisen, particularly over human rights issues and a number of corruption cases with long and challenging investigation processes, giving the impression of relative impunity. In some cases, this has led to suspension of external support, requiring emergency measures to be agreed to restore confidence in government systems. These tensions, along with shifting priorities among the donor community, have led to a reduction in budget support and a different dialogue with Government emerging.<sup>9</sup> ODA to Uganda has declined from 32.6% of the budget in 2009/10 to 19.2% in 2014/15.<sup>10</sup>

To some extent, this has changed the scope and opportunities for dialogue on CD needs, in some cases increasing the dialogue, but becoming more specific, from a broader national agenda, towards a more focused project-based dialogue. For example the withdrawal of donors from the general budget support facility is likely to have consequences for the level of GoU ownership, engagement and sustainability where there is reduced use of national systems and may require a focus on introducing specific CD programs to tackle the longer-term needs, as well as filling short-term gaps.

The legal and institutional frameworks in place have not been as effective as anticipated by civil society and development partners. Rent seeking and state capture by the ruling party have been on the increase.<sup>11</sup> Effective implementation of the framework is hampered by the poor enabling environment for the anti-corruption agencies to carry out their work including low public demand of accountability, limited support and incentive to change within the ruling elite, lack of a definitive collaborative framework in the accountability sector, the lack of follow up on recommendations made by oversight institutions and the executive exercising quasi judicial powers and threatening the independence of the judiciary.

The governance deficiencies also stem from insufficient capacity in the anti-corruption agencies to attract, train and retain skilled and specialised staff and poor information management systems, which manifest itself as delays in the completion of investigation, prosecution and final disposal of cases and a backlog in carrying out the required audits and inspections of public entities.<sup>12</sup> The increasing number of districts has only exacerbated these problems by spreading resources even more thinly. The situation is further exacerbated by new trends of corruption, by international drivers of corruption and the challenges to prosecution that come with globalization and technological advancements, which in turn affect the efficacy of regulatory and financial systems.

On a positive note, there are improvements with regard to accountability at MDAs with an improving trend in the production of quality financial reports. The number of qualified audits has declined from app. 80% to app 40% in less than 10 years.<sup>13</sup> The role of civil society is more visible on matter of accountability, there is more demand and monitoring of service delivery at local level, the Public Accounts Committee in Parliament is vocal in trying to hold the Government accountable (although its effectiveness is hampered by limited capacity) and Judiciary and the IG have displayed a certain degree of independence.

## 2.3 Socio-economic

In November 2014, the Ministry of Finance, released a report on poverty. According to the report, poverty levels have declined to 19.7%. The significant decline in overall inequality from

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<sup>9</sup> Granger (WHO), *The demand and supply of technical assistance in Uganda*, 2014.

<sup>10</sup> <http://budget.go.ug/budget/content/budget-speech-3>

<sup>11</sup> IG, *Data Tracking Mechanism of Corruption*, 2014, DEI, *National Anti-Corruption Strategy* (2014-2019).

<sup>12</sup> Including by the Public Service Inspections, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Asset Authority (PPDAA) and the Office of the Auditor General (OAG).

<sup>13</sup> The Strategic Investment Plan for the Accountability Sector (2014-2019).

0.426% in 2009/10 to 0.395% also suggests that socio-economic interventions are beginning to yield some positive results. The report further notes that whereas the progress (poverty eradication) is commendable, much remains to be done to improve delivery of quality services to the people of Uganda, as well as improve the income and secure the livelihood of the approximately 43% of the population that is at risk of falling back into poverty in the event of a shock (inflation, unemployment, etc.). Effort is needed to reduce vulnerability, and help build the resilience of individuals and communities especially in northern Uganda where poverty rates remain high as a result of high youth unemployment, gender inequality, lack of access to basic services, and low economic development.<sup>14</sup>

Earlier, to enhance economic development, the GoU decided to adopt a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in 1998 to planning and public service delivery processes. The SWAp initially sought to facilitate the realization of the various reforms outlined under the PEAP. As a result, Sectors were formed to cover all major areas of the economy such as the Health, Education, Agriculture, Justice Law & Order and Accountability sectors.

To improve on performance in the public sector, a five-year National Development Plan (NDP) was formulated with the purpose of developing Uganda into a middle-income country by 2017. This NDP was launched in 2010 by Government for implementation during 2010-2015. The aim is to effectively realize the goals and objectives of the NDP as a transformation of the PEAP, through strengthening coordination and coherence among institutions with closely linked mandates and goals hence performing complimentary roles in the delivery of public services. According to the NDP, the vision for Uganda is to be “A transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years”. The NDP has various elements, which include inter-alia: ability to exploit and use its resources gainfully and sustainably to promote competitiveness, independence, self-sustenance, and a dynamic economy, which is resilient to any external shocks; and secondly an economy which supports stability and protection of biological and physical systems. An economy will be developed that is sustainable and free from donor dependence”.

To achieve the NDP the expected outcomes that were formulated included: increasing household incomes and promoting equity; enhancing the availability and quality of gainful employment; improving stock and quality of economic infrastructure; increasing access to quality social services; promoting science, technology, innovation and ICT to enhance competitiveness; enhancing human capital development; strengthening good governance, defence and security as well as promoting sustainable use of the environment and natural resources. The NDP underscores the importance of key reforms and initiatives that have been adopted to improve efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure management to promote transparency and accountability and enhance the quality of public finance management and service delivery. Some of these include: Commitment Control System (CCS); Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS); Fiscal Decentralization Strategy (FDS) Non-Tax Revenue (NTR); Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT); Results Based Management (RBM) and Budget Policy. All these reforms are good on paper and they are being implemented by support from development partners and GoU. Through annual and periodic reviews, the challenges in implementation are discussed to reduce the impact. Although these strategies, plans and reforms are explicit on paper and are being supported by development partners and GoU, there has been and is still a serious challenge in implementation.

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<sup>14</sup> Ministry of Finance, *Poverty Assessment report*, 2014.

The need to mobilise domestic revenue to meet financing needs more sustainably has not yet been achieved consistently and domestic revenue is the lowest in the region as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Resources for public service delivery and public finance management are therefore often inadequate and performance has been affected. Donor-Government tensions have also arisen, particularly over human rights issues and a number of corruption cases with long and challenging investigation processes, giving the impression of relative impunity. In some cases, this has led to suspension of external support, including Technical Assistance (TA), requiring emergency measures to be agreed to restore confidence in government systems, including budget restrictions and agreement to undertake public service reforms.

These tensions, along with shifting priorities among the donor community, has led to a reduction in budget support and a different dialogue with Government emerging, to frame the use of a more diverse range of aid modalities, particularly where General Budget Support partners have moved away from GBS towards projects or providing support through civil society. To some extent, this has changed the scope and opportunities for dialogue on TA needs, in some cases increasing the dialogue, but becoming more specific, from a broader national agenda, towards a more focused project-based dialogue. This is likely to have consequences on the level of government ownership, engagement and sustainability where there is reduced use of national systems and may require special focus on introducing specific capacity building programmes to tackle the longer-term needs, as well as filling short-term gaps.”<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Granger, Heather: “Demand and Supply of Technical Assistance and Lessons for the Health Sector-Country Perspective Note, Uganda 2014”, a report prepared for the International Health Partnership (ihp+).

### 3. Observations and Findings

This chapter is structured to correspond to OECD/DAC's five evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Strictly speaking, they are not specifically inherent to a study of CD, but they are relevant to an evaluation and a Theory of Change model. The four programmes included in the Evaluation (U-Growth, ACP, UGOGO and JWESSP) are dealt with by the evaluation criteria.

The Ugandan Country Programme as a whole took place within the socio-economic, political and governance contexts explained in Chapter 2. But the formulation and implementation of individual Danida interventions and programmes also took place within their own “sub-contexts” that are complex and vary from organisation to organisation, sector to sector and enabling environment to enabling environment (to name only three vectors). The field mission to Uganda studied these contexts inasmuch as they were presented through documents and interviews. The evaluation team took these contexts into account in their analysis, to the extent possible. It is clear that a two week field visit to many different projects cannot provide the detailed knowledge needed to fully understand these contexts, and it may be that important considerations were not unearthed, or sufficiently taken into account.

#### 3.1 Relevance

##### U-GROWTH 2010-2013

There is a high degree of relevance between the capacity development objectives of U-GROWTH 1 (UG-1) on the one hand and the national development and sector strategies and plans on the other. Though the official GDP figures estimate that agriculture only accounts for 23.1% of GDP, agriculture continues to be important in terms of engaging about 80% of the total labour force, delivering about 70% of exports, and providing a large proportion of the raw materials for industry (2013 data). All GoU plans and strategies point to the need to increase household income through, inter alia, the generation of employment and agricultural surpluses that can be marketed as is or with value-added through further processing. The UG1 intervention was essentially geared towards increasing the level of wellbeing of the Ugandan people and Ugandan enterprises throughout the Agricultural and Agribusiness sectors value-chains. To that effect, the focus was placed on three integrated components: a) institutional support to the Ministry responsible for the enabling environment in that sector (the PSAS component), b) ensuring that the rural road system was adequate to both enable inputs to be brought to the farmstead and to market surpluses (the RTI component) and c) the development of the private sector's ability to transform those surpluses into saleable products (the aBi component).

Documents show that Uganda has long has a relatively sound policy framework for Agriculture and Agribusiness, but has an important implementation gap “due to important institutional weaknesses, rent-seeking and circumstances in the political economy”<sup>16</sup>. The link between MAAIF HQ and the districts is weak, with limited staff, weak supervision and poor and often inappropriate resources to work with. This is especially so in regard to the pressing regulatory and pest and disease surveillance and control responsibilities, and the extension and technical support directly to the farmers. Historically, the 1992 decentralisation policy devolved service delivery to the district local governments. MAAIF HQ responsibility in this regard was limited to support local governments to deliver services relating to regulatory frameworks, pest and disease control, quality assurance services, and agriculture statistics and information. MAAIF was also to assist with capacity building in local government. MAAIF's major link with the districts is through the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), an organisation that has become

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<sup>16</sup> UGROWTH 2 Uganda, “Component Description-Agriculture Business Initiative, 2014-2018” February 2014.

not only politicised but also inadequate for the task. Communication MAAIF – field has not historically been effective, but could improve if the Single-Spine extension system is actualized.

The macro-level policy framework has been defined by the Poverty Eradication Action Plans (PEAP 1997-2008) and is currently defined by the National Development Plan (NDP, 2010/11-2014/15), which succeeded the PEAP. The policy framework for the agricultural sector has been defined by the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA 2000<sup>17</sup>), and two Development Strategies and Investment Plans of MAAIF (DSIP 2005/06-2007/08 and DSIP 2010/11-2015/16). The PSAS Component was clearly relevant because it was originally designed to help the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) to develop the strategic and operational capabilities it required to oversee the development and implementation of the government plans under its responsibility, including its policy frameworks, regulatory frameworks and on-the-ground service delivery, be it at the farm gate or the agribusiness level. This was to be done through the PSAS objective of: “to support MAAIF in its preparations to receive sector budget support and subsequently to support implementation of the DSIP and its associated bankable programmes”. The MAAIF has long had important difficulties in generating the required capabilities to carry out its mandate: public services supporting agricultural development (research, extension/advisory, regulatory services and other domains) have been constrained with very low levels of capacity due to poor in-house abilities and skills, “modest budget allocations and ineffective use of allocated resources due to serious governance and accountability problems, and political interference. Based on that analysis it is likely that it will not be able to implement neither the GoU’s recently published accountability standards, nor the National Development Plan 2 (July 2015).<sup>18</sup> Regulatory services of the Ministry also have limited capacity and issues of governance.”<sup>19</sup> In that context, Capacity Development support to the MAAIF was relevant and necessary, but Danida’s support to the Ministry was constrained by Denmark’s policy of re-directing resources away from GoU institutions except to directly support the poorest (rural roads and water, for example).

So was the need to ensure that rural transport systems were in place. Danida has for the last 20 years supported the rural transport sector in Uganda, in close alignment to GoU’s plans. The Ministry of Works (MoW) had, for many years, been faced with the problem of un-sealed rural roads that in some areas literally deteriorated after each rainy season and has to be essentially re-built or rehabilitated. The subsequent support provided by Danida to find a solution to this problem and to develop the capacity of organisational and individual stakeholders to apply that solution under various conditions was directly relevant to the national and sector goals noted above.

While many may question the proposal that Uganda should not base its future development on primary agriculture production, current plans call for the need to broadly develop the private sector (including individual farmers) so that value is added to agricultural products throughout the value chain(s) and so that the sector’s outputs become more competitive. Danida’s support to that goal through the Agriculture Business Initiative is directly relevant to that goal and is in line with the highest priorities of the Country; the relevance of this component is further defined by the fact that Danida’s partner is the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED).

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<sup>17</sup> MAAIF and MOFPED, August 2000: Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture: Eradicating Poverty in Uganda “Government Strategy and Operational Framework”.

<sup>18</sup> The new structure of MAAIF was approved and is under implementation. Filling of vacant positions in MAAIF though constraint by funding is ongoing. By the time the FIPs were developed the staffing level at MAAIF HQ was 54% (369) of the recommended (689).

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, U-GROWTH 2 Uganda Feb 2014.

## **Joint Water & Environment Sector Support Programme (JWESSP) 2013-2018**

Following the merger of Water and Environment into one Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) in 2008, it was decided to integrate environment and climate change into JWESSP<sup>20</sup>. The merger enabled clear synergies between water and environment issues, which are also important at the local level where management of water resources must factor in how environmental degradation and changing climate affect available water resources. The JWESSP focuses on safe water to the rural and urban populations, water for productive use, as well as sustainable management and protection of water resources. The water sector in general has had low levels of funding. This coupled with a population growth rate of 3.4% constitute a significant challenge for expanding the coverage, while also operating and maintaining the current water supply systems.

Denmark is the largest bilateral Development Partner to the Water and Environment sector in Uganda. Support started in 1991 and since then the Danish assistance has contributed to significant achievements in ensuring increased coverage of safe and clean water supply and sanitation in the rural areas – current coverage stands at 65% up from 31% in 2000. The Danish support will facilitate decentralisation to enhance delivery efficiency as well as strengthening maintenance of water supply infrastructure through private sector involvement, especially as regards rural water supply. The institutional capacities across MWE and local governments will be addressed. The goals are fully aligned to the targets of the National Development Plan. It is anticipated that the Danish support can contribute to an additional 800,000 rural Ugandans gaining access to safe water annually through a rights-based approach. This will in turn contribute to better health, social progress, and broader economic growth.

## **The Anti-Corruption Programme (ACP 2008-2011) and UGOGO (2011-2016)<sup>21</sup>**

**The ACP** was well aligned with the overall policy framework for curbing corruption in Uganda. Most notably the anti-corruption policy actions in pillar 4 of the PEAP and what later became the National Development Plan (NDP) as well as the (draft) Strategic Investment Plan for the Accountability Sector.<sup>22</sup> There is not an explicit reference to relevant diagnostic assessments underpinning the focus of the program. However, the PD describes key challenges in the accountability sector, e.g. overlapping and conflicting mandates, lack of effective institutional collaboration and coordination, inadequate funding to oversight institutions, limited technical capacity and a poor performance in enforcement. Given this context it has been highly relevant to allocate a large share of the funding to civil society (app. 40% of ACP and later on app. 50% of U-GOGO) to support the demand side of good governance.

A lessons learned report on ACP I (2003-2008) was carried out to provide input for the ACP phase II programme.<sup>23</sup> The report concluded that necessary local capacity was not available to carry out some of the CD activities and that this had impacted negatively on the outcome of the CD interventions. There has to be experience locally to understand and steer the CD process when external CD expertise is brought in. A key recommendation from the lessons learned report was that Danida should focus on institutional capacity building in the new phase.<sup>24</sup> The ACP II programme document, which is drafted subsequently, includes a short institutional assessment of the partners and highlight that the capacity of the institutions to fight corruption remains limited in spite of support provided over the years. The ToC is generic and the

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<sup>20</sup> GoU/MWE. Final Programme Document, April 2013.

<sup>21</sup> ACP: Support to IG, ACD, DEI and CSOs. UGOGO: Support to DGF, Judiciary and the JLOS secretariat, IG, ULGA and Ministry of Local Government, FINMAP. This evaluation is primarily focusing on support to DGF, Judiciary and IG.

<sup>22</sup> And the National Anti-Corruption Strategy was not in place at the time.

<sup>23</sup> Onoria & Co Consultants, *Report on assessment of the ACP and capacity of CSOs to administer support interventions*, 2007.

<sup>24</sup> Also a key recommendation in the 2008 TAS Review.

programme document does not specify the capacity gaps in the institutions that will be supported and the envisaged capacity development outcomes. The strategy in phase II was to pick specific outputs under the beneficiaries' strategic plan and support specific CD initiatives such as improving IG manuals. The PD does not specify the capacity development approach that is envisioned nor does it refer to Danida's CD guidelines or the ROACH model despite it being recommended in the appraisal report.

The lessons learned report recommended that future support to the IG should include an assessment of institutional acceptability even on already agreed outputs. However IG management turned out to be a stumbling block in reaching key objectives under the ACP. The IG management was not committed to the collaboration and coordination under the Inter-Agency Forum (through support to the DEI). A focus on institutional output constrains (along the line of the approach in the ROACH model) may have guided the formulation towards supporting more relevant interventions with strong institutional backing.

**The U-GOGO Programme** is relevant in the national context and is well aligned to national priorities - notably the NDP and the African Peer Review Mechanism analysis and action plan. The Programme Document does not explicitly refer to a capacity development strategy nor to the Danida CD guidelines. The overall design of the programme was relevant as it balances the support to non-state actors (directly or through the DGF) with direct bilateral support to state actors such as IG, the Judiciary and Ministry of Local Government and the Government of Uganda's Public Financial Management Reform Programme (also known as FINMAP – Financial Management and Accountability Programme). Danida had established long-term and strategic partnerships with both the IG and the Judiciary.

The DGF does not have an explicit and comprehensive strategy for capacity development of either CSO or Government/State institutions.<sup>25</sup> There are five international TA positions in the DGF. These are however all primarily engaged in transactional tasks as programme managers (Head of Programme, Head of Finance and Component Managers). The DGF is aligned to the organisations and institutions' strategic plans/action plans and is addressing operational deficiencies on demand for both CSOs and government. Capacity development as provided by the facility is primarily focused on the ability of the CSOs to account for donor funds, e.g. financial management and M&E (a notable exception is capacity development support for gender mainstreaming). Capacity development support is not extended to Government/State institutions. Strategic partnerships involving longer-term funding of CSOs' strategic and operational plans with capacity development support have been the preferred Danida approach to supporting CSOs (ACP I and II, the HUGGO programme). This modality has been carried over to the DGF (for more established CSOs). Danida is however not in a position to facilitate a change strategy for strategic partners through the DGF to the same extent, as Danida was when the agency had a more direct bilateral partnership with CSO partners (ACP and HUGGO).<sup>26</sup>

The Judiciary had proven to be relatively independent and the leadership was committed to improving integrity. The support to the Judiciary is aligned to the Sector Investment Plan and its focus on effective and efficient use of the structures and human resources. The support is earmarked to reach specific 'strategic elements' such as the performance enhancement mechanism, reduce backlog, small claims procedure, which in turn is supposed to lead to outcomes such as access to justice, improve observance of human rights and efficient use of resources.<sup>27</sup> There are number of CD interventions such as training courses (including a training

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<sup>25</sup> App. 20% is allocated to seven Government/State institutions.

<sup>26</sup> See also MFA, *Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society*, 2013.

<sup>27</sup> As the sector investment plan was being developed.

course in Denmark) and a TA attached to the Judiciary. The Judiciary strongly supports the Danish approach to CD including a long-term strategic partnership with earmarked funding in the areas that are most problematic (as opposed to core funding) and CD provided as courses in Denmark and having a TA attached to the Judiciary.

The support to the IG and the Anti-Corruption Court (ACC) was relevant as they are the key institutions in enforcing the anti-corruption legislation and it has been an appropriate strategy to support key entry points based on the Corporate and Development Plan (2010-2014). The support to improve the investigative and prosecutorial capacity of the IG has been very relevant especially in conjunction with the support to the AC Court (under ACP). It is however questionable whether it was relevant to support the implementation of the Leadership Code without adequate resources for verification (0.3 of the declarations were investigated last year<sup>28</sup>) and considering the political resistance to an effective punitive regime.

### ***Overall comments on temporal contexts for policies regarding programme formulation and capacity development***

As regards programme formulation and management, one of the three main sector programmes was formulated at a time when the “Guidelines for Sector Programme Support (SPS), 1998” were still in use. ‘Development of sector policy and planning capability’ and ‘Support to capacity development’ were mentioned in those guidelines as examples for Danida’s support. An updated version of the SPS Guidelines was later issued in which it is stated “*In situations where a national sector framework is not adequately developed, SPS will typically focus on support to policy and strategy development as well as capacity support to relevant institutions and organisations (p. 15)*”.

During the formulation and implementation stages of ACP and in the formulation stages of the other key sector programmes, Danida issued “Guidelines for Programme Management, 2009” (GPM) which from then on guided implementation and progress monitoring. The underlying principle of the GPM was to strengthen and use country systems to the maximum extent possible in the implementation of development assistance to public partners. An update of the GPM in 2011 was prompted by several events, most notably the adaption to the new overall policy for Danish development assistance “Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change, 2010”. This represented a major change in policy with consequences for programme management, because it focussed on five policy priorities – thereby abolishing the notion of crosscutting issues and particular priority themes. The five policy issues are: 1) Growth and employment; 2) Freedom, democracy and human rights; 3) Gender equality; 4) Stability and fragility; and 5) Environment and climate. The policy notes that the priorities are all interconnected and essential for fighting poverty and reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Overall, each of the key programmes we examined followed the policy orientations expressed above. The poor absorption capacity of many Ugandan public agencies and organisations<sup>29</sup>, as well as their inability to qualify for budget support mechanisms, meant that the use of the project modality was to continue for support to most GoU organisations, but Danida showed considerable flexibility and adaptation to local contexts when it put together the driving processes behind aBi. The U-Growth 2 intervention, interestingly, is based on a Human rights Based Approach (HRBA) in the context of private sector support. The U-GOGO intervention focussed heavily on the issues of the 2010 policy declaration with its emphasis on freedom,

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<sup>28</sup> The IG has very limited capacity to verify the information provided (see among others the IG DTM report, 2014).

<sup>29</sup> There are many references to support this statement. See the EU Country Level Evaluation of 2009, the Appraisal Report for UG-2; the “Absorptive Capacity Constraints publication of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development in 2011.

democracy and human rights as well as gender equality. In the case of Gender it should be noted that aBi had a Gender for Growth (G4G) sub-component built into the process.

As regards capacity development, the guidelines that were in use during formulation and implementation (except for the early stages of ACP) were: 1) A Results-oriented Approach to Capacity Change (ROACH), 2005; and 2) Guidance Note on Danish Support for Capacity Development, 2006.<sup>30</sup> Capacity enhancement of the public sector in poor countries was seen as needed and desired as a key strategy to achieve sustained poverty reduction. Unfortunately, this has often not been the case – being the reason why donors and partner governments changed from project-focused development assistance to programme approaches such as sector-wide approaches (SWAp) and budgetary aid. ROACH focuses on specific organisational results and pays analytical and operational attention on organisations and networks of organisations whose outputs are important.

Guidelines for technical assistance were issued in 2009 “Guidelines for Technical Assistance, 2009”. Experience of Danish technical assistance had indicated a need for improving preparation of technical assistance inputs, specifically by enhancing capacity assessment of the partner institution. The Guidelines emphasise national ownership, alignment to national procedures and harmonisation of technical assistance. The Guidelines adhere to the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” and the “Accra Agenda for Action”. Capacity development is regarded as the general objective of technical assistance, and the Guidelines follow the capacity development priority areas that have been identified in the Accra Agenda for Action, e.g. donors’ support for capacity development will be demand-driven and designed to support country ownership.

None of the projects we examined used a results-based approach extensively, with the exception of the support to the water sector. While the concept was overlaid over the interventions and their management, we did not find any CD component that created a baseline of existing Capabilities and Capacities at the onset of the project and then measured progress toward specific targets. That does not mean that CD did not happen; but it was nearly impossible to plan for, and monitor progress towards attaining a level of capacity that would ensure an autonomous ability to continue to perform at required levels and to improve again beyond that.

### 3.2 Efficiency

*Donor agency and partner institutions’ capacity to manage development process*

#### U-GROWTH

The logic that was used for the design of UG 1 was clear, comprehensive, and coherent with the problems that faced the poor of Uganda and the “employment and growth” strategy that was approved by Danida’s Board. The operational strategy for dealing with the institutional development of MAAIF (i.e. through the DSIP and then the FIPs) through **PSAS** was also sound, being a step-wise approach to defining CD approaches and result frameworks. The decision not to continue with that component does not allow for any higher-level lessons to be drawn in terms of efficiency.<sup>31</sup> The expenditure for the 21 courses with 57 participants was clearly

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<sup>30</sup> The Guidance Note was a follow-up on the ROACH Paper and takes the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness into account. The objective of the Guidance Note is to provide staff at embassies and Headquarters as well as consultants with an easy-to-apply assessment tool for the planning and preparation of the CD interventions in programmes and projects supported by Denmark.

<sup>31</sup> The Danish Government reacted to Uganda’s passing of the law against homosexuals by restructuring the support to GoU institutions by directing USD 10 million to civil society and private sector activities. Activities related to existing engagements within water and rural roads – even though it goes through the Government. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 24 March 2014.

not efficient, mainly because the majority of that expenditure was not directly related to capacity improvement in any way that could be applied in the Ugandan context at that time. The training efforts were not insignificant in relation to the CD requirements of the Ministry as a whole, but represented only an individual-based approach rather than one based on an organisational or enabling environment approach. Even after only a few hours on site and after analysed many documents produced for Danida and other DP, it is clear that there is no reason to believe that MAAIF is in a position to manage its own reform or CD processes at this time.

The **RTI** component was quite effective and could not have been done in any other manner that would have been more cost-effective. It obviously benefitted from good leadership at the MELTC and a high level of motivation from its staff and partners. Since it is relevant, efficient and effective (see below), some way should be found to leverage the success and CD management ability of the MELTC. MELTC's mandate is to develop capacity in both the public and private sectors in the use of Labour-Based Methods for road construction and maintenance. The main thrust has over the years been on gravel roads (including bridges and storm-water drains), but in recent years low-cost sealed roads has been introduced.

The **aBi** has shown itself to be highly efficient at generating jobs and at increasing the household/ enterprise/cooperative incomes of those who have participated. Its outstanding niche strategy is that it builds capacity from the perspective of the private sector and uses economic and organisational argumentation in tandem with access to financing at acceptable rates to incite beneficiaries to invest in increased value-added or increases production bases (to name a few). The Component Description for U-Growth 2 describes the potential of efficiency of this innovative programme. It was noticed that both in Uganda and in Nepal, Danida had managed to support initiatives that relied on the direct participation of the national financial institutions. Now that USAID and KfW have become partners in aBi, the efficiency (in terms of transaction costs and the scope of adapting to lessons learnt from a broader base) will likely be increased. A clarification is in order to fully understand: aBi only acts as a funds-holder for KfW. However, Sweden, NL, Belgium, EU and USAID have been or a providing core funding to aBi – together with Denmark.

The policy shift away from supporting governmental institutions and the experience with aBi has also helped the EoD to define how it will work with Component 2 of UG-2, especially with respect to support to Trademarks East Africa. In effect the outcomes and results will be generated by that organisation that has a good track record for performance. The EoD did not require that the organisation provide a CD strategy because it (the EoD) had, in its due diligence, established that the TMEA already had the capability to deliver the results it had proposed. In many ways, this Danida logic and strategy is similar (but not identical) to that used in aBi under UG-1 and UG-2. It may not have been articulated as such, but this strategy outsources the management of CD to the private sector where other forces intervene (risks are different, transaction costs are accounted for and taken into account and not externalised, personal (or corporate) motivations prevail, etc.).

## **JWESSP**

Danida has contributed to the development of the Sector Performance Monitoring Framework, and support to the Government in carrying out comprehensive reforms for the water sector; adoption and implementation of the Sector Wide Approach to Planning (SWAp) – as a framework which has brought together all the sector stakeholders for a more coordinated and concerted action to achieve sector goals. The main areas of focus for Danish assistance are: (i) budget support to decentralised implementation of rural water supply & sanitation; (ii) Support to Water Resources Management Department; (iii) Capacity development support to the MWE and

district local governments; (iv) Mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues like gender, environment; and (v) support to climate change activities.

The importance of capacity development has long been recognized by the sector and considerable resources have been invested in capacity building since the early 1990s. However, while capacity development investments were largely channelled to the individual and organisational level, over time it became apparent that the sector needed to come up with capacity development strategies that built on past experiences, but also went beyond the limits of Human Resources Development (HRD) plans that have been done in the past, to address the enabling environment as a priority.

The Ministry of Water and Environment in Uganda, has therefore developed a broad and deep approach to CD – the “Water and Environment Sector Capacity Development Strategy 2013-2018”<sup>32</sup> – that encompasses and integrates the enabling environment, including the context, the political motivations and constraints and a number of other factors. The overall objective of this strategy is to put in place a more effective means of implementing capacity development activities in order to respond to the sector needs in a more harmonized and well-coordinated approach while taking into account the overriding influences and requirements for change in the existing enabling environment.

It is also based on the concept of “capability to resolve problems” that are facing the actors and beneficiaries of the water sector; this is a “capability for what” is actually demanded, and contrasts with a “supply side” or bottoms-up approach to building a “capacity to handle just about anything that may be required”. To date, the Ministry has also been supported by GIZ and other Development Partners (DPs) to operationalise this approach. The ownership by the stakeholders has been achieved through the participatory approach used during the process of development of the strategy, and the implementation framework is in place. Access to CD funds at sector level is dependent on approved CD plans and conformity to this approach. CD plans are consolidated and harmonised for efficiency to be sure, but also so that leveraging and rollout can take place, all adding up to a cumulative effect within the sector as a whole. In that case (i.e. water), there is clear evidence<sup>33</sup> that a Capability to manage Capability has been generated, a rare occurrence indeed.

### **ACP and U-GOGO**

The Danish support has ensured that the IG has been able to fulfil its mandate of investigations, prosecution and awareness raising to a larger extent than if Danida support had not been extended as evidenced in the increase in the number of prosecutions and convictions over the last 5-10 years. The Danish support has enabled the institution reach certain outputs such as increased level of investigations and prosecutions. It has however not brought the institution to a new level of effectiveness in terms of delivering on its mandate of enforcing the leadership and ensuring rule of law and good governance in public administration (see section on effectiveness).

Substantial amounts have also been allocated to capacity development of the Judiciary but with more substantial results in terms of capacity achieved. A major CD component in the support the Judiciary has been the Law and Justice Course. More than 200 magistrates have been to Denmark on the course since 1996. Approximately DKK 80,000 is spent per participant on the course in

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<sup>32</sup> MWE, October 2012.

<sup>33</sup> See GIZ quarterly reports on their support to the sector, as well as the underlying principles of the Workbook and Toolbox.

Denmark every year.<sup>34</sup> The alternative would have been to hold magistrate courses in Uganda. This would, however, not have yielded the same results according to interviewees<sup>35</sup>. An important part of the course was getting exposed to another way of doing things and actually being in Denmark and observing court cases, prisons and interaction between the different groups in society exposed the participants to “doing things in a simple, less bureaucratic and more efficient way” and “how to respect human rights of the defendants and prisoners in practice”. The ET collected many illustrative examples of how former course participants routinely apply this new way of doing court business in their everyday work.

Danida is also extending support for an international TA in the Judiciary. It is the conclusion of the ET<sup>36</sup> that there is an added value of having an international TA in the Judiciary as opposed to the cheaper solution of hiring extra staff locally. It is likewise an issue of judiciary officers exposed to “other ways of doing business in practice”. The TA is playing multiple roles in overseeing, facilitation and nudging programme implementation including implementation of CD aspects. The partner institution accepts and appreciates the oversight role of the TA and it is aiding a resource strapped Embassy. The TA has recently new received new ToR, which focuses solely on advisory role. It is however the view of the ET<sup>37</sup> that in practice it is very difficult to complete abandon the oversight role.

The DGF is more cost-effective than bilateral support to individual CSO partners as development partners can reduce transaction cost when they pool their resources (although the Facility is relatively more expensive for Denmark compared to other donors, as Denmark is the lead entity). The Facility has also been efficient in reaching many of its outputs.<sup>38</sup>

Capacity development of partners does require a certain engagement from the Embassy. An active involvement of the embassy and Danish institutions at the highest level contributes to the success of certain types of CD initiatives. It involves and commits management at the highest level in the Ugandan institutions and creates a feeling of mutual respect and partnership. The collaboration with the Judiciary and the collaboration between the IG, the DPP and the Danish DPP are cases in point.

The local capacity to steer key capacity development interventions in the IG (or even if outsourced locally) was not available at the time when the Fast Track Screening Tool (FTST) was developed by the Danish tax authorities. The FTST as well as the computerised case management system are still only partial functional after all these years of trying to implement them. A key lesson learned is that Danida should be better at assessing the available local capacity to steer the capacity development especially when dealing with introduction of complex technical solutions - and especially when these technical solutions are imported from abroad.

### ***Overall efficiency of Danida's Capacity Development interventions***

The inability of Ugandan ministries or sectors involved with Danida programmes to qualify for SWAp mechanisms has obviously meant that Danida has had to use mechanisms where the transaction costs are greater, but even using rough figures it is clear that the total cost difference is acceptable; what is not as easily calculated in quantitative terms is the fact that much more

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<sup>34</sup> 12 participants per year at a total cost of app. DKK 1 million.

<sup>35</sup> Interviews with the Judiciary, course participants and TA.

<sup>36</sup> Based on interviews with management in the Judiciary and the TA herself.

<sup>37</sup> Based on discussion with the TA and the Judiciary.

<sup>38</sup> See DGF Annual Review 2014.

effort is required by EoD staff to manage these interventions. The notable exception is the DGF<sup>39</sup> where eight donors have pooled their resource to support primarily CSOs.

If future Danida policy on CD were to mean that results-based approaches were to become the norm, based on Theories of Change and performance approaches, the workload would clearly increase.<sup>40</sup> As it is, when the agendas of the EoD personnel are constantly filled up, there is a risk that events could overtake the capacity of the EoD to manage them while still overseeing the formulation, monitoring, evaluation, supervision and advice-giving that complex projects in the Ugandan context requires, not to mention the interface required with standard MFA activities and the collaboration with the many country visits that the EoD is asked to provide.

### 3.3 Effectiveness

#### *Achievement of planned results at outcome level*

This sub-section deals with the findings and lessons learnt in attempting to put into place a holistic approach to CD. Historically, many reports refer to analyses that would be classified under one of three different levels: “individual”, “organisational” and “institutional”. This section deals with the need to achieve “outcomes” so it will focus on the organisational level, without forgetting to examine the efforts spent on developing capacity at the individual level. Instead of “institutional” as the third level, the more appropriate concept should be the “enabling environment”.<sup>41</sup>

#### **U-GROWTH**

**PSAS** did not achieve any of its expected CD outcomes; this was an expected result of the decision, by Denmark MFA, to terminate any support directly to the MAAIF. It was also a consequence of challenges within MAAIF even before the decision to discontinue with the support under the current U-Growth phase. The **PSAS**, as shown by the descriptions on effectiveness and efficiency above, does not appear to have been able to put into place the essentials of holistic CD, as we know it, even after many years of donor support. Most interviewees attributed this to a lack of willingness to reform and to a basic incompatibility between the political influences and meddling in the sector and the service delivery and regulatory framework mandates given to the Ministry. There is nothing else that is inherent to the sector that could explain why reform is not being championed and insisted upon. The embassy notes, in support, that the “MAAIF reform process needs to be driven externally. It is difficult to see how reforms would be expedited by those who might be negatively affected by it”. It should be noted that a number of induced outputs were created under PSAS<sup>42</sup>. “The PSAS included a short-term TA to assist MAAIF in building capacity in strategic areas, i.e. financial management, budget process, better functioning SWG, finalisation of DSIP, policy document. The DSIP was approved and is in place. DSIP is being implemented although not at the expected speed due to budgetary constraints. The budget process is not as participatory as it should be to create ownership. The budget is aligned to the DSIP. The National Coffee Policy and the National Agricultural Policy were launched last year”.

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<sup>39</sup> The embassy has pointed out that the same is the case with aBi where DK is managing (or has managed) funds from USAID, Belgium, EU, Sweden and NL. This has reduced the transaction costs for aBi as an institution, and has created the space and ownership for aBi to implement its own business plan.

<sup>40</sup> The coming country programme will also see a significant reduction in the number of partners. The Evaluation did not factor this into its analysis, not being in a position to analyse the potential impacts. Note is taken that the items listed are not generally considered outcomes.

<sup>41</sup> To make an important conceptual point, the use of the term “institutional” is incorrect when used in this historical way. In management, the term more correctly relates to the rules and protocols that provide the boundaries of an organisation’s behaviour and processes.

<sup>42</sup> The following analysis was provided by the embassy.

All of the CD outputs of the **RTI** Component have been generated. First-hand observation during field visits indicates that the capacity development *outcomes* are well on their way to being sustainable, with the proviso that continued financial and operations support will continue to be forthcoming from the Ministry of Works and Transport. There is a strong probability of that happening as the new Minister suggested continued support during the recent visit to MELTC, and the EU is now defining its transport priorities for the new EDF 11 Country Programme and may be considering support. According to annual reports, the road construction sub-component has essentially generated its outputs; outcomes are not likely ever to be known because no monitoring systems at that level are in place.

The specific objectives of the **aBi** component included<sup>43</sup> “documenting areas within which employment has been created, determining growth in employment attributed to aBi activities, making projection estimates of jobs to be created, and recommending improvements to achieve the aBi employment targets. Through the partner financial institutions, the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) get loans, training and outreach services, which have enabled them to employ more workers. After only one year of operations, the overall employment objectives for the entire project had almost been attained, as exemplified by this extract: “On average, each of the 12 partner financial institutions extends the support to 2,177 SME clients per year and each of the SMEs employs six extra workers per year as a result. This means that on average 156,744 jobs are created annually through this channel. There may be some justifiable questioning of the accuracy of the number itself, but even a part of that is an impressive achievement in the Ugandan context.<sup>44</sup> In addition, each of the 30 aBi-supported Farmers’ Organisations also supports an average of 1,156 economically active SME farmers. This translates into an average of 34,680 supported farmers. With each farmer employing six extra workers in a year, 208,080 jobs are created annually. In total, about 364,824 jobs are created. At a growth rate of 18.8% per year, employment is projected to grow by 68,587 jobs among the currently supported SMEs to a total of about 433,411 jobs by the end of 2013. This is 91% of aBi target, which is considered a very good performance”.<sup>45</sup>

But aBi is not just about employment. It is also about growth and the development of the agribusiness “sector”, leading to value-added, export and a stronger and more robust private sector. To that end it has adapted the standard value-chain approaches and adapted them to a more comprehensive business model that better integrates the various players as they are needed to ensure the realisation of the value-adding leveraging that is the hallmark of a value chain. This way of working has been applied across aBi and increases the likelihood of higher-level sustainable *outcomes* in the long term, even when aBi support disappears (if ever that happens). It has also developed an interesting business model that represents the slogan “We are in the business of Agribusiness”. Although it is early days for determining whether *outcomes* have been attained (i.e. UG-2 has essentially just started), the model and the behavioural changes it is likely to bring about an important stimulus for capacity development at all levels.

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<sup>43</sup> This section was copied from an internal report prepared by aBi.

<sup>44</sup> This comment was provided by the embassy.

<sup>45</sup> Danida/EoD had commissioned an employment study undertaken in May-June 2012 estimating that “433,411 jobs would have been created by the end of 2013”. The 2012 Annual Review (RAM 28 October 2012) concluded that all three aBi sub-components (Value Chain Development, Financial services Development, and Gender for Growth) performed well in terms of outputs delivered, but expressed some concerns about the validity of numbers, especially the number of farmers reached. The aBi 2013 Annual Report shows that 214,497 farmers had been reached – compared to 209,202 as indicated in the Semi-annual Report, June 2012. The employment number was questioned, as the assumption that each farmer reached would employ six additional labourers was not found probable. The Review Team recommended that the study’s methodology, assumptions and conclusions should be verified.

aBi is a special case and would warrant the investment of resources to study how those development strategies and business cases can be transformed into operational tactics to influence capacity all across a number of value chains (commodity, thematic, etc.) and across a large number of partners. The aBi has the potential to incite a considerable number of beneficiaries and partners to change the way they have been doing things; it also provides some fundamental CD activities to help them change. So there are two different elements to consider: the capacity of aBi to develop capacity in others, and the capacity of the partners to provoke capacity changes all along the value-chain.

Because it was a merely a sub-component, the mission did not interview anyone directly involved with the implementation of **G4G**, but a summary report prepared in 2012, entitled: “An Assessment of Potentially Sustainable Approaches to Women and Youth Economic Empowerment” noted that its overall finding was that the G4G program had achieved remarkable results within its short life span. The report says that G4G has aptly introduced the tools and the guidance in how to put the attitude changes required to enable “working as a family” into practice. This is not a statement of CD outcomes but is the only proxy indicator available, as monitoring of outcomes over the long term was not carried out. Importantly, CD outcomes would have had a strong motivation thrust in this case because the G4G programs were linked operationally with aBi Trust-funded programs. Specifically, the use of the same groups for both value chain development and gender mainstreaming was implemented resulting (we hypothesize) in “reinforcement” and “vision enhancement” where the benefits of economic change are tied to behavioural changes dealing with gender. The same report notes that the objective of mainstreaming youth into economic change did not really take place due to the short life span of G4G.

## **JWESSP**

The JWESSP was in its second year when the Joint GoU-DPs Sector Review was conducted in October 2014. The main issues related to sector capacity development were: i) the need to take stock of and update the exiting human resources at national and decentralised level; ii) definition of coordination mechanisms with line ministries, local governments and semi-autonomous institutions to develop linkages, synergies and alignment; iii) the need to plan and estimate the budget for capacity development activities consistent with available funding resources; and iv) dissemination and integration of the new Handbook and Toolbox on operationalisation of capacity development activities in the current financial year. The ‘Agreed Minutes’ stated the corresponding actions required to address the four issues.<sup>46</sup>

The MWE is the first ministry in Uganda that redefined its understanding of capacity development from human resources management – according to the Public Service Training Policy – to a more holistic approach that addresses capacity development not only within the ministry but for ‘*water and environment sector*’ (WES) as a whole, as elaborated in the WES Capacity Development Strategy. The Strategy emphasises a results-oriented, integrated capacity development approach starting with the analysis of performance gaps and priorities; and integrating activities on three levels: the individual level, the organisational level, and the level of the enabling environment. The “Handbook and Toolbox on Operationalisation of Capacity Development in the Ugandan Water and Environment Sector” were published in November 2014.<sup>47</sup>

## **ACP and UGOGO**

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<sup>46</sup> Water and Environment Sector, Agreed Minutes October 2014: The 6th Joint Government of Uganda – Development Partners Sector Review 2014.

<sup>47</sup> GIZ, Cathrin Denker and Thomas Lutz, November 2014.

**The DEI/Support to the Accountability Sector:** In a bid to strengthen its function of coordinating national efforts against corruption and recognizing the need to involve all the stakeholders in the process, the DEI was formed and has over time partnered with both Danida and DFID. Further, the Accountability Sector was formed following the adoption of the Sector Wide Approach to planning in 1998, mainly to ensure efficient allocation and utilization of resources. DEI and the sector have not had any impact on coordination specifically because of the conflicting mandates of institutions under the sector<sup>48</sup> and insufficient commitment from the leadership. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2014-2019) developed by DEI and the Strategic Investment Plan for the Accountability Sector (2014-2019) developed by the Accountability Secretariat at the Ministry of Finance were for example both published mid 2014 without any coordination whatsoever and without even referring to each other.

**IG:** Oversight institutions such as the IG are chronically underfinanced and for periods of time since 1988 – including currently – Danida has been the only external donor to the IG and has supported the institution through the ACP I, II and the UGOGO with pretty much the same objectives and many of the same activities. According to different stakeholders consulted, including the IG, the institution would have “crashed” without Danida support. Danida have in particular contributed to bringing the IG closer to the rural poor by building and equipping regional offices. The number of cases that have been prosecuted through the court system has increased steadily since 2006 (except for 2013 when the Anti-Corruption Court was suspended for 6 month). Inadequate staffing at both the IG and in the court system however contributes to the delays in concluding prosecutions initiated by the IG. Nevertheless, there has been a general improvement in the resolution of corruption cases, which has been attributed to the operationalisation of the Anti-Corruption Courts (ACC) since May 2008.<sup>49</sup> Establishment of the ACC (supported by Danida in the ACP) has been a small breakthrough in impunity for the corrupt and supporting both the IG and the ACC is a good example of how working at the enabling environment and constraints ensures better results.

A training policy and needs assessment for the IG has been on the agenda for years but has not yet materialised. Danida has supported basic staff orientation courses and courses in investigative and prosecution skills and has hereby contributed to IG being able to carry out its mandate. The ET has not found any evidence to support that sending IG staff members on individual courses (whether in the region or in Denmark) have contributed to improving the performance of staff members or the institution. The training courses were more seen as a reward, rather than being part of an overall strategy to IG's performance. The training is not based on identification of needs or a strategy for how to ensure that the individual learning outcomes are being institutionalised. A successfully capacity development initiative is the collaboration between the DPPs of Denmark and Uganda and the IG. The training and associated learning from experiences shared has led to increased knowledge of how to conduct a prosecution led investigation and why it is important- also improving the practical collaboration between the two institutions with overlapping mandates. Implementation of the learning experience is gradually providing indications that subsequent prosecutions will end up in higher chances of success.<sup>50</sup>

The objective of compliance and enforcement with Leadership Code since 2003 has at best been partly accomplished. The IG continues to receive declarations but without resources for verification and without the Leadership Code Tribunal for sanctioning there is not going to be effective compliance with the Code. There is a major problem with backlog of cases especially as

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<sup>48</sup> The IG and the Uganda Police Force are for example both mandated to investigate cases. The DPP and the IG are both prosecuting and both IG and DEI are mandated to prevent corruption e.g. through awareness raising.

<sup>49</sup> IG progress reports 2014 and IG the Data Tracking Mechanism of Corruption 2014.

<sup>50</sup> Interviews with IGG and DPP; the Danish DPP and IG Progress Report July 13-June 2014.

regional level, the institution is only able to verify 0,3% of the leadership declarations and other institutions routinely ignore or refuse to implement IG recommendations.<sup>51</sup> This is greatly undermining the effectiveness of the institution.

**The Judiciary:** Denmark has played a key role in capacity development of the Judiciary over the years dating back to 1989. The capacity development has at least the potential to be successful because it has worked with an institution where management was committed to change, the support has been sustained over long time, it has concurrently worked on many initiatives pointing in the same direction, it has trained a critical mass of people that has created an alumni for continuous follow-up and it has ensured institutional capacity by changing rules and procedures (performance enhancement mechanism, small claims procedures, sentencing guidelines, anti-corruption strategy). The Judiciary Strategic Investment Plan (III) does not include a Results Framework outlining indicators, their baseline and targets so it is not possible to determine whether the institution overall reached its intended outcomes and objectives. The results framework for the Danish support to the Judiciary has not been phrased as the autonomous ability of the institution to perform at a specified level and to evolve as circumstances change and without specific targets and baselines it is difficult to determine whether the Danish support has reached its targets.

The Danish support has, however, to some extent contributed to the objective of “promoting observance of human rights and accountability”. The Small Claims Procedure (SCP) has been credited with improvement of the case disposal rate because of its simplicity<sup>52</sup> but a specific evaluation of the SCP and its results is yet to be undertaken (scheduled for 2015). Other Danish supported initiatives have contributed to enhancing the corporate values in the Judiciary in the direction of respect for human rights and accountability including customer care. Overall are still major issues with regard to rule of law and access to justice for the poor e.g. app. 30% of the people that interacted with the Judiciary pay a bribe and when people lose confidence in the system they adopted various coping mechanisms e.g. 25% of the people that were asked for a bribe forfeited the service.<sup>53</sup> However values and mind set have shifted and a critical mass of change agents in the institution has been created (observance of the human rights of defendant and prisoners have been imprinted in a critical mass of staff members (judicial officers as well as support staff), the idea that judiciary staff should be held accountable for their performance have also been embraced by the staff despite initial fierce resistance) and the enabling environment has also been strengthened e.g. adoption of guidelines and policies.<sup>54</sup>

**The demand side:** It is not possible to measure the results of support extended for capacity development of the CSOs (direct support to specific CSOs under the ACP and through the DGF). Neither Ugandan CSOs nor Danish support channels have a common, clear understanding and only occasionally a systematic approach to capacity development. However, both the ACP and the U-GOGO programmes have balanced support to capacity development of state and government institutions with support to civil society, which has created important synergies. The Danish contribution to CSOs in Uganda has been important and consistent both through ACP and UGOGO and has supplemented oversight institutions in exposing the governing elite’s misuse of power, improving the enabling environment (anti-corruption legislation) and educating citizens on their rights.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> IG, *Data Tracking of Corruption*, 2014.

<sup>52</sup> TAS, *Review Aide Memoire*, 2013, Progress Report January 2015 and interviews.

<sup>53</sup> IG, *Data Tracking Mechanism of Corruption*, 2014.

<sup>54</sup> TAS, *Review Aide Memoire*, 2013, Interviews and FGD.

<sup>55</sup> MFA, *Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society*, 2013, Interviews and FGD.

### 3.4 Impact

#### U-GROWTH

Both UG-1 and UG-2 have the potential for significant impact on employment and growth, and the contribution of the CD efforts to achieve those impacts is also significant. If the GoU supports the continued research and training into road surfacing and if these technologies are applied in opening up the rural economies in Northern Uganda (such as providing access to markets, education, health and so forth), then the developmental objectives for that part of the country have just eliminated one very serious constraint. The aBi has proven to be a means to generate employment opportunities on a large scale, and the “business of Agribusiness” approach it takes, combined with the use of economic and entrepreneurial paradigms in its day-to-day operations with its partners (including many local banks that had never worked in the agriculture sector before), shows solid signs of being sustainable and effective. Hundreds of thousands will benefit directly from the interface of aBi and G4G, including women and men who are convinced that “working as a family” is not only going to help the status of women but the economic, social and individual well-being of their partners.

#### ACP/UGOGO

A number of initiatives are pitched in the direction of access to services for the poor. IG regional offices have been rolled out, facilitated and equipped to take its services closer to the people. The regional offices are structured to perform the functions of the Inspectorate and are distributed over the country in 16 different locations and the major impact of such intervention is that public awareness of the office has increased, preventive mechanisms through inspection are enhanced and receiving cases of corruption at the grass root has helped the communities to access the service.<sup>56</sup> Danida supported them through provision of equipment, furniture and running costs. Their success is attributed to this support. Danida support to regional offices has ensured that the IG has been able to expedite especially cases of ombudsman’s nature. Ombudsman’s cases (as opposed to criminal cases) are in generally of more consequence to the everyday lives of the poor and of women. Changelink, a project initiated with Danida seed funding 10 years ago to bring key institutions together in the field of criminal justice at district level have been very successful in expediting cases quicker at the local level to the rural communities according to interviewees.<sup>57</sup>

The majority of the regional courts under the judiciary have also been established with support from Danida. Through DGF, there is also support going to capacity development of Local Council Courts (LCC) whose main aim is to help the vulnerable populations access justice at affordable or no cost.

### 3.5 Sustainability

#### U-Growth

While significant achievements have been achieved in the vast majority of areas supported by Danida – jointly with Government and other donors – the sustainability of these achievements require continuous maintenance and update of the institutions’ capacity and further enhancement of the enabling framework, including policy, legal and administrative reforms and further development and delivery systems – and not least appropriate recurrent and development budgets.

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<sup>56</sup> TAS, *Review Aide Memoire*, 2013

<sup>57</sup> Interviews with the Judiciary, the TA, the Judiciary in Kampala, the Magistrates Court and IG regional office in Masaka.

In the Ugandan context, achievements can be fragile, and capacity development outcomes even more so. It is clear that the next NDP will focus considerably on infrastructure, and that rural infrastructure is not on par with the building of large dams or axis roads with large usage figures. But rural roads can be political liabilities if they are not passable. aBi will likely benefit from a hands-off approach to the private sector's leadership of growth and employment, but there may be pressures to support larger well-established firms, as suggested by the UG-2 Appraisal. There is a World Bank (WB) formulation in progress that could undermine the aBi by distorting markets with highly subsidized loans in the same market niche. The international praxis in entrepreneurship indicates that once SME start to innovate, grow and make more profit, they will try to leverage their new capacity even further, providing that they have access to an enabling environment and some risk capital (money, knowledge, partnerships, etc.).

aBi has reduced the risks associated with non-support in large measure through its innovative structure, where the aBi Trust executes most of the service-and-support functions, and aBi Finance, a sister organisation with its own oversight structure, is responsible for managing trust or endowment funds and for engaging in loan guarantees, at least for some of the donors. In this context, DfID and other donors have shown support to the agri-business thrust of aBi through the provision of funds to aBi Finance, which, inter alia, will ensure operational sustainability of aBi. Part of these funds were provided by DfID and directed towards ensuring that rural roads provide access to markets for first-level products in agricultural value-chains. aBi Finance is not only involved in the aBi intervention supported by Danida but also funds some of the roads that are also funded by Danida and that are subject to the technologies promoted by MELTC, both being part of RTI in UG-1. Important clarifications to this apparently complicated architecture include the fact that Denmark provides core funding to aBi's business plan. There are no special areas of focus. The same goes for the capitalization/funding of aBi Finance, which again is working in an autonomous way, providing loans (and synergies) to all relevant activities getting support from aBi Trust.

aBi Finance intends to strengthen the lender institution's ability to finance the national road construction and maintenance sector, by easing access to bid and performance bonds as well as advance payment guarantees for small and medium sized national roads contractors. This is expected to stimulate competition, profitability, efficiency and cost effectiveness in the sector and thereby increase the competitiveness of the Ugandan economy. It also helps in ensuring the sustainability of the initial Danida support to aBi.

### **ACP and U-GOGO**

Uganda is likely to reach middle-income status in the short/medium term and external support is destined to dry out as a consequence. A major challenge will be how CSOs and agencies like Judiciary, IG, ACC, Electoral Commission, etc. are able to sustain themselves beyond such support. Where donors have had key investments, the Government has held back funding partly because they are comfortable that agencies are operating without any budget support and hence clear lack of exit strategies. The DGF does not have an exit strategy either or a sustainability plan for CSOs beyond external donor support. There is a need for focusing on genuine empowerment and sustainability of civil society in Uganda, e.g. endowment funds, crowd sourcing, adaptation into social enterprises, adaption of cost saving mechanisms and in generally focusing on download (to constituencies) as opposed to primarily upward accountability (to external donors).

Evidence suggest that a critical mass of staff have to be trained, there has to be follow-up and it has to be an integrated part of broader CD efforts that has strong backing from the management in order to leave a lasting mark on an institution as has been the case with the Judiciary. A critical mass of judicial officers and support staff has been trained and continuous to be trained, which

have resulted in changing both mind-sets and behavior contributing to the intended outcomes of enhanced access to justice and increased observance of human rights and accountability that has the potential to be sustained over time. The capacity developed is however not static and irreversible. The Judiciary is increasingly under pressure as the executive keeps on exercising quasi-judicial powers and there is a role of Danida and development partners have a role to play in advocating for the Government to respect judicial independence.

Another example of sustainability is the Anti Corruption Court, which is in operation again after the six months suspension and has the relative independence and capacity to address the rent seeking that is bound to follow the massive investment in infrastructure under the next NDP.

### 3.6 Some lessons learned

What lessons can be learnt from Danida's Ugandan experiences (across all five evaluation criteria) include the following. These should be considered as complementary to the Section 5.2

- CD that is institutionalised (i.e. comprehensively integrated between the individual, organisation and enabling environment levels) has a much better chance of staying in place than if it is not. Ownership is better integrated at all levels, and the constraints and leverages of one level are taken into account and adjusted at another.
- What works best is a much greater degree of CD model specificity than has been traditionally the case. Scoping the model at the sector level ensures a broader net and the models must represent the entire CD playing field at all levels. Modelling the “corporate Ministry of Water and Environment” training needs is a lot simpler than modelling the “Water sector CD requirements for resolving strategic problems and meeting national objectives”, but the latter it is a much more stable and effective way to go.
- CD models are not generic or transferable – general CD principles may be applicable, but CD interventions must be consistent with the evolving context. For example, models for integrating the water sector in Uganda cannot be directly transposed to another country, even if minor adjustments are made, no more than models for the water “sector” can be transposed to other sectors such as transport.
- By the same logic, Theories of Change have to be pinpoint specific and comprehensive. A generic model of intervention logic may be useful for ensuring that Danida's functional processes (ex. contracting, reporting) are coherent with its programme and project management cycles, but each intervention will require that the “generic” model be expanded considerably to represent the specific case that is being analysed.
- Much more time and money are required to understand what will work and how and for preparing the foundation for the change process, especially when public processes are concerned,
- Working through the private sector removes a lot of social and network risks and relies on an entirely different paradigm to ensure sustainability.
- There is an urgent need to focus on sustainability of CSOs in Uganda. Capacity development of CSO (through the DGF) should focus on adaption of strategies that deliver accountability and result directly relevant to domestic constituencies as opposed to capacity development of CSO partners to manage external donor funds. The capabilities of CSO should be measured on their autonomous ability to perform at a specified level as well as their ability to evolve as circumstances change so when donor funds dry out they need to be able to solicit funds and support from domestic constituencies.
- The ET has not found evidence to suggest that individual trainings courses where one person from a partner institution is trained have led to improved institutional

performance. Persons interviewed indicated that the participants were picked based on availability of scholarships and short-term training courses and as a reward rather than the choice being systematically based on a specific capacity development plan to address the capacity needs of the institution.

- The Uganda case study has confirmed that it takes a long time to change behaviour if the owners and involved stakeholders of that change don't agree that there is a reason to change. CD efforts in Uganda underperformed, or did not work at all, where a commonality of purpose was absent. The failed attempts to coordinate the institutions in the accountability sector or drive forward reforms in the MAAAIF are cases in point, even if one assumes that reforms are not likely to be expedited by those negatively affected by them.

## 4. Focus Areas and Hypotheses

### 4.1 Hypotheses tested in the Danida-Uganda development cooperation context

The ToR for this mandate are “guided” by an Approach Paper on Capacity Development which developed various CD concepts and proposed four “hypotheses”. These were translated into four focus areas that are found in the “Scope of Services”. These hypotheses are being subjected to testing by the evaluation team through its evaluation approach, methodology and field evidence gathering. In this section, evidence to validate or negate the hypotheses, using observation and data obtained in Uganda, is presented. The Ugandan analysis is extrapolated to the hypotheses at large, on a “global” scale so to speak. This latter step has its methodological weaknesses: one should generally not draw conclusions about a hypothesis solely on the basis of a part of the proposed sample (unless the methodology warrants it). In this case, the extrapolation is meant only as a means of ensuring that the logic of the hypotheses stands up to scrutiny. The key benefit to be derived from this “pragmatic” approach is that the hypotheses, if validated, will provide a basis for elaborating a Theory of Change for any proposed CD intervention. If the hypotheses are struck down, another direction will need to be proposed and studied.

#### ***Hypothesis 1: Donor support to capacity development is (more) effective when it fits the drivers for and constraints to change***

The evidence gathered during this mission overwhelmingly supports this hypothesis (see also Section 4.2).

In the Ugandan country programme, there is overwhelming evidence that Danida has formulated its Capacity development interventions to reflect the major drivers and constraints to change in the contexts of those actions. The support to MAAIF was cancelled for political and policy reasons (ref. Footnote 17), but it was well known by Danida that MAAIF was not respecting its commitments for change at any level even before support was halted, even if a number of donor-supported projects were underway<sup>58</sup>. In practice, the strategy initially adopted for CD in MAAIF was built on a step-wise process that required evidence of commitment to change before Danida would agree to any CD investment (ex. operational planning for FIPs). The evidence does not support the contention that MAAIF presented any bankable positive drivers for change, or any commitment to reform, and the operationalisation of PSAS took that into account.

The support to the rural roads reflected a number of positive drivers including the national commitment at the highest levels to the development of the hinterlands overall (for political reasons as well as socio-economic ones, as well as the policies dealing with Northern Uganda’s development for security, economic and other reasons). The component was clearly structured to take advantage of the MELTC burgeoning capacity to do research-and-application rollouts, and Danida appeared to apply a modicum of flexibility (i.e. payment for) in the application of various CD strategies. This “best fit” paid off in terms of effectiveness.

A particularly good example of “best fit” and adaptation to drivers and constraints is the aBi component. An innovative business strategy was developed to build on Ugandan entrepreneurship at the local level with the support of the most powerful and forward thinking ministry, the one responsible for finance, planning and economic development. Circumventing the official mandate of MAAIF to work directly in agri-business, and bringing in partners from

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<sup>58</sup> The embassy provided the following clarification: Danida provided Local Technical Assistance (LTA) to MAAIF from 2011-2014. One of the planned outputs was ‘DPs ready to support implementation of the DSIP’. (Note that this is not an “output” per se. By the time the LTA ended in September 2014, a number of projects for the implementation of the DSIP were running – both through (on budget) and outside (off budget) MAAIF.

the private sector including the financial sector (among others), this component has succeeded in mitigating against the constraints to change inherent in sector ministries and in leveraging the interest and existing capacity of the private sector. One of the key historical constraints to working towards income generation in Uganda, i.e. the heavy, unreliable and ineffective public sector responsible for point-of delivery assistance, has also been neutralised by defining a niche that takes self-help (entrepreneurship), value-added through association (ex. farmer cooperatives) and shared risk taking (i.e. rural financing with guarantees provided by aBi), among others, directly to the farm gate.

Strengthening the capacity of the IG, the Judiciary, the Anti-Corruption Court as well as the support to CSOs working in the accountability and justice sector has been very appropriate and the best fit in the Ugandan context with a host of challenges such as state capture, money politics, poor enforcement of legislation, chronically under resourced oversight institutions with limited institutional capabilities and limited public, social and political accountability. This situation called for holistic and integrated initiatives including educative, preventive and investigate approaches as applied in the ACP and UGOGO programmes.

Where CD initiatives did not take the Ugandan context into account, where flexibility was not built into project implementation, or where the Ugandan counterparts did not integrate their CD programmes into the various contexts of the country in order to obtain ownership and the institutionalisation of CD results or where e.g. individual trainings was not based on a need assessment or part of an integrated approach to CD (ex. MAAIF organisational development, support to DEI/IAF, support to individual training courses) interventions were not nearly as successful.

To some extent, intervention design tended to mitigate the effects of constraints (ex. slowly building up absorptive capacity in governance and water, developing managerial ability in the RTI and water, focussing on production and end-results when there is an absence of baselines and data on outcomes in rural roads, aBi and many U-GOGO components and sub-components). Evidence points to Danida's use of such mitigation strategies as a long-term commitment to its partners and flexible results parameters for TA. It should be borne in mind that formulation and operational documents for individual interventions do not contain these types of analyses in any rigorous way, nor do the few analyses that were found go into any detail concerning the context and its management. Context analyses are done at the formulation stages and then not formally updated or even monitored. The comments above are at a meta-level and represent large-scale trends.

Based on the above, it would be logical to conclude that Danida has been quite successful in designing its support to the GoU and to non-governmental CD targets in Uganda in a way that lends to leverage the drivers for change as Danida knows them (see also Hypothesis 3) and mitigates against the effects of constraints. However, there are also areas where much deeper and more probing analyses into these drivers and constraints may have saved Danida some resources and efforts (support to the DEI/IAF, partly IG). It has done the basics to be sure, and in a very complicated and ever-changing set of internal and external contexts, and it has been successful in meeting the key objectives of its interventions to a large extent. With CD objectives taking on a more or less back-room standing when compared to the technical and social objectives, however, research would show that it could have been somewhat more effective; the problem is that it is hard to tell at this point because precise results for CD were not often defined, monitored or evaluated.

The hypothesis can therefore be considered to be valid with the understanding that the "best fit" has to be understood to be at all levels and subject to constant adjustment.

***Hypothesis 2: Donor support to capacity development is (more) effective when donors engage in dimensions of capacity development where external agencies are likely to be able to contribute (not too complex for outsider facilitation) and when donor involvement is found appropriate and legitimate***

In the specific case of Danish-Ugandan development cooperation, the evidence shows that Danida had the technical and managerial expertise to engage in CD within the interventions examined (ex. employment, agri-business, water, governance, judiciary, road infrastructure and public sector management). Expat staff is, however, only posted for three to four years and are not necessarily technical experts in specific sectors. The embassy is therefore to a large extent dependent on the institutional and thematic knowledge of Ugandan staff members. However, Danida has a long partnership history of collaboration in all but one sub-sector in which it is engaged (specifically agri-business in private sector) and was, and still is, considered as a *bona fide* and *legitimate* intervener by their partners. This has to do with its history of long-term involvement, its partnering with Ugandan organisations (participatory and subsidiarity processes, distance with political processes, sharing of responsibilities, etc.).

Complexity has been the defining characteristic in the achievement of expected outcomes; major constraints have mostly been out of the control sphere of both Danida and the agencies with which it has worked (ex: political influence, the weather and its effect on infrastructure, and the pursuit of better and higher forms of democracy in the form of regulatory reform, governance architecture and a disposition to actually implement regulatory frameworks or policy).

Notwithstanding and over the years, Danida has found it more and more difficult to find consistent and capable public bodies with which to engage in further capacity development and permanent change; for other reasons though, it has begun a process of shifting away from public to private, civil society and societal paradigms (ex. support to NGOs and CS, aBi, TMEA). It was observed that “no part of any intervention was seen as being too complex for Danida, (except PSAS)”, and there was no CD intervention that was seen as “not appropriate for Danida, including important CD within the prosecution and inspection services function for anti-corruption action. On the contrary, the fact that Denmark has a reputation for rule of law, fairness, justice and good governance was mentioned numerous times as a reason to want to study the Danish integrity system and to try to operate in “the Danish way” as it has been branded in the Judiciary.

Danida has at times engaged in processes that proved to be too complex and where there has been little traction. Getting a final Accountability Sector Strategic Investment Plan (2014-2019) has been a long and painful process that has taken over 10 years. Danida/DfID tried to push the process forward by offering consultancy support and financial resources but to no avail. This initiative was simply too complex for donors to engage in and donor conditionality, e.g. making IG attendance at Steering Group Meeting a condition for support as suggested by the last Danida review of the ACP II has not been effective.

However, as a general rule it is clear that Danida has been able to effectively contribute to more effective CD because it is seen as legitimate partner, it is a recognised model to emulate and it has adopted flexible mechanisms and instruments to deal with the “complexity”. Moreover, it has facilitated the ownership of the development process by favouring intervention design that placed GoU in either a leadership or a partnership role and left Danida in an advisory function to accompany the financial and other resources it made available.

Based on the above, the hypothesis would be validated.

***Hypothesis 3: Donor support to capacity development is (more) effective when one looks beyond “supply-side” or “push” approaches that only work from the inside in public***

***organisations, aiming also to foster broader accountability relations (the issue of so-called “supply and demand”)***

There is evidence<sup>59</sup> to show that the GoU has responded favourably to the “demands” of its citizens and CSOs in the provision of goods and services in those domains where it agreed with the demands and in areas where it “hurts” the ruling party the least e.g. petty corruption as opposed to grand political corruption. In those cases, CSOs have clearly pushed forward the time frame for delivery (access, implementation), and have resulted in some additional priority being placed in those domains (ex: fight against petty corruption, inclusion of local and district level capability to manage public funds as a means of developing ability to govern/administer at those levels, PFM rollout). On the other hand, interviewees have noted that there are many examples of NGOs being branded as “the opposition” and shunned after advocating for demands that the GoU did not have in its sights (oil governance, environment, farmer associations). As time goes by, say the interviewees, there are more and more “opponents”, a statement that the contextual analysis in Section 2 would support.

There are many examples of how support to CSOs has reinforced the results of support to capacity development of state institution. In the area of access to justice, support to the Judiciary to strengthen the service delivery and respect for human rights has been supplemented and reinforced by DGF CSO partners training paralegals to enable them provide effective legal assistance to prisoners and in general provision of legal aid to vulnerable groups. However systemic service delivery constraints such as endemic corruption in the justice system renders upstream work in access to justice difficult. On a similar note education by CSO is beginning to pay off and public officials at local level are becoming more conscious of their obligation to be accountable to citizens as they implement the different government programs and projects. It is, however, more difficult and there are limited results in using demand side approaches to hold higher tiers of Government accountable.

In this way, the dynamic equilibrium may have been slightly shifted in the direction of the “demand” especially at the local level, and this to an extent greater than would have been the case in the absence of the “pull”. The Government, however, still has a firm grip on State institutions. In the period covered, there is no evidence of the emergence of significantly more formal accountability relationships between the various parties and, as noted in Chapter 2, in many cases this relationship has deteriorated. Danida has encouraged both the demand and supply factors through its support to NSAs, directly or indirectly (ex. farmer associations and cooperatives through aBi, and training and development of communities in RTI). The support (at least as can be observed in the small sample used in this evaluation) has been seen by CSOs in the accountability sector as instrumental: ex: “we could not have done without Danida in setting up a dialog with the GoU on corruption”; (ex. “Danida has helped us organise for, and develop our services which are now regarded as indispensable by those we serve”). On the other hand, the GoU is apparently not overly sympathetic at this moment to the continued pressure to deliver, because it shows that the State cannot deliver; to complicate matters, the next national development plan will focus extensively on large infrastructure projects, with their environmental, human displacement and governance issues, not to mention the opportunity for corruption. Interviewees noted that they believed that Danida’s support to CSOs is welcome as long as it does not put the State in a defensive or confrontational position. It is early days to see the extent to which the CSOs will become determinant forces in policy development but, compared to many other countries, the emerging signs appear to be positive.

The hypothesis cannot be supported as a blanket statement because it is overly generic. The issue needs to be contextualised and specified. In other words, it may be true or not, depending on the

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<sup>59</sup> See among others DGF annual review 2014.

positions of either side, the specific gap between what the “supply provider” is prepared to offer in relation to the demand.

The evaluation team has gathered information and perceptions of a number of perspectives on this issue, and it has come to the conclusion that referring to a “supply and demand” analogy, while simple, leads to reductionism and therefore may be doing more harm than good. The relationship at any time between the State and the People is a multi-layer and complex set of equilibria, and is never stable, unlike the result of the supply and demand intersect that is proposed in economics. The latter can be conceived of as the value of a transaction at an intersect. It also supposes that the supplier and demander (plurals both) are prepared to exist at that intersect. It would take many, many curves to illustrate the situation at any one time between the supplier and the demander in Uganda. And even if an analyst tried to represent that relationship in a very small subset of social or economic or political life, it would be dependent on the relationship somewhere else (ex. the supply of education is dependent not only on demand for education from parents and CSO but on the demands of industry for power dams and the need for roads. On top of that it also depends on what the needs are for enticing parents to vote favourably in upcoming elections.

***Hypothesis 4: Donor support to capacity development is (more) effective when it uses results sensibly to measure progress, correct course and learn***

The cases of the support to the IG and the Judiciary clearly support this hypothesis. With regard to the IG there is not a results framework in place that allows for systematic tracking of the activities and outputs to the overall objective. The overall objective is very vaguely formulated and indicators and targets have never been established – making it difficult for the EoD to monitor whether institutional capacity development actually contributes to the overall objective. In the case of the Judiciary the outputs are pitched in the direction of achieving the outcomes but without describing the pathways that are supposed to lead from one to the other.

There is a certain fatigue with the current demand for measuring and monitoring results. RBM as it is currently being practiced is considered donor driven and it rarely contributing to improving local ownership and improving institutional capacity at national and local level. The Data Tracking Mechanism (DTM) commissioned by the IG is a welcome step in the other direction. The DTM is an initiative aimed at presenting locally generated governance data on corruption and anti-corruption on an annual basis.

Most of Danida’s **CD** projects in Uganda speak to “results” but are managed on the basis of outputs and inputs rather than outcomes and impacts. Moreover, where RBM has been implemented (or parts thereof), such as in the water sector and in aBi, the focus of management in the corresponding organisations has concentrated much more on achieving results than would otherwise be the case. They have been able to step back from the day-to-day and ponder, with evidence, what they could do in order to be more effective or efficient. Overall the evidence points to the confusion between terms used in RBM and the problem of clearly specifying, “what is the CD result(s) we want to put into place?”. Some respondents have indicated that Danida should insist on RBM and that it will take CD to get there. They also suggest that all activities should be geared towards achieving those results (ex. international training needs to reflect specific results and clearly defined needs). The evidence points to the fact that the introduction of RBM is highly contextualised: sometimes it takes years to be able to express what the most appropriate results should be and what indicators should be used to measure not only achievement of results but progress towards achievement. Interviewees constantly asked “but how can we indicate what results we should be looking for?” Many confused productivity and capacity and had a hard time dealing with whether increases in throughput were a measure of

Capacity or Capability. Many agreed that there was a need for assistance and examples to “unpack” these concepts.

There is no evidence to support the contention that there is a “Learning System”<sup>60</sup> in place in Danida programmes, or that corrective actions were based on “results”. There is some evidence to show that there is a learning component in the Ministry of Water and Environment and in aBi, but the evaluation team did not examine them in detail. The evaluation notes and agrees with the EoD that care must be taken to distinguish between the fact that a learning system exists and the willingness of the actors to put the lessons learned into practice by engaging in corrective actions.

Based on the foregoing, the hypothesis appears to be validated. If CD results were employed as a management basis it will help to focus management’s attention towards higher-level performance and integrating the CD and operational aspects.

## 4.2 Response to the generic hypotheses in the ToR

On the basis of the evidence gathered during this field mission, it is possible to begin to address these hypotheses in a generic manner, but *based solely on the case of Danish experience with the selected interventions in Nepal and Uganda*. The “titles” of the hypotheses have been shortened for clarity but they are the same as in Section 4.1

### ***Hypothesis 1: Dealing with effectiveness and “best fit”***

Not surprisingly, the Uganda experience lends support to the Nepal analysis: the more an intervention is specifically designed to reflect the specific contexts and other realities of the problem it purports to resolve, and the more it is designed to deal with the drivers for, and constraints to, the achievement of its objectives, the greater are its chances of success. So in many ways the hypothesis is not a hypothesis at all, but a statement of experimental fact. The Approach paper also lists a number of generic factors that affect the outcomes of Capacity Development in response to “best fit” including the scope or distribution of the capabilities, the incentives to perform, the specificity of the required changes. These are not, properly speaking, factors that improve “best fit”, but are the definition of best fit itself. It should be noted that the field experience shows that there is no such thing as a “perfect fit”. Specificity may be missing, risks may not be defined, and commitment to change may be challenged or nullified, for example. What is required is “the best possible fit at any one time”, and an understanding that this “fit” will change, and needs to be changed, over time, so that the relationship is not so much “benchmarked” or static but is “living and adapting”. This will be further developed in the evaluation’s main report.

Overall, Danida has not imported “best practices” and blindly applied them in the Ugandan context (a strategy that is called “isomorphic mimicry” by researchers and political analysts). Danida has provided ample opportunity for adaptation and flexibility in its intervention formulation. It has not used a “blueprint” approach (note the innovations in TMEA, aBi, MELTC and the Judiciary) and since the GoU and its agencies have been the drivers of the cooperation planning and have had a leadership role in design and adaptation to local contexts (as evidenced by interviews, document reviews and focus group responses), the designs should have been a “best fit”, at least as far as it was possible to generate at the time with existing

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<sup>60</sup> A “Learning System” is an organised set of processes, storage facilities and algorithms that enable a network of users to share and ultimately add value to data that has been retrieved dealing with a common interest or practice. It should not be confused with a Learning Management System, which is any one of a number of software applications that deal with the administration, documentation, tracking, reporting and delivery of electronic educational technology.

Danida policies, guidelines and practices. It has not been as rigorous as it could have been with a different paradigm (for example involving RBM, ToC and enabling environment management, but it has supported relationship building and has enabled both partners to work on solutions in a flexible manner as interventions evolved. Part of the reason Danida and GoU have achieved the results it did in CD, however, was that the expectations were set lower than they could have been, and the outcome definitions were often not specific enough for “organisation or systems-wide” changes to be targeted. The evaluation team did not find any definition of targets as being described in terms of “performance” or “strategic level coherence with national strategies”. In large measure due to its long-term commitments, Danida has been able to work in domains where there has been at least a minimum of consensus on political and societal priorities (ex. roads, water, governance and support to rural poor), and has accepted the development strategies of the GoU as a base position.

Based on the above, the evaluation team would conclude that “best fit” was a positive reinforcing factor for increased effectiveness.

### ***Hypothesis 2: Dealing with appropriate ability to contribute and legitimacy***

Most evidence suggests that donors generally are not restricted by complexity or any other factor from “contributing” to a national priority, unless there is a political, policy or strategic reason to not engage – the support to DEI is one exception. The response from the donor is primarily dependent upon the result of the negotiations with the partner country; an appropriate design that incorporates a common understanding of the terms of the agreement, and a commitment to engage resources and other tangible and intangible assets. The conditions under which a donor should engage are solely a factor of the expected impacts, the risks involved, and the expected value to both parties. In some cases, the expected degree of success is low if the environment is constrained, but the donor will engage for reasons other than effectiveness and rationality.

In the case of Uganda, Danida has been a trusted partner for decades and its behaviour and commitment to capacity development corresponds to the needs of its partner as well as to its values, norms and sense of identity (to name a few). As a trusted partner, it even reacted strongly when its trust was challenged e.g. the corruption scandal in the Office of the Prime minister and, as a result, the nature and target of that relationship was adjusted; in this case quickly and without recourse, Danida did not, as expected, abandon the poor or its joint effort to add capacity within governmental systems to fight corruption and improve governance. For that reason, Danida is still appreciated as a legitimate partner and can not only provide partnership services but it can also challenge its partner without breaking the bonds of the relationship. This is a considerable value-added for development in general and capacity development in particular where one of the most difficult challenges is to bring about lasting change.

Individuals that were interviewed spoke to the real challenge of generating, or at least identifying, a “willingness” to change (CD) on the part of partners. This applies equally well to aBi as it does to MELTC, or G4G or U-GOGO. Ugandans were unanimous in noting that Danida should not proceed with CD if this willingness is not present, proven and evident. Part of this, they note, is dependent on the partners’ willingness to invest heavily in their own CD. Danida, they noted, should not be the one to want the change; that is the partner’s responsibility – with Danida’s help. Tools and strategies should be developed or adapted to find a way to gauge the “willingness” and to proceed with caution (i.e. other strategies needed) if it is not there. aBi could help here as it already captures “willingness” in its due diligence process. As noted in the Nepal country report, some CD investment under these conditions of risk may be appropriate under conditions where this willingness to change is not clear, but where there is some prospect of willingness would materialise. In those cases, much smaller “foundation” interventions should be used.

Based on the above, it would appear that the hypothesis would be validated.

***Hypothesis 3: Dealing with “supply and demand”.***

Both the ACP and the UGOGO incorporated a significant “demand” or “pull” component from potential beneficiaries, stakeholders or society at large. There is however no way to quantify where Danida’s interventions created a *significant* demand, or whether the interventions always actively managed that demand in a way that produced capacity-related responses from GoU. It is not evident that the interventions “enabled” the demand to be channelled and resulted in a changed “equilibrium” between the state and society that was likely closer to the expectations of the people that would have been the case if such “pressure” had not been there. Many respondents have also highlighted that the governance situation would have been much worse if CSOs had not had a certain capacity to hold the Government accountable.

Given the above, the Denmark-Uganda experience would indicate that given the possibility to do so, finding ways to empower society (or stakeholders, or citizens) would eventually require most agencies to provide a higher level of service; therefore, it is logical to assume that managing both sides of this equilibrium would require Capacity Development of both parties. It also assumes that both parties are willing to dialog as a result of recognition of the space that each legitimately should occupy in society. Although this is stated as a duality (two parties), it is recognised that it is highly complicated; interviewees even noted that it is clearly not in Danida’s interest to support CSO that eventually are seen as being the political “opposition”; the juggling act is a difficult one indeed.

The hypothesis is validated with the proviso that it be considered as a highly context-based hypothesis, as noted in Section 4.1 above.

***Hypothesis 4: Dealing with results-based approaches***

Almost every individual and agency interviewed in the course of this mission to Uganda has indicated that their CD interventions were not results based. Further, some noted that the management focus was on lower end: i.e. outputs (mostly based on the reinforcement of the individual or systems) rather than outcomes or impact). Some respondents highlighted that Ugandan institutions (as well as donors) need to have better understanding and application of the entire RBM concept.

A few interventions have established RBM-based systems (ex: Water sector, aBi), but many have not. It should be recognised that Danida has assisted many CSOs to develop strategic and CD plans that reflect an integrated approach and are quite specific as to the results to be achieved. That may be, as one participant noted in a focus group, that “We did not have any choice if we wanted to receive financial support”. The RBM-based systems are as a general rule geared towards upwards accountability to donors as opposed to downward accountability to local constituencies.

Going the next step will likely be difficult for Danida in Uganda because it will require interventions to be formulated in much more detail and will require managerial and behavioural changes from stakeholders at all levels, but it will improve the results of the CD interventions.

Based on the above, the hypothesis would appear to be validated. If results were to become the foundation, then the effectiveness would improve.

## 5. Conclusion

### 5.1 Synthesis on past CD support

Danida's support to CD in Uganda has had the following characteristics:

*Type of cooperation:* All sector programmes (ACP, UGOGO, U-Growth in particular RTI, and the Water Sector) have been based on a long-term cooperation. Danida has been supporting key Government/State Institutions and CSOs in the accountability and justice sector for a long time, which has provided significant leverage to shape the programmes. Danida has been instrumental in developing CSOs' capacity through Danida Human Rights and Good Governance Advisory Unit (HUGGO), the DGF and long-term partnership with specific CSO (e.g. Rwenzori Anti-Corruption Coalition and Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda). The aBi-trust was launched recently and represents an innovative approach to the use of private sector paradigms to leverage social and economic objectives. It has not been in place very long but the perspectives for success are very promising. It is unclear to what the extent Danida's past experience (long-term) has given it any comparative advantage or insight in the formulation of this 'new approach'. The close cooperation over a long time especially within infrastructure, accountability/justice sector has promoted ownership as well as mutual respect and accountability and has also paved the way for e.g. the on-going Government to Government collaboration between the IGG and the Danish and Ugandan Public Prosecutors.

*Donor harmonisation:* Multi-donor cooperation has been partially applied in the Danida interventions reviewed. A large number of donors have pooled their resources through the DGF, which has promoted donor harmonisation and reduced transaction costs. Denmark is the lead entity, which is quite resource demanding (there is one Councillor in the embassy working on the DGF alone). The multi-donor cooperation has implied that compromises had to be made as regards capacity development and TA towards especially CSOs. In the justice and accountability sectors bilateral support to the Judiciary and IG has been maintained, which has been an opportunity to focus on an integrated approach to CD in the case of the Judiciary. DFID opted out of support to DEI but has just launched a big accountability program (SUGAR), which will support more or less all the links in the chain. Many donors (KfW, USAID, EU, the Netherlands and Sweden) have joined the aBi initiative<sup>61</sup> and GIZ has been a partner in the water sector for many years, especially in CD.

*Approach to capacity development:* Capacity development has, in all sectors programme support documents, been understood to mean everything from support to staff, buildings, vehicles, trainings and TA, etc. It is sometimes characterised on the basis of inputs (training courses), outputs (courses generated), intermediate results (roads built) or long-term outcomes or visions (Northern Uganda integrated development plan). Various partners consulted by the ET have also echoed this broad definition. Danida has sometimes promoted a holistic approach to capacity development that has taken the term to mean many things: for example, in the justice and accountability sectors it is holistic in the sense that Government, State and CSOs have all been supported. But the water sector goes much further than that and starts with a 'problem resolution' approach to a desired state and then does reverse engineering to define what needs to be in place – so it is sector-wide and based on capability. The Judiciary has been supported with an integrated approach covering all aspects of institutional capacity development including incentive of behavioural change. Across the sector programmes there is an issue of how to institutionalise CD initiatives.<sup>62</sup> In general, strategic and organisational plans have been the main mechanisms to ensure a coordinated approach to achieve the planned results that ensure local ownership, but

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<sup>61</sup> KfW was likely a one-off.

<sup>62</sup> TAS, *Review Aide Memoire UGOGO*, 2013, Interviews, FGD.

coordination has been difficult to realise. Policy, legal and institutional aspects were integral parts of the strategic plans. The approaches generally focused on inclusion and downward and upward accountability, even if, in most cases, the line up and down was often shorter than it could have been. The long-term and high level of engagement of Danida has created mutual trust and confidence – a key building block in capacity development engagement.

The aBi has an entirely different approach that should be extensively documented because it relies on the ability of partners to become motivated enough to change and to change anyone above or below them in value chains. The TMEA approach, as far as Danida is concerned, is that they already have the capability to execute what they said they needed to put into place and Danida is essentially providing the resources to bring this about. Both of these two approaches are dependent upon Danida's 'due diligence' process, and in the case of long-term sustainability of results, Danida needs to monitor or at least ensure that there is self-supervision and learning taking place. The road sealing technology capacity building programme has been successful and relies on a sector-wide and leader/champion strategy. The technology transfer and learning is somewhat straightforward but the inclusion strategy involving the ministries, district/municipal officials and politicians, community committees, private sector contractors, and the like, was complex to set up and has led to a high level of ownership and absorption at all levels

*Results-Based Management:* Specific results related to capacity development were generally not clearly stated. Baseline studies and capacity needs assessment appears not to be conducted, which could otherwise have provided more insight into capacity gaps and assisted in defining capacity results. In consequence of not having well-defined capacity development results, RBM of human resources could not be practised. The Water sector RBM model appears to be highly developed and accepted by all stakeholders as the norm for management decisions. It is based on RBM and a continuous monitoring and adjusting mechanisms. On the contrary, the CD support to the Judiciary created changes without applying a comprehensive RBM approach. In general results have been generated but with limited attention to CD results and hereby with serious implications for continued sustainability of these results.

*TA modality:* TA was integrated in the recipient and executing agencies in the Ministry of Water and Environment, the Judiciary and in U-Growth. The TA often had multiple functions spanning from oversight/project monitoring, facilitation, nudging, advice, and gap filler.<sup>63</sup> There seems to be an understanding among the partner agencies that one of the key roles of the TA is provide oversight and accountability to Danida. In some instances the TA compensate for the lack of resources in the Embassy for programme monitoring. The national partners are appreciating this role as well as the accessible link to the Embassy through the TA. There are also good examples of how the TA has transferred knowledge and skills (e.g. outcome based budgeting in the ministry of water or how to conduct meetings, write reports, etc. in the Judiciary). The Danida Guidelines for Technical Assistance provides limited guidance on how to transfer knowledge and skills to the counterpart (the so called capability to manage and transfer capability).<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> TAS, *Review Aide Memoire*, 2013, Interviews and FGD.

<sup>64</sup> The Advisory Group placed a lot of attention to how TA is applied in the Danida supported programmes. Formerly PIUs were extensively used for management of the programmes – sometimes with the result that the executing agencies' roles and responsibilities were reduced. With the advent of the 'ownership principle', Danida abandoned the PIU modality either completely or replaced with them with a more soft approach emphasising the 'facilitation' role (e.g. HUGOU in Nepal and Uganda). One reason that the discussion on TA has got a renewed interest in Danida is that the EoDs' resources are continuously being reduced, which limit the EoDs' level of engagement while the demand on the EoDs' services seems to increase with SWAp, ToC, etc. As the level of engagement is seen as a deciding factor for providing appropriate support, one option is that the TA modality is reconsidered to enable a higher level of Danish embassies' engagement.

*Involvement of CSOs:* CSOs has played a role in the Danish supported interventions in the accountability and justice sector in enhancing government accountability especially at local level, improving the enabling environment and raising public awareness. CSOs have directly been enhancing the implementation capacity of the Government/State Institutions supported by Danida, e.g. CSO supporting DEI in vitalising the Inter Agency Forum, supplementing the awareness raising efforts carried out by the IG and the Judiciary or advocating policy makers to adopt legislation that enables the work of an oversight institution such as the IG (amendments to the Anti-Corruption legislation). The Ugandan Government has over the last decade increasingly been repressing those who attempt to question its actions (opposition party, human rights and anti-corruption activists and CSOs). Danida support either bilaterally (ACP) or through the DGF has not specifically focused on protection of CSOs nor has it explicitly addressed the sustainability issue when the lion's share of external aid to CSOs disappear as Uganda attain middle income status.

*EOD's role:* The EOD has competent programme managers and the embassy is in general viewed by Ugandan partners as credible and display respect for the partner. The EOD is, however, resource strapped and the increasing focusing on results and a requirement to conduct monitoring visit in partner organisations is another strain on the embassy. If context analysis, RBM and ToC, along with its inherent need to be constantly monitored in order to make changes to intervention plans, the EoD will find itself in a position where it will need a significant level of effort to execute its part. Until now, the EoD staff has been seen as providing valuable insights and suggestions to the national partners and their downstream stakeholders. Their management support is undervalued or at least not explicitly appreciated because the EOD staff is often the 'invisible' partner in the reporting mechanisms.

## 5.2 Considerations on current and future CD support

This section outlines important elements that Danida should consider in the formulation and implementation of CD support, based on observations and findings that were obtained in Uganda. They are the result of the evaluation team's analysis of interviews and FGD that were held in Uganda, the literature review, the portfolio screening and the desk-based review of Ugandan programmes. The points have been grouped under four headings:

- Feasibility and justification (for the CD part of the intervention)
- Formulation of interventions
- Implementation and monitoring
- Completion

It should be noted that quotation marks used in this section are meant to convey the essential parts of the answers to our interview questions and the suggestions of interviewees. They are used as a literary form, and do not imply that the words in the quotation are exactly what was said and how.

### *Feasibility and justification*

The Theory of Change (ToC) modality should preferably be applied for long-term and comprehensive interventions that are well adapted to the larger national reform process into which they should fit and be related to the national partners' desire for change. In dealing with the issue of how possible is it to plan for CD, practitioners noted that assumptions about how CD will progress should be made and the associated risk situation analysed – based on a detailed analysis of the interventions' context – including governance context and absorptive capacity. Data should be gathered to establish the CD baseline and a CD needs analysis be conducted for outlining of the results-chain for competencies to be obtained. The stated results should be

adequately specific to become the basis for RBM with concrete targets set for the anticipated performance (i.e. results should be observable). The important thing, according to many, is that the CD plan should not be more complex than the partner's ability to manage it.

Many respondents and interviewees noted that it is essential to map what the problem is that they are trying to resolve (another way of stating that the capabilities required to perform at a certain level has to be clearly defined), and ensure that all stakeholders agree to and fully understand the push and pull factors that drive service delivery and its ties to politics and the various forces within civil society in Uganda. The experience in Uganda has demonstrated that CD works best when there is a demonstrated willingness, and a tangible commitment to change. Until now, Danida has counted on its long-term relationship to mobilise that willingness and it has been successful overall, but dynamics change and commitment will have to be constantly reassessed.

Most people, especially those who had been part of the management team of an intervention, noted that national partners should take the lead as well as ownership of the supported intervention and demonstrate readiness to change – which at times may require intense dialogue to overcome barriers to change. Champions that drive the change process should be identified and supported, including with the necessary communications budgets to ensure that all stakeholders are continuously aware of progress and of plans. There was overwhelming support for the principle that CD should encompass the organisation that is the centre of the intervention as well as external organisations that are essential for the overall performance of the intervention. The concurrent support to the IG and the ACC is a good case in point. CD should focus on technology/technical aspects as well as organisational/management aspects. The introduction of the Fast Track Management Tool in IG without ensuring the required organisational capability to manage the process is an example of how it should *not* be done. CD should include planned tasks as well as provided incentives for endogenous CD – as capacity will evolve over time, measures of flexibility should be applied in order to adjust to evolving circumstances.

Some respondents and in particular donors questioned whether there is a contradiction between insisting on an explicit CD component including a comprehensive change management strategy, baselines, comprehensive RBA and then on the other hand the requirement in Danida (as well as in Sida and Norad) to use country systems including strategic plans and performance assessment frameworks of partners.

#### *Formulation of interventions*

The greater the specificity that is introduced into models<sup>65</sup> (ex. ToC, outcome maps), the greater will be the likelihood of the model representing reality, and the more useful it will be for managing CD. Where Ugandan interventions did not use a model (ex. ToC or stakeholder mapping), they often were under-scoped and offered only partial solutions. The experience of Danida and other donors has shown that analyses for CD or organisational change have to be much deeper, focussed and more precise than they have been. Training has been shown to be only a part of the solution that needed to be applied to any set of problems. The training provided must be very specific to needs at organisation capability level.

The success of CD interventions depended on the “accurate fit between intervention design, the integration of all stakeholders affected, and the internal and external contexts”. Thus not only is the context analysis at the beginning of an intervention important, but the likely way the context may evolve over time is also an essential element of programme documents. CD should be

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<sup>65</sup> It is worth noting that these were not introduced until after the four Danida programmes were approved. The comments are not meant to criticize Danida experience but to analyse the potential benefits that could accrue to CD applications.

planned as an integral part of the intervention (as opposed to a stand-alone thrust) and should be specifically designed to facilitate the reform and change process. Many believed that a “comprehensive CD concept should be applied that is dynamic and strategic about time, quantity, relationships, leveraging, and change management strategies”. The thrust of the CD should include the improvement of the processes and quality of outputs – and training should lead to such improvements.

There was some level of agreement that a basic change management strategy should be created and performance benchmarks established to enable RBM. The sophistication of the RBM structure and format used needs to reflect the capability of the partner to fully integrate and then use it. It may take time (years) to get to that point, but it is better to use a “step-wise approach rather than none at all”. Progress against expected CD results should be analysed regularly to assess adequacy of resource allocation and priorities. In fact, as can be concluded from an examination of Danida’s support to the judiciary, it is quite possible to generate significant changes in mind-set and behaviour without a comprehensive RBM framework specifying every step of the way.

CD must support all players, but prioritise those that are at the centre of the intervention. “Many trickle-down strategies and theories are fine in theory but in practice they don’t trickle down to the lowest levels” was the contention of two senior managers who were talking about train-the-trainers as a means of training for knowledge and skills. The details of the mechanisms and functioning of any supported organisations should be well understood, including how that organisation interacts with others; the capability to manage and transfer capability, the absorption capacity of those organisations should also be well estimated.

The use of foreign TA was well received in Uganda as a means of obtaining advice and knowledge. Solid and extensive justification for TA should be provided at the formulation stage in terms of complementary competence contributing to the reform and change process as regards knowledge, useful international experience, analytical and management skills, etc. Most Ugandan interviewees and focus group members understood and even appreciated that TA is also used as an ‘extended arms’ of the donor to assist in various reporting and information tasks and for control of funds. This is however contrary to the Danida TA Guidelines that stress that TA personal should be reporting to and accountable to the partner organization. It is interesting to note that this phenomenon appears to have taken place even if Danida policy, known by TA in Ministry of Water and Environment, clearly states that TA are not to be seen as an extended arm of Danida. The evaluation is aware that the sample from which this observation was made is very restricted in size, and that further validation may be required. Overall, it is clear that Danida does not manage its TA the same way that other donors do; a comparative analysis would help to identify and analyse key differences dealing with impact, effectiveness and efficiency.

A particularly interesting report was referenced earlier on in this report concerning Technical Assistance in Uganda <sup>66</sup>. In that report a section deals with key conclusions on a) the demand and b) the supply for TA in Uganda. The subject of her research was on TAs generally and not necessarily the CD strategies, responsibilities and mandates of the technical assistants themselves. Her conclusions are particularly pertinent in the context of this paper. Selected parts of those sections are presented below for ease of reference in dealing with the specific situation of TA in Uganda. The details of each conclusion have been deleted from this report for ease of reference, but can be found in the paper:

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<sup>66</sup> See Heather Granger in section (Chapter 2).

### **Key conclusions on the demand for TA in Uganda**

- A lot of demand for TA in Uganda comes from donors' concerns about project preparation and execution. In most cases, the TA ends with the project however in a few, where a need has been sufficiently demonstrated, Government has absorbed or mainstreamed the TA.
- Capacity of the institution at the start is important to the outcome both in being able to articulate demand and to absorb the TA.
- In the case of policy support, demand and selection of the development partner are: a) driven by the perceived level of expertise they provide; and b) their access to a pool or network of suitable specialists to achieve the given objective and provide a level of credibility in the resulting recommendations or outputs.

### **Key conclusions on supply of TA in Uganda**

- The process of defining the demand and commissioning TA varies between donors.
- Where TAs take 'front-line' or decision-making positions the outcomes are likely to be less sustainable. For example, project-related TA to Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) supported specialist functions that were not available in Uganda e.g. bridge engineers, but the individuals ended up in decision-making positions instead of support functions.
- Short-term TA working on well-defined, fixed policy output or system development is easier to coordinate, organise and deliver what is demanded."

### *Implementation and monitoring*

Many Ugandan participants noted that monitoring of performance, i.e. results achieved and actual or emerging risks is crucial, but they also agree that it has not taken place (with some exceptions) and that they don't really know what they should have measured and how. The ET found that there were very few baselines established for Uganda, and those that purport to be baselines are not based on empirical evidence but estimates. Periodic reviews – often joint donor and Government – are generally the norm for taking stock of the situation (i.e. progress) and adjusting for internal and external factors including risks, but some of those who had access to those documents noted that they did not always reflect either the dynamics of the intervention, the importance of the constraints or the enabling environment.

Close monitoring and supervision of CD progress in a number of Danida's interventions in Uganda provided valuable information on what had to be done to achieve or exceed objectives. There was consensus among those who had installed and operated a monitoring system for CD (aBi, MELTC, Water sector) that the monitoring had been essential and very useful. For example, it was noted, "we must monitor closely if we are to "step back and change the way we do things".

### *Completion*

Some Ugandan programmes have had a number of five-year phases – mainly because the intervention was from the onset determined to be a long-term engagement (ex. roads and rural development), or because it was anticipated that the outcomes of the previous phase could be further developed and disseminated. In such cases there would be no need to have an 'exit strategy' from the very beginning of the intervention. But generally each intervention should have one, and even more so with CD components (refer to Danida CD guidelines) and especially if it is anticipated that donors are expected to leave a sector or country such as in Uganda in the short/medium run. Almost all participants were unaware of such strategies but they all agreed they would be useful, even if the exit strategy were relatively simple and straightforward. It was clear to those interviewed on the subject that exit strategies are critical in long-term CD interventions and should be better reflected in the intervention plans.

In a few interviews, a discussion ensued concerning the fact that the level of capacity reached at the time of exit is closely related to the intervention's prospects for sustainability. The interviewees noted that "the likelihood of sustaining the CD benefits gained in the project is much higher if the organisation's sense of ownership is high at the time of launching; one should not plan on achieving a high level of ownership *only as a result of the intervention*". Capability traps should be avoided by matching expectations to the level and rate of improvement that can realistically be achieved in the prevailing institutional setting.

In multi-donor supported interventions, all donors may not exit at the same time (e.g. DGF, Water, aBi), but there should be an end-of-project strategy nevertheless. At the time of exit, an ex-post evaluation focusing on outcomes, impacts and sustainability could provide important insights to how the organisation could best continue the CD endeavours; ideally, donors should develop this skill and ability within Ugandan organisations so that the GoU (or others) could internalize the results.

## Appendices

## A. List of Persons Met

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
Martin Bo Brander	Danish Embassy
Majbrit Holm Jacobsen	Danish Embassy
Cate Najjuma	Danish Embassy
Søren Høgsbro Larsen	Danish Embassy
Mads Mayerhofer	Danish Embassy
Charles Magala	Danish Embassy
Albert Bruun Birnbaum	Danish Embassy
Bageya Waiswa	Inspectorate of Government
Nicholas Abola	Directorate of Ethics and Integrity
Paul Gadenya	Judiciary/Chief Registrar
Joseph Opit	Ministry of Water and Environment
Sandy Richter	OAG Technical Advisor/GIZ
Justice Mike Chibita	Director Public Prosecution
Acio Jane	Directorate of Public Prosecution
Helen Mealins	Democratic Governance Facility
Namalika Doreen	Inspectorate of Government
Crescent Babyetsiza	Inspectorate of Government
Kwijuka Arthur	Inspectorate of Government
Mary Ikit	Judiciary /Chief Magistrate
Nabukeera Aisha	Judiciary/ Magistrate
Francis Luwangwa	Accountability Sector
Katja Kerschbaumer	Judiciary/Technical Advisor
Mukobe Robert	Accountability Sector
Abon Muzamil	Inspectorate of Government
Rwerezza J.J	Inspectorate of Government
Twine Annet	Inspectorate of Government
Wanyana Caroline	Inspectorate of Government
Mwanje Timothy	Inspectorate of Government
Munaaba Noel	Inspectorate of Government
Onzoma Appollo	Ministry of Agriculture
Mayanja Fred	Ministry of Agriculture
Muzaale Paul	Ministry of Agriculture

Principal and Staff MELTEC	Ministry of Works
Contractors and District Officials	Mbale and Kumi
<b>Focus Group Discussion 1</b>	
Nankabaazi Diana	Inspectorate of Government
Nabiuye Sylvia	Inspectorate of Government
Bukenya Robert	Inspectorate of Government
Kinube Rogers	Inspectorate of Government
Opiya Robert	Inspectorate of Government
Wandera Doreen	Uganda Water and Sanitation Network (WASNET)
Knudsen Niels	TA Ralnuc
Kaluganbe Tom	Directorate of Public Prosecution
Angom Harriet	Directorate of Public Prosecution
Nalule Bernadette	Directorate of Public Prosecution
Mutabula Wycliff	Inspectorate of Government
<b>Focus Group Discussion 2</b>	
Luteete Mikka	Directorate of Public Prosecution
Lilian Kaweesa	Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU)
Brenda Kimbugwe M.	Inspector General of Government
Claire Ninsiima	Inspector General of Government
David Bisamunyu	Directorate of Public Prosecution
Okoth Thomas	Directorate of Public Prosecution
Irene Akankwatsa	Anti Corruption Court

## B. Program for CD Evaluation 1-13 March 2015

Date	Time and Activity	Venue	Sections and Components
1 March Sunday	Marina Buch Kristensen and Robert Le Blanch arrive and check in at Sheraton		
2 March Monday	09.00 - 10.00 Briefing meeting with EoD management 10.00 – 12.00 Team Session with Jasper Lantern at Sheraton 14.00 – 16.00 U-Growth Programme	Embassy Sheraton Embassy	Component 1: Support to Agriculture Component 2: Rural Transport Infrastructure Component 3: aBi
3 March Tuesday	09.00-12.00 Anti-Corruption Programme 14.00-16.00 UGOGO  Visit to Mbale U-GROWTH	Embassy Embassy	Component 1: Democratic Governance Facility Component 2: Justice, Law and Order Sector Rural Transport Infrastructure
4 March Wednesday	Visit to UGOGO and AC central level stakeholder Visit to Mount Elgon Labour-Based Training Centre	Judiciary,	Chief Registrar U-GROWTH, Rural Transport Infrastructure
5 March Thursday	09.00 Leave for Masaka, meeting with 11.00 IGG Regional Office xx		National stakeholders Judiciary Chief Magistrate U-Growth
6 March Friday	09.00 -16.00 Visit to UGOGO central stakeholders U-Growth Central Level Stakeholders	Judiciary Entebbe	DGF MAAIF Entebbe
7 March Saturday	Kampala Sheraton Summing-up and report writing	Sheraton	
8 March Sunday	Summing-up and report writing	Sheraton	

9 March Monday	Additional visits to U-Growth stakeholders incl. CSOs	Embassy	U-Growth and ABi
	9.30 Additional visits to UGOGO stakeholders incl. CSOs	MoFED	Accountability Sector
10 March Tuesday	Additional visits to U-Growth stakeholders incl. CSOs	Kampala	Judiciary and Democratic Governance Facility
	Additional visits to UGOGO stakeholders incl. CSOs		
11 March Wednesday	9.00 Additional visits to U-Growth and UGOGO stakeholders	Embassy	Directors of IG & Directors aBi IGG prosecutors, UDN, WASNET
	14.00 - 16.00 Focus group discussion – see note below		
12 March Thursday	09.00 - 12.00 Focus group discussion – see note below	Embassy	Focus Group for Central Stakeholders, IGG, judiciary and prosecutors  Deputy heads of missions
	15.30 Meeting with the Norwegian and Swedish embassies on capacity development in general and specifically on joint programme		
	Writing of debriefing note/ country report		
13 March Friday	09.00 - 11.00 Debriefing embassy staff	Embassy	Component Heads
	Discussions and clarifications with EOD programme officers	Sheraton	Consultants
	12.00 Discussion report writing		
	Departure for airport		



## Uganda Capacity Development Background Note<sup>67</sup>

### Country context that may influence success of CD or organisational change initiatives

Uganda is a country with significant economic and social aspirations, although it faces some performance and implementation challenges. The Government's national strategic Vision 2040 document and National Development Plan (NDP) 2010-2015 aims to transform society '...from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years', with the ambition to become a competitive upper middle income country within 30 years (GoU 2012a, GoU 2010a). Since 1986 Uganda has achieved relative peace and security, after defeating rebels in the north of Uganda and undertaking efforts to rebuild the poorest regions. Uganda has sustained relatively high growth at an average of 6-7% annually. Reasonably stable macroeconomic management has also yielded a sustainable debt position and enabled Uganda to make impressive progress in reducing the population living below the poverty line (Granger 2014). Uganda's HDI ranking was 161/187 in 2013, reflecting progress in the underlying indicators.<sup>68</sup> The total adult literacy rate between 2008 and 2012 was 73.2%.<sup>69</sup>

Public service reforms streamlined the civil service. In 1991 the number of ministries was cut from 38 to 21 and in 1992 the finance and planning ministries were merged (Tilley et al 2015 forthcoming). However efforts have since waned, leaving pay scales out of line with the region and private sector counterparts, as well as rigid structures that are not responsive to capacity needs. This has led to greater demand for 'gap filling' by enabling well-qualified and motivated professionals to do the job of civil servants through subsidised salaries. Low motivation and low capacity of counterpart staff may constrain the capability-transfer impact.

Political commentators on Uganda have often lamented the apparent veneer of democracy and reform (Barkan 2011). In the context of a well-documented patronage system that favours policies that generate opportunities for rewarding political loyalty with power or wealth, reforms that reward merit, compliance and results are harder to implement consistently. This has resulted in elaborate legal frameworks, regulations and systems that follow best international practice but that have an implementation gap in their enforcement and compliance. For example, Global Integrity calculates this gap as 51% for Uganda.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Prepared by Helen Tilley, Research Fellow, ODI [h.tilley@odi.org](mailto:h.tilley@odi.org)

<sup>68</sup> Between 1980 and 2012, Uganda's life expectancy at birth increased by 4.4 years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.8 years and expected years of schooling increased by 7.2 years. Uganda's GNI per capita increased by about 125 % between 1985 and 2012. <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/UGA.pdf>  
[http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com\\_content&id=24302:uganda-climbs-human-development-ladder](http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&id=24302:uganda-climbs-human-development-ladder)

<sup>69</sup> [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/uganda\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/uganda_statistics.html)

<sup>70</sup> Laws score 100 out of 100 points but implementation scores only 49 out of 100 points.

Uganda was one of the first countries to receive budget support and enjoyed good relations with donors, who have also provided significant on-budget and off-budget project support.<sup>71</sup>

Nonetheless, Uganda still faces major challenges. In line with its NDP, the Government has focused development spending on accelerated infrastructure development. The need to mobilise domestic revenue to manage financing needs more sustainably has not yet been achieved consistently and domestic revenue is the lowest in the region as a percentage of GDP. Resources for public service delivery are therefore often inadequate and performance has been affected. For example, through stagnant or worsening trends in maternal mortality and HIV/AIDs, difficulty raising educational performance and several cases of poor quality public works. Donor-Government tensions have also arisen, particularly over human rights issues and a number of corruption cases with long and challenging investigation processes, giving the impression of relative impunity. In some cases, this has led to suspension of external support, requiring emergency measures to be agreed to restore confidence in government systems. These tensions, along with shifting priorities among the donor community, have led to a reduction in budget support and a different dialogue with government emerging (Granger 2014). ODA to Uganda has declined from 32.6% of the budget in 2009/10 to 19.2% in 2014/15.<sup>72</sup>

To some extent, this has changed the scope and opportunities for dialogue on CD needs, in some cases increasing the dialogue, but becoming more specific, from a broader national agenda, towards a more focused project-based dialogue. For example, the withdrawal of donors from the general budget support facility is likely to have consequences for the level of GoU ownership, engagement and sustainability where there is reduced use of national systems and may require a focus on introducing specific CD programs to tackle the longer-term needs, as well as filling short-term gaps.

### **Key findings of ex post evaluation reports and approval documents from CD-related interventions**

Many of the initiatives considered had CD as a small part of a much larger intervention. They were selected on the basis that they may have included some training, some system development to allow organisational capacity to increase. There was also an effort to represent the largest donors to Uganda. Most of the documents obtained were evaluations of either specific projects or country programme evaluations. The country programme evaluations were limited in their information on specific capacity building interventions but where relevant they have been referred to.

### **Were the initiatives designed to take contextual factors into account?**

The budget support review found that in general reforms were not responsive enough to political economy contextual factors and that donors should go with the political economy grain rather than confronting it (Williamson et al 2015a). An example of where this can be seen is in the area of public financial management. After being recommended by donors for some years the Treasury Single Account reform took place as the Office of the Prime Minister corruption case provided direct impetus to close dormant accounts.

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<sup>71</sup> Budget support to Uganda may be divided into three phases: the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), Poverty Action Fund (PAF) and Sector Budget Support (SBS) (1998-2001); General Budget Support (GBS) and the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) (2001-08); and the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) and the shift back to projects (2008-12).

<sup>72</sup> <http://budget.go.ug/budget/content/budget-speech-3>

The EC's CD interventions do not appear to have adequately taken the context into account. Challenges noted included 'insufficient funding to local government; the absence of an engaged, informed and active citizenry; and exceedingly high levels of corruption' (EC 2009: 59). For CSO CD the restrictive regulatory environment was perceived to be a limiting factor but most importantly the distribution of the interventions does not appear to have been appropriate as 'the interventions...are overly spread out over too many recipients and will not, in all likelihood, have much of a long-term effect.' (EC 2009: 61, 4). Despite these challenges, overall the country programme had the flexibility to respond to changes in Uganda's environment and this is considered important for the programme's relevance.

The FAO assessment found that overall most materials produced for CD are based on specific needs identified.<sup>73</sup> Most appear to be relevant to the target countries' development priorities. However, no formal mechanisms exist at headquarters to align FAO's approach and processes to country priorities. The report recommended a strong field presence to understand the context. There did not appear to be close partnering with national research organisations and universities to complement field presence and provide local knowledge (FAO 2010: 38). FAO CD projects received a common ceiling which took no account of disparities with respect to the size of the country, its population, infrastructure and institutional circumstances, all of which affect project design and implementation (FAO 2010: 46).

Sida's support to Makerere University reflects Sida's own priorities such that 'excellent proposals for pure and basic research...get...rejected due to them not fitting the development agenda' (Sida 2014: 67). This is a particular concern in this case as Sida supports a large share of the University's and national research budgets and therefore directly influences Uganda's research landscape. Sida does not take into account the M&E structures that the university has in place, instead Sida has created separate reporting and planning systems and procedures (Sida 2014: 66).

Irish Aid did not pay sufficient attention to the risk of conflict and in particular the underlying causes of conflict, despite this being highlighted as a lesson from an earlier CSP (2010: 23).

JICA's rural electrification project did not consider customers' ability to pay and therefore uptake of services has been low and the target missed (JICA 2012: 25). More positively, JICA's project to enhance health care facilities was designed to respond to identify deterioration in facilities in four districts where improvements were urgently needed. The districts were considered to be particularly important given GoU's priority of improving countrywide health services (JICA 2010). However the human resource challenges were not adequately considered and a shortage of staff and the inability to provide incentives due to budget constraints have presented a sustainability challenge for the project (JICA 2010: 13).

**Were the initiatives based on a monitoring framework including baselines and a Theory of Change (ToC) logic? Was there a clear description of the results chain i.e. how each part of the chain was supposed to produce the next part?**

In the past capacity development has tended to be ad hoc, has failed to deliver cumulative benefits and has on occasion led to duplication (GoU 2013: 15). The first NDP 2010/11-2014/15 did not include a full capacity needs assessment, but it is GoU's intention to elaborate on this in the next NDP. A Task Force on Capacity Development is developing this (Granger 2014). Equally most donor CD initiatives have weaknesses in the specification of their monitoring frameworks, ToC and results chain.

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<sup>73</sup> The countries covered in the evaluation were Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana and Burkina Faso.

Many of the evaluation reports included in the FAO synthesis highlighted the difficulty in assessing impact. Most projects lacked capacity needs assessments (CNA) and few had adequate baseline data or benchmark indicators to assess performance. Where impact was assessed, it usually correlated positively with good practices, such as integrating CD into a planning phase, building in measures to ensure sustainability and forging successful partnerships (FAO 2010: 28). Strategies for follow-up and exit were also found to be missing. As noted in the evaluation of the EC/FAO Food Security Information for Action, FAO should ‘develop sound hand-over strategies from the beginning to ensure the sustainability of programme activities, including periodic and continuous assessment of progress made in various capacity development activities’ (FAO: 2010: 23).

Irish Aid’s programme was considered to have sound baselines and target indicators, benefitting from being tied to sector frameworks that were well established. As monitoring was part of the harmonised Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) Policy and Results Matrix it was not always possible to clearly attribute results to Irish Aid. It was noted that quality across sectors was variable and in particular the governance programme suffered from missing indicators and collection systems (Irish Aid 2010: 21). The ToC employs a complex logic with ambitious objectives that can only be delivered through a narrow set of three pillars – this prevented an effective M&E system being designed.

Uganda’s water and environment sector’s capacity building programme is based on identified performance gaps, priority CD outcomes, outputs and actions and associated indicators and targets. These provide a results chain and a ToC (GoU 2012b: v). The monitoring framework draws data from an MIS and the indicators are also used for output oriented budgeting and for the Joint Budget Support Framework (JAF indicators) (GoU 2013). Some new indicators are proposed which include capacity building targets, although the challenge of how to measure capacity built does not appear to have been considered in any depth. These monitoring arrangements are generally appropriate although there is a need to adjust some indicators to better measure appropriate results.

JICA’s support had impact indicators but not all had the desired baseline data so some proxies were applied to measure progress and in some cases no quantitative measurement was referred to.

It is unclear whether EU’s support is based on a clear results chain but it appears that this may have been missing given the weaknesses in monitoring highlighted by the evaluation. Certainly there was no baseline determined for the country programme. The EU programme could not monitor progress by results as there were insufficient data produced by GoU systems. Overall it appears that there were substantial shortfalls in monitoring systems and data and no conversations with GoU took place to identify the weaknesses (EC 2009).

Sida’s research cooperation support does not have robust monitoring systems in place and there are no core performance indicators and benchmarks for all the components (Sida 2014: 70). The ToC does not appear to be robust or to sufficiently reflect reality, as there is only a weak link between research activities and poverty reduction efforts. The evaluation suggests reasons for this including a less than optimal selection of research projects or only indirect linkages over the longer term being expected. Were there a clear results chain and an explicit ToC it would be possible to examine this without having to suggest explanations. As highlighted above, Sida’s imposition of its own reporting structures and procedures duplicate national systems. Many of the reports were too detailed, weak on substance and analysis of relevance and effectiveness (Sida 2014: 66).

Cooperation through NGOs is an important channel for support in the context of the move away from providing support through GoU systems. Although most NGOs that Norad supported in East Africa did not have robust monitoring systems (ranging from missing baseline data to activities not being linked to results or not documented), it appears that the Ugandan NGOs had better monitoring capacity with a strong results focus (Norad 2011a and 2011b).<sup>74</sup>

### **Were the recipient countries the primary designers, implementers and decision-makers?**

The extent to which GoU leads CD initiatives varies between donors. Some donors work together with GoU to define the Terms of Reference and have a joint selection process; others provide financing and give GoU responsibility for commissioning, with approval of donors. DFID's efforts to support the strengthening of evidence-based decision making in GoU has involved support to Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics since 2005 although it is not clear where the demand originated from and the extent of involvement of various parties (DfID 2013).

A high level of engagement and ownership was found in the water and environment sector's CD programme (GoU 2012b, GoU 2013, Granger 2014). This was jointly developed by donors and GoU with the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) sometimes taking the lead in determining the scope of work. This higher than normal involvement of GoU appears to have been facilitated by donors' objective to encourage the use of national systems and to develop a good relationship with GoU.

CD that was linked to budget support was considered to reflect the key decision-making processes of GoU, notably the budget process and annual sector reviews. This incentive to work together through sector processes was provided by the substantial contribution that budget support made to the national budget (Williamson et al 2015a: 44).

In contrast the EC appears to have generally not worked closely with GoU and as it has not been able to establish a mutually accountable relationship this has negatively impacted on some outcomes (EC 2009). Interestingly, the evaluation places the responsibility for the weakness with the Government, rather than considering how the EC could have adjusted its approach: 'as a challenging development partner in that it has not always participated pro-actively within a collaborative framework with the community of donors... there is little in the way of Ugandan-led mutual accountability measures or dialogue' (EC 2009: 67).

The impact of not sufficiently consulting with local authorities was demonstrated by a cross-border project to improve food security through the modernization of agriculture. As a consequence implementing staff had to negotiate at length with farmers on the use of an outside agency and further resources were wasted on inappropriate infrastructure (FAO 2010: 20). The country cases found that beneficiaries were seldom included in the design and policy assistance often emphasized outputs rather than the processes required to ensure effective ownership and outcomes (FAO 2010: 20).

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<sup>74</sup> Norwegian People's Aid – Christian Sports Organisation in Norway – EMIMA: Youth Rights, East Africa Cup covering Uganda and Tanzania had weak monitoring and reporting systems. Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) is linked to GoU systems and has a strong monitoring system through GoU although there were no feedback loops in evidence. There is a results framework but no indicators are specified. Legal Aid Project was results focussed with a clear log frame. Although vocational training support did not have a baseline, results had appropriate targets and indicators. Save the Children has log frames with objectives and appropriate (but mainly qualitative) indicators and targets (Norad 2011b: 77, 88, 99, 104, 114).

JICA's project design was not led and sufficiently responsive to the needs of the beneficiaries. This had negative consequences for the sustainability of the impact of the training that was undertaken (JICA 2010: 17).

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## **D. Notes from Field Visits**

### **VISIT TO MBALE AND KUMI**

#### **A) Feasibility and Justification Analysis**

The Ministry of Works had been working with Danida for a long time, directly and indirectly. The GoU published its national development plan and a plan for the development of the Ugandan interior. Key to the economic development was education, health, access to markets, implementation of the rule of law, and a host of other difficult themes. In addition, they all depended on “access”: stable, dependable, adequate, safe and affordable. The GoU has spent many years in constructing and rehabilitating rural roads but was not typically applying a sealing to the road. As a result the road would deteriorate with every rainy season.

The Ministry (the division responsible for district and rural roads) asked the MELTC (established in 1995) to see what would be the feasibility of using low-cost sealing technologies and Danida was asked in 2000 to support that thrust. There was very definitely “ownership” by the GoU, because it could not achieve its development plan without access. The key parts of the initial strategy were generated by MELTC and a TA was assigned to transform that into plans and programs. Danida provided funding for road construction and for training MELTEC staff. It also supported the cost of training all other players at district levels and for contractors. It helped pay for the module design for training and the andragogical support required.

#### **B) Formulation**

A capacity development strategy was integrated into the intervention, including the initial establishment steps, then research into technologies, then training of MELTEC staff, then pilot projects to test the technologies, then, then, then...

No specific CD plan was created per se but the entire intervention became a CD intervention so the frameworks, result areas and so on for the intervention became the CD plan.

There was no official Theory of Change, but the logical flow of the intervention illustrated the underlying path to reaching the objectives of the intervention.

Although ordinary people from local communities are hired to most of the work, and given that the labour content is clearly mostly non-qualified, the intervention did not concern itself with the development of a “pull” or “demand” vector. If such a force existed it was because of the political players. Getting a road sealed or built at all is a political gift in Uganda, even if it meets the requirements of national plans. Communities are mobilised through district and community associations of all kinds, and training on how to construct roads and bridges is provided by supervisors (district and contractors)

#### **C) Implementation**

There is no capacity development plan or a change management plan, but the Principal is so overwhelmingly transparent and involved that key people at all levels knew what the next steps would be and why.

The success of the intervention can be traced to the following contributory factors, among others:

1. The ability of the Principal to provide a vision and lead the project in all dimensions
2. A solid base of knowledge and abilities from the key MELTC staff who remained with MELTEC after receiving some form of training.

3. The opportunity to apply what was learned quickly on the part of the staff of MELTC, both in training preparation and on-the-ground practicums.
4. The technical and conceptual support provided by a long-term TA that was, apparently, very much valued as a human being (shared values) and as a technical expert.
5. The fact that Danida could fund the materials and other support required quickly through its executing agency (TA), a UK-based consultancy firm
6. The fact that, in a country with many levels and forms of governance structures, the MELTC found a way to constantly keep everyone on board, involved, motivated and anxious to participate.
7. The fact that the Ministry was constantly asking the MELTC to continue its research in order to provide answers on best practices under different scenarios.
8. The MELTC used a business ecosystem approach and ensured that the level of capacity of its own staff was transmitted to ministry and district staff, at policy and engineering levels.
9. MELTEC and Ministry officials received training in Uganda, in Denmark and in third countries.

#### **D) Completion**

- Danida has decided to abandon the Transport sector and is trying to convince the EU to include CD in the transport sector in its next programming cycle.
- Danida had informed the Ministry and MELTC of its decision to leave the sector and, while the people interviewed knew this was coming, they still feel that Danida still has a lot to offer. The MELTC is searching for a way to remain funded, a fact that means that Danida is leaving without ensuring the financial sustainability of the institution.
- Suggestions about becoming a revenue centre by charging for courses are stop-gap at best and not really serious, since the cost of R&D (through the building of roads) is one of the greatest costs and cannot be covered by profit margins in training,
- There still is a great deal to do with respect to policy...for example all discussions concerning road technology revolves around direct expenditure and not economic or social analyses.

#### **E) Notable achievements and results**

Danida has, through this project:

1. Helped to build 14 km of sealed roads (training outputs); about 500 km of gravel roads have benefitted from Danida-supported training modules.
2. Helped to train 360 staff from construction firms and from 56 districts. The capacity is there now to continue alone. There will always be a need to evolve with these and other technologies, but the MELTC can do this part well.
3. At one time, during peak construction periods, over 530,000 day jobs were created with most of the money for the construction projects being returned to local impacts.
4. Businesses are now being started along sealed roads.
5. Schools now operate all the time because children and teachers can cross bridges and use public transport.
6. Every year many people died by drowning. Bridges now protect from that. Lives are directly saved.

7. Health workers say that they now see more people in a day because of new roads and bridges.
8. Police say that crime is down somewhat because they can operate inter-district to pursue people.
9. Truckers say that the roads save a great deal on wear and tear. It also reduces time to travel and makes them get more money.
10. Contractors say that (although profit margins are tight), they don't have to worry about damage to heavy equipment (breakdowns cost money-a lot). They also say that the scheduling of work is easier to predict with low cost sealing.
11. Contributed to increasing the household income of thousands of people through faster, earlier and more secure access to markets.

#### F) Unexpected results

1. Because it became more accessible, land values along the rural roads increased.
2. Women were being paid directly for labour, causing some need for adjustment in the home as to who decides to do what with the money.
3. People have fewer throat and lung infections because dust is very much reduced.
4. In the Kumi region, the new roads will reach an island and a ferry, which will enable inter-district trade and exchanges to take place.
5. Since rural roads also enable trading centres to develop, the Kumi region has experienced some economic growth and building of stores and homes. Taxes are being collected...
- 6.

The Regional commissioner noted (without evidence) that consumer prices have been lowered or at least stabilized over longer periods.

## VISIT TO MASAKA

Two members of the evaluation paid a field visit to Masaka on March 5, to experience first-hand the CD experience with Danida in the judiciary and governance sub-sectors. The following are notes from that field visit.

### Regional IG office

#### PART 1

##### **A) Feasibility and Justification Analysis and formulation**

The regional office had not been involved at these stages in terms of formulation of Danida support. The field manager had been consulted on on-going organisational assessment, but this was not a CD analysis, more of an organisational situation analysis

##### **B) Formulation**

District staff had not been involved in formulation, either of the Danida project or the CD plan

##### **C) Implementation**

The Masaka regional office is among the 16 regional offices that have opened to bring services closer to the people and for the IG to carry out its mandate more effectively. Danida has played a key role in getting these regional offices up and running (mostly physical infrastructure and funds

for staff and support for trainings in investigations). Regional offices also benefitted from the Change Link project – also supported by Danida.

*Results:*

- The existence and operations of the IG is felt by the local citizens
- There is closer collaboration between the institutions in the accountability sector (quarterly meetings). This is also a result of the Change Link project.
- Ombudsman cases are handled faster. Also as a result of the Change Link project. It is bringing information gaps and making the institutions work better together.
- They have started criminal proceedings – and successfully – again after the AC court has been established. Before the AC court prosecution was not effective; after that they primarily went for administrative sanctions.
- The office works closely with CSOs (such as ACCU and its local members). They supplement the work of IG in terms of awareness raising on rights and responsibilities of citizens and they refer cases (advise citizens).
- People demonstrated (in Kampala?) when the AC court was suspended.

IGG is not prioritised in the national budget- needs earmarked funding.

Interviewee says that donors like Danida can help improve the capacity of staff by providing training – specifically, it needs upgrading of technical skills in investigations. The corrupt are becoming more sophisticated (e.g. syndicates) and there is a need for continuous training on new approaches and techniques as well as on the use of sophisticated equipment. There is a need for more skills in how to write standardised reports. A TA should be placed in the regional office- it gives Danida hands-on knowledge of how things are in practice that they can pass on to HQ.

Staff members undergo appraisals every 6 months.

#### **D) Completion**

*The added value of Danida* is the long-term partnership- Danida takes the long-term perspective. Danida stays even when things are difficult (the OPM scandal and the anti-gay bill)

### **PART 2**

#### **Judiciary Masaka**

Met with former participants in the Law and Justice course in Denmark:

The course has been very useful and they apply it daily. They came back as changed persons. It equipped them to work as judicial officers- more efficiently and with more accountability and respecting human rights (of the defendant and prisoners). They understand the importance of treating the people with courtesy and respecting their rights -to behave in a professional way. They now see the Court as part of the community and the wider society. They have introduced open days.

The insight into the Danish system taught her that things could be done more effectively in a simple way. Sometimes they say to each other “why not do it the Danish way”. To expedite things in a more efficient way despite the challenges. The small claims procedure- also supported by Danida- has also helped in delivering quick justice. The issue of respecting human rights in the daily work is always in the back of their heads after the course – a whole new perspective. Now they always think about the effect on the person in front of her (e.g. of prolonged judgement,

bail). While in DK they *really* understood the Ugandan constitution. The alumni of former course participants meet every year- keeps the learning alive.

*The Changelink project.* It has been institutionalised as justice coordination committees. They meet regularly in the districts. Before the Changelink the institutions engaged in blame games and there was no coordination and now they solve the issues and coordinate.

The Danida support has been spot on.

## E. Synthesis of Focus Group Discussions

### Analysis of Uganda questionnaire

#### There were 18 participants.

- Six had been part of a project where donors had been present for more than 10 years, and five more had been in projects where donors had been present between 5 and 10 years.
- Twelve had been on a training course that lasted between 5-7 days. The others had not been on a class-room training course
- Fourteen were coached by non-Ugandan TA, and 13 had been coached by Ugandan TA

Fifty-nine questions were used in a questionnaire. Responses were given on a scale of 1-7 (Likert Scale).

The responses were inserted into a database and analysed statistically. The responses were then grouped by the level of agreement or disagreement with the statement. Mid-range responses were not analysed further. The following are the five statistically most relevant groupings

#### **A) Quite strongly disagree with (Less than 3)**

**Q13** The systems and delegations of authorities that were required to ensure that capacity was sustainable did not receive sufficient attention. (AVERAGE= 2.77;  $\delta$ =2.13)

**Q39** Although Danida financed this project in whole or in part, any donor could have done the job as well; Danida did not bring any special comparative advantage to the project (other than funding). (AVERAGE= 1.94;  $\delta$ =1.15)

#### **INITIAL ANALYSIS**

As in Nepal, respondents were adamant that no other donor could have done the same job as well as Danida.

Compared to what the literature and interviews in Uganda shows, there was a strong disagreement to the proposition that systems and delegations did not receive attention. The reason may be that a significant proportion of the respondents were from ministries that received mostly training and a small amount of other support.

#### **B) Mostly disagree with (3.0 to 3.99)**

**Q2** The design documents of the project (project plans or project formulation) were written in large part by Uganda (AVERAGE= 3.07;  $\delta$ =2.09)

**Q3** International consultants and Danida personnel wrote most design documents with or without consultations with Uganda (AVERAGE= 3.92;  $\delta$ =2.43)

**Q10** I was informed, in detail, of what were the project's **capacity** development outputs and outcomes (AVERAGE= 3.81;  $\delta$ =2.14)

**Q23** The project's objectives probably agreed with the interests of the political leaders (the "elite" and party leaders) of Uganda. (AVERAGE= 3.93;  $\delta$ =2.02)

**Q40** DANIDA used its status as an international donor agency to directly engage in policy dialogue related to the project and thus help the organisation to resolve any problems (AVERAGE= 3.86;  $\delta$ =2.07)

**Q50** Generally, public managers and political decision-makers in Uganda believe that donors should get more involved in "demand-side" capacity development (AVERAGE= 3.82;  $\delta$ =1.18)

**Q53** The project undertook monitoring of all risks so that they could be managed (AVERAGE= 3.71;  $\delta$ =1.73)

#### INITIAL ANALYSIS

In Q2, most agreed that design documents were **not** prepared by the GoU or its contractors. This is a stronger statement than in Nepal where Nepalese officials were believed to have written most documents. This analysis is somewhat nullified by Q3 because cannot be prepared in conformity with the answers to both of these questions (i.e. they are mutually exclusive)

As in Nepal, respondents thought that they had **NOT** been informed of expected outcomes and that the project was aligned to the support of the elite.

But contrary to Nepal, respondents did not think that Danida and the EoD had used enough of its influence through policy dialogue. Nor did it monitor or manage risks well

They suggest strongly that donors not get involved in "supply-side" endeavours

#### C) Clear, but low level of agreement with (5 to 5.599)

**Q1** The need for capacity development in the project was identified by Uganda (and not the donors) (AVERAGE= 5.4;  $\delta$ =1.4)

**Q4** The design of the project was based on a detailed description of what new levels of services or products were supposed to be created\delivered (AVERAGE= 5;  $\delta$ =1.62)

**Q5** Uganda determined the type of Capacity Development support it needed (training, equipment, etc.), how much of it was required, and when (AVERAGE= 5.36;  $\delta$ =1.34)

**Q8** The design and management of the project allowed project managers from Uganda to change (if required) both the planned activities and the way that resources and budgets were used (AVERAGE= 5.25;  $\delta$ =1.81)

**Q14** Today, the ability of staff to deliver the required levels of goods and services is still limited because any one or more of the following are not in place: a) financial resources, b) processes, systems and equipment or c) authority to implement or d) some other critical resources (AVERAGE= 5.56;  $\delta$ =1.63)

**Q15** The project focussed on the capacity of a small number of organisations that directly deliver the goods or services, but it did not include the capacity development of stakeholders in civil society, the private sector or other public organisations that should have been included if service levels were to be improved. (AVERAGE= 5.29;  $\delta$ =2.27)

**Q19** The project always had the support of “champions”, (individuals who could influence decision-makers so that the project could proceed as planned) (AVERAGE= 5.07;  $\delta$ =1.54)

**Q21** Generally, people who received training were subsequently asked to perform new tasks that reflected their **new** abilities once their training was done (AVERAGE= 5.25;  $\delta$ =1.88)

**Q26** The type of CD support that was made available by Danida changed over time to reflect changes in the external influences of the project (the “context”) (AVERAGE= 5.33;  $\delta$ =1.18)

**Q30** The resources that were provided with the donor financing (ex. training courses, consultancies, Technical Assistance, study tours etc.) directly generated new sustainable capacities that were necessary to achieve the project’s objectives (AVERAGE= 5.33;  $\delta$ =1.64)

**Q31** The role Danida played in the project was exactly what Uganda wanted it to play (AVERAGE= 5.34;  $\delta$ =1.14)

**Q32** Danida and Uganda completely agreed on what the results of the CD thrust of the project are supposed to be (AVERAGE= 5.27;  $\delta$ =1.1)

**Q45** The various studies and assessments that led to the final project definition and plan not only considered the internal forces (the “supply”) that were necessary to bring about change (ex. increased ability to perform, management support, development of networks between public institutions, etc.), but also external forces coming from citizens, the private sector, Non-State Actors, the international community and others (the “demand”). (AVERAGE= 5.13;  $\delta$ = .99)

**Q47** “Demand-side” actors related to my project, such as the private sector or community level organisations, actually influence, or can influence, the decision-makers in Uganda (AVERAGE= 5.18;  $\delta$ =1.67)

**Q54** Monitoring and supervision are based on evidence of the attainment of results (AVERAGE= 5.31;  $\delta$ =1.78)

**Q55** Reporting to Danida is based on results (AVERAGE= 5.43;  $\delta$ =1.22)

**Q56** Human rights related targets are based on expected results (AVERAGE= 5;  $\delta$ =1.22)

**Q59** Supervision of the project has been made easier because discussions are facilitated by being based on results (especially monitoring and progress data) (AVERAGE = 5.5;  $\delta$  =1.29)

## INITIAL ANALYSIS

A significant number of questions were located in this bracket. A response of 5 is a full point past a neutral response (4) and is considered a sign of solid agreement.

Interestingly, although respondents somewhat agreed with statements indicating that the intervention had a detailed description of performance requirements and that the CD needs were identified and described by Uganda, interviews and documentation were not nearly that positive on that point; in fact, as in Nepal, we found a lack of result definition at all levels. So the respondents may have had a developed sense of belief in their superiors' definition and management prowess. There was a strong agreement that Uganda had determined the type of support it needed, a fact that was borne out in the field.

Interestingly, reports and interviews showed strongly that there were still important impediments to the organisation's ability to perform at expected levels, the participants thought the opposite. This may again be due to their profiles. The responses were also not strongly positive with respect to the fact that results based approaches were used. Dialog was not done using results, nor was reporting or any management of human rights paradigm.

There was not significant support for the idea that champions had been involved, and it is proposed that they would have known if they had. There was little agreement (although slightly positive) that people who took training were asked to do new things when they returned.

The response to sustainability was also lukewarm. If it had been sustainable it would have been known.

While respondents indicated that they thought that baselines and analyses had been generated for CD and that a change management strategy was in place, the project documents and the interviews with officials in Uganda indicated that this was not the case except in a few places.

Respondents believed (but just) that there was flexibility to change plans and adapt.

### **D) Strongly agree with (5.6 to 5.99)**

**Q17** The project objectives corresponded to the wishes and priorities of the Government of Uganda (AVERAGE= 5.88;  $\delta$ =1.41)

**Q18** During project implementation all, or almost all, of the people involved continued to be motivated to learn and acquire new abilities (AVERAGE= 5.82;  $\delta$ =1.42)

**Q22** Most people who received training, or mentoring from technical assistants still work in the same organisation for which they were trained (AVERAGE= 5.73;  $\delta$ =1.94)

**Q49** By increasing the capacity of "demand-side" stakeholders to better influence the government and public organisations of Uganda, a more direct sense of accountability and transparency between the Government and the people will emerge (AVERAGE= 5.61;  $\delta$ =1.82)

**Q51** Project documents are specific about what results have to be produced, and all results are stated in a way that it is possible to know when they are achieved. (AVERAGE= 5.6;  $\delta$ =1.4)

## INITIAL ANALYSIS

The participants strongly agreed that their project corresponded to the priorities of the GoU and that Danida was doing the job it wanted them to do. This level of response was higher in Uganda than in Uganda where some doubt existed.

Perhaps because the participants were from an organisation that has been in the limelight for years (prosecution and inspections), they remained highly motivated during the life of the project and not only while in “training” or some time-limited event. The organisational affiliations of the participants makes it even more interesting to note that they strongly agree that working with “demand” would improve transparency. This was triangulated in the field through interviews and document review.

Q51 provided a mystery to this evaluation team: respondents perceived that the project documents were very specific concerning the definition of results; in-field analysis showed that the interventions were not, except for a small number of interventions, exposed to results-based management, and all interventions were vague in terms of what their results were supposed to be. The only explanation that we can offer is that when respondents think of a good “result” definition, they do it by using standards and definitions that are different than those of donors.

## **E) Very strongly agree with: (6 or more)**

**Q12** The project was mostly designed to improve the personal skills and knowledge of people in the key organisation(s) (AVERAGE= 6.;  $\delta$ =1.5)

**Q27** While Danida may have contributed resources and expertise, it is the responsibility of Uganda and its organisations to generate the capacity required to achieve national goals (AVERAGE= 6.67;  $\delta$ = .59)

**Q44** If the project achieves all of its objectives, Uganda will be able to achieve some of the key strategic objectives that will generate development (AVERAGE=6.22;  $\delta$ =.81)

**Q48** If donors were to increase their levels of capacity development support to “demand-side” actors, that would eventually facilitate and speed up change processes in Uganda (AVERAGE= 6;  $\delta$ =1.28)

## INITIAL ANALYSIS

There is a very strong response in Q12 where participants appeared convinced that their project was mostly about individual abilities and skills. This is higher than in Uganda and may be because many respondents were sent off for training but were not part of a management team. Q 27, Q44 and Q48 registered the same very strong responses as they did in Uganda. These responses point to a very strong level of agreement on the following: first, that Uganda is the master of its own destiny (so to speak) when it comes to CD. Second, the intervention was strategic and will allow Uganda to achieve some strategic objectives. Third, and more strategic and interventionist in nature, a great deal of support to the granting of more support to the demand side of the State-society equation. This level of response is also interesting in the light of the comments received during interviews that donors must be cautious lest they be perceived as supporting the “opposition” parties.

## Comments from focus group discussions

Comments from the two focus groups have been integrated into one document for the purposes of this report. No attempt has been made to select or modify any comments; responses were recorded as accurately as possible.

The focus groups lasted at least two hours, and were carried out by the same facilitator (Deputy Team Leader) each time. A four-part questionnaire was administered and a discussion followed each part. The analysis of the questionnaires follows the narrative of the discussion.

Care should be exercised when attempting to draw conclusions from these focus groups. Although an attempt was made to make sure that the focus groups would be composed of people who had participated, in one way or another, in a cross-sample of the Danida interventions under study, the reality is that very few participants were NOT from the Public prosecutors' or the Judiciary. This causes a bias to be introduced in the results, even if a few people from the Water and Environment sector and from NGOs were also present.

These comments have been integrated into both Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this report.

The comments have been grouped to correspond to the four parts of the questionnaire

### **Part one: Dealing with how donor support has been specifically designed to reflect the contexts, circumstances and conditions of Uganda**

- Overall the design of projects was OK. Based on individual's capacity gaps
- There was not enough training. We needed to have a larger quantity to things to study, but it has been useful
- Training as a group provided a forum to meet and discuss a number of things, and how we saw them. Difficult to do that on-the-job. Exchange with my colleagues is useful for clarifying points and coming up with decisions as to what part of training I am going to integrate
- Not involved in bigger project, but training allowed me to see were done by more sophisticated models (i.e. Denmark)
- We have laws in place that we cannot get anyone to implement.
- We have fixed parts of systems but not all. It works a little better but not well. Asset recovery, for example, means that the systems are not yet working right, but there is no political will to change this.
- We, as individuals, have changed and could change some more, but we adjust cogs in much larger machinery. The change we have gone through must be offered to the top
- Other training is required but there is no mechanism in place to get DP support, or we don't know how to get it.
- Involve CS with government processes: why are we looking to change and what part of CS has to be ready to accommodate and take advantage of this change?
- The project was conceived well to cut across all the links in the chain, investigators, prosecutors, and magistrates. To deal with what are expected from all the institutions. Share experiences and expose the staff to the other parties and their roles.
- Need more consultation on where trainings are needed e.g. cyber-crime, asset recovery before projects are launched. Need follow up. One training session was not enough. Hungry for more.
- Issues in the enabling environment lacking e.g. the Leadership Tribunal. This can come later when the trainings have given the participants a good understanding.

- Danish and Ugandan seem in agreement on the collaboration and what was supposed to be done. They did not just impose.
- Government and donors sometimes disagreement when funds were leaked (e.g. the scandals in the OPM)
- Danish and Ugandan were in agreement on the kind of capacity needed. Both sides agree on the rationale. Need to stay on the agreed while implementing, which is understandable.
- Support to the Ministry of Agriculture some time back- donors set the agenda. Things have changed.
- In the beginning, donors took charge of the definition of content. Now it is different and they work with us.
- We need to work on prosecution led investigation, but we need to know how to change a whole system that accommodated that. We don't have the planning and analysis skills

### **Part two: Dealing with the role and responsibilities of donors and its Partner Country**

- We could work with and benefit from South-South dialogue. Denmark will not pay for this, will they? Burundi for example, apparently has good corruption prosecution and investigation systems.
- NGO perspective (water sector)- the communities have a role to play in terms of integration, sustainability. Often the capacity is not strengthened at the grass root level. The final beneficiaries are overlooked.
- DEI- dissemination of AC laws- targeted different types of people at all levels. It will take a while to get to all categories- but it is done in phases.
- Do we have to plan in more detail (question asked by facilitator)? It is relevant when it is a market situation e.g. selling goods – need to get all the links right. But one institution can't do all. Every institution has their plan. Need to pool resource and have a division of labour. It is very important to work on the awareness part otherwise all is lost. Need CSOs to work on that.
- When the elites get trainings – it is the responsibility of the Ugandans to take it further. Can't expect to do all at a go. Need to take it in phases.
- Need to share in developing enabling environment and in getting rid of corruption that stops decisions from being made- Donors play a part but the Ugandans take it the next step. It is already happening. Ugandans are taking on the responsibility.

### **Part three: Dealing with supply (push) and demand (pull) factors that ensure that interventions are supported by Government and citizens**

- Wherever the CSOs pressure the Government they are given the title of “opposition”. We are prepared to work with CS if the Government allows it. There is no certainty here.
- It depends on how CS “demands”
- The demand side (CSOs), would it be politically correct to support the CSO, would it improve things (question asked by facilitator)? Answer: with corruption it is the way to go. It is maybe not politically acceptable.
- Uganda does not have a framework to hold CSOs accountable. CSOs are accountable to donors primarily. Government is more accountable – there are channels for that.
- There is not political will to fight corruption. Need CSOs to push.

### **Part four: Dealing with Results-based Management applied to Capacity Development**

- Immediate results are easy to understand because each of us has (or is) one of them when we speak about training. It is not easy to speak of or conceive of organisational results

- Most of the training we received was theoretical and not practical. The teachers were good, and the schools excellent, but we “looked” at how things were done in a context we don’t have, and cannot hope to have.
- RBM- the difficult part is that all institutions are dependent on other institutions for results. Do not have the same indicators of success: prosecutors fix conviction and other institutions fix acquittal
- Collection of results also has the role of creating ownership on the ground. A balance between more accurate results and local ownership (perception based NIS created ownership on the ground).

## F. Briefs on Danida Supported Interventions

### 1. U-Growth Programme

**Country and Danida Code:** 104.Uganda-821

**Actual:** 2010-2013

#### **Overview and Analysis:**

**Relevance:** The U-Growth was designed to be aligned to the national policy framework for rural economic growth. This policy framework consisted of the National Development Plan, the Government’s Manifesto entitled: “Prosperity for All”, and the Competitiveness and Investment Climate Strategy for Sustainable Maintenance of District, Urban and Community Access Roads. Its objective is to be “the objective of the National Development Plan”, according to the Establishment Agreement, specifically its reference to “...continue building a self-sustaining export-led economy”.

Documents received do not specify the extent to which the project was initialised and designed by Ugandan officials. Since the GoU did not have a solid reputation for transparency and good governance, the programme was executed largely through TA and executing agencies and not GoU organisations. The project is very broad in its scope but has been broken down into three essentially separate components. Within those components the business ecosystem approach was been applied in the **aBi** component, but not the **RTI** or the **PSAS**. The oversight mechanisms were primarily preoccupied with financial management and transfers of funds, and documents studied do not refer to CD or to CD results except in a marginal way. It is clear from the documents studied that Uganda needed to develop the capacity required boosting its agricultural sector activities (toward exports). This project should have contributed.

The basic design called for institutional development to take place at all levels. The CD objectives of PSAS and RTI were not met and the results of the aBi component are not clear with respect to CD, even though there are numerous references to training and TA in the 2012 and 2013 work plans for aBi. The documents analysed deal with CD at an input level but show that there was not a CD strategy in place. There was no discernible change strategy or plan for any of the components, and the project logic is essentially linear and bottom-up, although the 2013 Work Plan for aBi notes that it plans to move towards DCED standards, thereby moving closer to the logic behind the ToC.

This is a classic Danida project design with a few important specific embellishments, including the aBi. Other donors participated in (bought into) public sector agriculture support (WB, AfDB, IFAD, JICA and EC for the PSAS). The aBi was co-financed by EU, Sweden, Belgium and USAID. DFID and KfW participated in the aBi Trust. Efforts at harmonisation were undertaken but one of the documents notes that harmonised approaches and joint programming was becoming more and more difficult as the number of donors rose, because donors wanted to do their own projects.

**Efficiency:** The intention of the new phase of support to PSAS in the agricultural sector was to move the institutions to a position where they could participate in a sector-wide approach where the support could be given against MAAIF’s Development Strategy and Investment Plan. This was the wish of the GoU. Unfortunately the project did not succeed in that objective, a result that was entirely predictable following a reading of the PSAS Component Description initially prepared and the Missions of the “Joint Development Partners” including the 2009 mission that identified a large number of weaknesses that were not likely going to be remedied. The ToR for the TA assigned to the GoU are very vague with respect to what capacity is to be developed, but

there aren't any reports that monitor this (that were made available). (Ex. "The capacity development of central parts of MAAIF are addressed").

The RTI component has had some success but has been severely crippled by the decisions of the GoU to apply heavy equipment to the rural roads sector, and to not transfer road user charges to the URF. A commitment to restructure the MoT has not seen the light as of 2013, and the entire road sector has remained seriously underfunded since the beginning. To make things worse, some of the technologies and strategies that were identified in U-Growth planning have underperformed (ex. low-cost sealing, spot improvements and community access processes). The documentation does not support the contention that any studies had been done at the planning stage to show exactly which capabilities and abilities needed to be developed and the extent to which these had already been in place at inception. No change management plan was included in the documentation and the documentation does not support the idea that any "options" for strategic change were considered other than the one selected for this intervention. No GoU analysis is included that essentially identified what CD it wants to develop and for what purpose. The only component that speaks to that is the aBi, but even that is at a high level.

**Effectiveness:** There were no specifically defined capability targets and monitoring reports do not identify the need for doing a gap analysis in the ministry. Reviews point to the lack of data on CD progress. Reports show that both the PSAS component and the RTI did not achieve their objectives and do not specifically identify capacity gains. The aBi has information that shows that there was capacity in place to operate this type of Fund and to use it to advance towards objectives, but the aBi is not a permanent organisation and the sustainability of that type of instrument is not clear.

In the mid-term review of 2011 it was noted that Denmark had been supporting the road sector in Uganda since 1995 and had provided about DKK 750 million. Approximately 60% of the funds had been utilised for public and private sector development. District staff had been trained in the Rehabilitation and Maintenance Planning System (RAMPS) and labour-based construction methods. Small-scale contractors and consultants had been trained in planning and implementation of road rehabilitation and maintenance using appropriate technologies at Mount Elgon Labour-based Training Centre (MELTC). The RTI programme for rehabilitating district roads had met its target but not those roads that were to use new technology. The conflict between MoWT and URF to clarify which of the two entities has the overall responsibility for road maintenance has caused problems of jurisdiction

By 2011, a Manual for Community Access (CAS) was developed under the RSPS2 and RRP and has been ready for printing for a long time. The MELT sub-component under RTI is primarily focussed on CD. And the 2011 review noted that a significant number of training actions had taken place. No mention of outputs or outcomes is in the documentation. A long-term training advisor was assigned to MELT.

No unplanned results were identified. M&E systems were inadequate for purposes related to CD but appear to be appropriate for GoU purposes. No real Danish comparative advantages were noted as being specifically exploited.

**Poverty Reduction:** The entire project strategy is based on the implied impacts of improved agricultural effectiveness on growth (agri-business, roads, entrepreneurship, etc.) and therefore poverty. The documentation available does not support any conclusion to that effect, since it does not include monitoring of poverty indicators or changes on the livelihoods of the poorest.

**Sustainability:** It is not clear at all what has been rendered sustainable in the three components, but it is clear that each component is a separate thrust and needs to be examined as such. The field mission will examine the extent to which capacity has been improved and rendered autonomous in PSAST, RTI and aBi.

### **Overall Comments**

There are a number of interesting things to observe in this project:

1. The analysis presented above was based on planning documents and was only able to benefit from a few monitoring or evaluation docs. The CD performance will need to be examined in the field.
2. It is noteworthy that such an important intervention, dealing with the generation of an autonomous capability to generate growth via the development of the agriculture sector through such strategies as value-added agribusiness, better rural and district roads to enable the transport of products to markets, and the development of innovation (to name a few) would have such a small explicitly devoted to CD.
3. The need to identify what capabilities and capacities were required in the sector (all parts of the business ecosystem) did not appear to be important in the development strategies (including inception reports) and plans prepared for the project.
4. The concept of best fit was not perceived as being important to the GoU, which systematically did not provide the resources, regulatory framework and project support it has committed to providing.

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## 2. Anti-corruption Programme (ACP)

**Country and Danida Code:** 104.Uganda.74

**Actual:** 2007-2011

### Overview and Analysis:

**Relevance:** The Danida ACP consists of three components that collectively seek to balance support to corruption fighting and prevention initiatives on the GoU side; while strengthening the *demand* side from the civil society for implementation of a "zero tolerance" policy.

#### Support to the Inspectorate of Government (IG)

According to a final review, the performance during the period under review was mixed. While performance on programme-defined indicators had been poor, there was improved performance on other relevant and related indicators (e.g. number of prosecutions compared to previous year). Some programme-supported investments that yielded impressive results are not reflected at all in the output indicators (e.g. technical assistance in the form of civil litigation support, directly linked to savings to the state of UGX 4.16 billion up to 2009). Overall, the final review noted that it had been difficult to evaluate the performance of the IG, as the institution did not report on performance or outcomes in a consistent or timely manner. The underlying fundamental challenge was then, and still is, that the IG does not have, and is unlikely to achieve, the level of human and financial resources required to fulfil its exceptionally broad mandate. The challenge is compounded by number of structural, operational, and management shortcomings that further hamper operations. Whatever CD initiatives that were put into effect were much more concerned with individual ability, through training, than at the organisational or enabling environment levels.

The Inspector General of Government had a poor absorption rate due to among others legalities affecting its ability to implement key aspects of the program. Since the implementation of the Leadership Code Act was very central to the national laws and systems put in place to fight corruption it had a negative implication on the development objective of the programme.

#### Support to the Anti-Corruption Division (ACD) of the High Court

The ACD has consistently reported favourable results since its establishment in 2008. The first corruption cases were adjudicated by mid-2009 in a timely and effective manner, and have been effectively (i.e. timely and professionally in accordance with existing laws) since then. The training in Denmark given to judges has been particularly effective in changing the attitude and behaviours of the judges, according to the field interviews of the evaluation team in Uganda.

#### Support to the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI)

Formal progress on defined performance indicators has apparently been weak, despite some early indications to the contrary. The major issue has been the absolute lack of coordination between the key institutions involved within the structures of the IAF and the Accountability Sector. Apparently the DEI continues to operate with very modest capacities, particularly staffing levels and their ability to achieve expected goals, which it appears unable to address effectively.

#### Support to Civil Society

The role envisaged for a strengthened Civil Society in the Danida Anti Corruption PD is a multi-pronged one where CSOs can *provide a demand side to government services, demanding accountability while monitoring government anti-corruption efforts, and raising public awareness while being the voice of the public in the anti-corruption fight.*<sup>75</sup> The Civil Society component of ACP seeks to support capacity development of anti-corruption CSOs with the objective of realizing "effective civic participation" in the fight

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<sup>75</sup> Danida Anti-Corruption Programme Document 2004-2007.

against corruption. Anti-corruption CSOs' effective engagement in these processes had hitherto been hindered by institutional weaknesses; poor coordination mechanisms; limited technical capacities and resource constraints.

This programme sub-component has, according to the final review and the evaluation field mission, supported some useful and effective civil society work (core funding), and has helped rebuild NGOs' capability after periods of crisis. Institutional support was provided to a small number of CSOs in implementing their strategic plans and in capacity and institutional support, mostly in line with management processes. Community-based monitoring of service delivery and mechanisms for citizens to report corruption and demand accountability of state institutions key – activities of the two regional coalitions – deserve highlighting in the context of promoting civic engagement in the fight against corruption. Those efforts are particularly promising in terms of integration in the planned activities and objectives of the Accountability Sector.

#### *Flexible funding and additional initiatives*

A variety of other activities were supported under this programme ranging from technical assistance to state institutions on specific skills or tasks that advanced overall programme outputs, to background studies that facilitated national institutions and development partners in designing future programmes. Most of this work took place in the early years but the final report notes that these efforts were useful for providing direction and consensus on structures. Through its ACP 2004-2007, Danida had attempted a more systematic and coordinated support to anti-corruption CSOs with a view to maximize use of available resources. During the short period of initial implementation of the ACP, it became apparent that the capacity development needs of anti-corruption CSOs at the various levels were broadly similar; and that a number of capacity building initiatives had been put in place to address them. Despite this, capacity to perform in advocacy, advice, service delivery or other roles was weak and almost totally dependent on external funding. The NCG report noted that there continued to be a steady stream of requests for more 'generic' and "individual" capacity development which raised the question of "**capacity to do what**" and hence necessitated further inquiry into capacity development needs of anti-corruption CSOs. The NCG study examinee these issues and prepared recommendations.

Major deviations on allocated budget were made against the Uganda Revenue Authority for failure to meet programme conditionality's and funds duly reallocated to the civil society component, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) and the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity. The Inspector General of Government had a poor absorption rate due to among others legalities affecting its ability to implement key aspects of the program. Since the implementation of the Leadership Code Act was very central to the national laws and systems put in place to fight corruption it had a negative implication on the development objective of the programme.

Documents received do not specify the extent to which ACP was initialised and designed by Ugandan officials. Since the GoU did not have a solid reputation for transparency and good governance, the programme was executed largely through TA, training and executing agencies.

**Efficiency:** There is nothing to compare the intervention with. No baselines were developed, and the objectives were not specific enough to determine efficiency either in terms of time or resources. No GoU analysis was found that specifically identified what capabilities or performance metrics it wanted to develop and for what purpose. Nevertheless, it should still be noted that a fundamental philosophy of the ACP was to provide support in a triangulated effort targeting Government of Uganda accountability agencies, CSOs and the media with each providing opportunity for enhancing complimentary roles around information and experience sharing, referral and complaints mechanisms and citizen awareness.

According to the completion report, “Efficiency was to be guaranteed, according to formulation documents, through investment (i.e. Danida contribution) in process and structural related investments in which internal governance mechanisms of partners and institutional performance were improved through provision of skills training, retooling, and procuring of critical furniture and equipment”.

If one examines the efficiency gains of individual segments, there is some results to note: the ACP was overall able to reduce the turnaround time in the process of verifications of leader assets/wealth, improve the procurement audit process from two cases per year at inception to 54 by close of the program through introduction of outsourcing methodologies and an audit manual. Additionally, the development of alternative case referral mechanisms employing public “Leader face your community” methodologies created an often instantaneous response from leaders.

According to the completion report, “The efficiencies around adoption of umbrella organizations as key entry points for effective management of programs cannot be underestimated. For instance the adoption of regional CSOs as important catalysts for change given their location, visibility and a culture of volunteerism upon which majority of them have been nurtured, significantly improved and sustained civic response to fighting corruption. The underlying efficiency being created by among others the emerging notion of “safety in numbers” and mass action based on populist concerns.”

But much of the above may not, and likely is not, the result of efficiencies in the components and segments, but the result of added resources being brought to bear. They may also be the result of different processes being put into place to do different things than before. There is no data to explore these issues further.

**Effectiveness:** The ACP design provided a flexible and often useful opportunity to shift outputs to meet the constant changing environment around corruption. The steering group and annual review approach constantly informed by action research and dialogue with key accountability stakeholders provided a solid base for effective management and implementation of the ACP program. Investment in key regulatory frameworks, improvement of institutional response to corruption through retooling and methodological, encouragement of civic groups critical in changing the risk threshold.

**Poverty Reduction:** None of the segments were directly tied to poverty reduction, although all were tied to human rights, good governance or democracy.

**Sustainability:** The final report notes that a considerable amount of actions were undertaken in CD during the span of the intervention<sup>76</sup>. Interviewees only focussed on training. It is also interesting that although the said report identifies the inputs in reference below, it does not attribute them to targeted organisations, so it is impossible to tell if they actually succeeded in increasing the capacity of the organisations. Nor does it indicate the extent to which CD was sustainable.

“The report also notes that: “A mapping and assessment approach to determine sector gaps underpinned by a periodic review of required needs provided an opportunity to customize program design to meet partner needs”; these analyses were not mentioned when representatives

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<sup>76</sup> “Investment in capacity building including aspects of organizational development, training, retooling, systems upgrade and development, provision of vehicles, furniture and equipment have been important additions to achieve mandates of all the key partners. The migration from manual to computerized systems and the development of process manuals and policies to facilitate better management and achievement of outputs was emphasized across the whole programme”.

of these segments were asked if they existed. Evidence shows, however, that contracts were provided to firms such as SKAT, Ramboll International, and PriceWaterhouse Coopers, to provide tools and training. The PPDA Audit Manual, the Fast Track Screening Tool, the Anti-Corruption Manual, the Universal Monitoring Tool and establishment of regional press clubs are some of the key tools and structural platforms supported. It is not known the extent to which they are still used, since the people met in March of 2015 had no knowledge of them.

**Some of the indicators for results that were used by the Final Review included:**

**Support to the Inspectorate of Government (IG):**

- Corruption cases effectively investigated and expeditiously prosecuted (DFID)
- Improved administrative effectiveness in processing, verification and investigation of leaders' declarations (Danida)

**Support to the Anti-Corruption Division (ACD) of the High Court**

- Specialised judicial capacity for effective, timely and fair adjudication of corruption cases strengthened (DFID)
- Timely and fair adjudication and disposal of corruption cases (Danida)

**Support to the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI)**

- Improved coordination of ACAs for the implementation of the NACS (DFID)
- Institutional capacity of DEI strengthened to effectively fulfil its mandate (Danida)
- An effective Inter-Agency Forum operating at national and sub national level (Danida)
- Accountability sector operational with a Strategic Investment Plan (Danida)

**Support to Civil Society**

- Citizen and private sector demand for accountability strengthened (DFID)
- Enhanced capacity of non-state actors to observe integrity and demand for accountability at national and district level (Danida)
- Collaboration among CSOs, the private sector and media at national and district level improved (Danida)
- An institutional mechanism for channelling support to CSO and private sector developed (Danida)

**Flexible funding initiatives**

- Flexible funding for strategic opportunities in the fight against corruption (DFID)

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### 3. Ugandan Good Governance Programme (UGOGO)

**Country and Danida Code:** 104.Uganda.81

**Actual:** 2011-2016

#### **Programme overview**

The Programme replaces three former programmes including ACP II. It continues to place strong emphasis on the supply and demand side of access to justice, democracy, human rights, peace building, and accountability. The development objective is: Equitable growth, poverty reduction, rule of law, and long-term stability in Uganda. The Programme is closely aligned to Uganda's National Development Plan and to the African Peer-Review Mechanism.

The Programme has three components:

1. Democratic Governance Facility
2. Justice, Law and Order Sector
3. Accountable Local Service Delivery

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## 4. Uganda, Joint Water & Environment Sector Support Programme (JWESSP)

**Country and Danida Code:** 104.Uganda.

**Actual:** 2013-2018

### **Programme overview**

Following the merger of Water and Environment into one Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) in 2008, it was decided to integrate environment and climate change into JWESSP. The merger enabled clear synergies between water, environment and climate issues. The objective of the JWESSP is: to support the water and environment sector to achieve its targets and improve its efficiency through a consistent, harmonised support programme that is aligned to government objectives, policies and delivery modalities. The JWESSP has seven components:

1. Sector Programme Support;
2. Rural Water Supply and Sanitation;
3. Urban Water Supply and Sanitation;
4. Water for Production;
5. Water Resources Management;
6. Water Management Zones;
7. Environment and Natural Resources Management; and 8) Climate Change.

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